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Corporate Investment and Cash Savings under Uncertainty
Guojun Chen
This dissertation focuses the corporate behaviors in a dynamic world with uncertainty. Espe-
cially, I am interested in how firms tradeoff their investment and cash savings when external
financing is costly. The first two chapters fit into this theme. One considers optimal invest-
ment and financing policies when uncertainty itself is time-varying, the second investigates
how firms prepare themselves against devaluation risks. Both chapters build dynamic cor-
porate theories and test them empirically. The third chapter steps back by asking why
aggregate volatility is time-varying and why is it persistent in a dynamic general equilib-
rium with endogenous growth. I show that endogenous asset allocation between different
assets can be the reason.
In the first chapter I study how firms manage their cash savings, financing, and invest-
ment when aggregate uncertainty is time-varying. I develop and estimate a dynamic model
featuring aggregate uncertainty shocks, costly external financing, investment irreversibility,
and time-varying risk premia. In my model, firms have a precautionary-savings motive and
real options to wait, both of which interact with time-varying uncertainty and are reinforced
by state-dependent risk premia. My model confirms previous findings that firms save more
in cash and invest less when aggregate uncertainty is high. In addition, I show that in the
high uncertainty states, (1) firms with high profitability and low cash are more likely to
delay equity issuance, (2) firms with low profitability and high cash are more likely to delay
payout, and (3) aggregate equity issuance and payout are both lower. Finally, counterfac-
tual experiments show that (1) a model without dynamic uncertainties cannot explain the
observed firm behaviors in high uncertainty states, and (2) time-varying risk premia amplify
the impact of the aggregate uncertainty shocks.
In the second chapter, I investigate the relationship between investment and cash savings
in a special setting: devaluation episodes in emerging markets. Devaluation events are
typically anticipated by the economy but affect local firms in the tradable versus nontradable
sectors differently. Tradable firms expect higher cash flows but nontradable firms expect
lower ones, even their current cash flows are stable because of the currency-pegging. I build a
model to show that, investment and cash savings are both complementarity, because of future
prospects, and substitution because of limited current cash balance. Before devaluation,
tradable firms invest more due to better expectation of the future but have to substitute
for a lower cash savings tomorrow. Empirically, I use difference-in-difference approach and
two devaluation episodes in Mexico and Argentina to test these predictions. I find strong
evidence in Mexico that tradable firms invested more than nontradable firms and save less,
as the devaluation was approaching. Evidence in Argentina is not strong. We discuss the
potential remedies and future works to do.
The final chapter explores asset allocation decisions and endogenous growth volatilities
in an economy with endogenous growth. Firms have two produced inputs, capital and
technology. When a representative firm optimally allocates the investment between the
two inputs, both the consumption growth and its volatility are functions of the economy’s
technology-to-capital ratio. As a result, not only the long run consumption growth is volatile,
but also its volatility is endogenously stochastic. Moreover, after a large negative or positive
shock, the economy is away from its optimal allocation. This takes time for the economy to
travel back to the optimal allocation because of the convex adjustment costs. As a result,
both the consumption growth and its stochastic volatility are persistent. Finally, we discuss
the asset pricing implication of the model and show that it microfounds Bansal and Yaron
(2004) long-run risk model with time-varying volatilities.
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Chapter 1






In the last decade, especially during and after the recent crisis, business owners and policy
makers have had a pervasive concern: macroeconomic uncertainty. For example, in a sur-
vey in December 2012, small business CEOs of all industries, regions, and genders named
macroeconomic uncertainty as the most significant issue they faced.1 Also, central bankers
have worried that increases in uncertainty can aggravate a recession and slow the recovery
by “inhibiting spending”.2 In macroeconomics, a large literature following Bloom (2009)
justifies such concerns.3 These researchers find that aggregate uncertainty shocks have sub-
stantial real impacts on investment and employment and can induce recessions. Stock and
Watson (2012) have even identified heightened uncertainty as one of the two culprits that
produced the recent crisis in 2009.4
However, this macroeconomic literature has so far neglected the role of corporate savings
in the stochastic aggregate uncertainty environment. Corporate savings are, however, a first-
order issue in corporate finance. For example, Bates et al. (2009) document that cash savings
in the U.S. has amounted to more than 20% of total assets in public firms. Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2012) show that corporate savings accounted for 80% of the total savings
in the U.S. in 2005. More importantly, cash savings become even higher when aggregate
uncertainty is high. (SÃ¡nchez et al. (2013) and Gao and Grinstein (2014).) Intuitively,
firms want to hoard more cash when facing more uncertainty. Empirically, I find that when
the CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX) is above its 90th percentile, firms hoard 9%
more cash relative to its normal levels. However, despite these conceptual relevance and
empirical importance, little theoretical or quantitative research has addressed the following
questions:5 How do firms manage its cash savings when uncertainty is high? How do firms
finance their cash savings? And how do such corporate saving policies in turn affect real
1WSJ VISTAGE Small Business CEO Survey, December 2012.
2Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Minutes, June 2009. More similar statements are made in
April 2008, September 2010, and etc.
3See Bloom (2014) for a survey of this literature.
4The other one is financial disruption.
5A few empirical papers have studied the impacts of uncertainty shocks on firm cash holdings, like Chen
et al. (2014) and Gao and Grinstein (2014).
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investment?
In this paper, I address these questions both theoretically and empirically. I propose
and structurally estimate a dynamic model to investigate firms’ behaviors with aggregate
uncertainty shocks. My model features four building blocks: (1) regime-switching states with
different volatilities of productivity growth; (3) financial frictions, including both external
financing costs and cash-carrying costs; (3) investment irreversibility with both fixed and
convex adjustment costs; and (4) risk premia for market risk and uncertainty risks.6 Firms
in this economy optimally manage their real capital and cash savings by conditioning their
investment and financial decisions on changing uncertainty states.
My model explains why high aggregate uncertainty simultaneously increases cash hold-
ings and reduces investment. It works through three channels interacting with aggregate
uncertainty. First, external financing costs induce precautionary savings motive, and such
precautionary demand for cash is even higher when uncertainty is high. Second, issuance
and investment costs generate the real options to wait, whose values increase with the level
of uncertainty. So higher uncertainty levels induce a firm to postpone both investment and
issuance decisions, and delay of one reinforces the delay of the other. Finally, higher uncer-
tainty inflates discount rates, making real investment even less attractive. All these three
channels reinforce each other and together increase cash savings and depress real investment.
My model also generates new predictions on how heterogeneous firms respond differently
to aggregate uncertainty shocks. For example, firms with high profitability and low cash
are the marginal players who are more likely to resort to external financing. And due to
the higher option values of waiting, these firms are less likely to issue new equity in the
high uncertainty state relative to the normal state. On the other hand, firms with low
profitability and high cash are the marginal ones who are more likely to distribute cash.
But because precautionary savings motive is more important in the high uncertainty state,
these firms will be more likely to refrain from paying out. Cross-sectional empirical evidence
6Aggregate uncertainty can have different meanings in different papers. Here, I consider aggregate un-
certainty as the volatility of aggregate cash flow. A shock to aggregate uncertainty will also increase the
associated risk premia.
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overall supports the model predictions. Moreover, these cross-section patterns imply that
higher aggregate uncertainty predicts lower equity issuance and lower payout in aggregate,
which is again supported by empirical evidence.
To evaluate the quantitative importance of the model ingredients, I structurally esti-
mate the model and conduct counterfactual experiments. These counterfactual experiments
show that (1) external financing costs are necessary to explain the observed comovement
of investment and financing activities; (2) a model without dynamic uncertainties cannot
explain the firm behaviors in high uncertainty states; and (3) risk premia are quantitatively
important to match the impacts of uncertainty shocks.
The primary contribution of this paper is to provide a structural framework to explain the
corporate savings and investment activities with aggregate uncertainty shocks. It achieves
this goal by combining two important literature in corporate finance and macroeconomics:
external financing costs and uncertainty shocks. On the one hand, external financing costs
require firms to optimally manage their composition of liquid (cash) and illiquid (capital)
assets. Optimal cash holding problem naturally emerges, as a result of financial friction
and uncertainty, according to Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009), Riddick and Whited
(2009), Bolton et al. (2011), Asvanunt et al. (2009), Nikolov and Whited (2013), and Nikolov
et al. (2013). Such optimal cash holding problem ought to be more relevant when aggregate
uncertainty and risk are changing over time. Therefore, I build on this literature and address
how optimal liquidity management is affected by uncertainty shocks and how firms achieve
such management via financing and investment policies.
On the other hand, a large macroeconomics and finance literature starting from Bloom
(2009) has investigated the impact of uncertainty shocks on real investment and employment.
But most of them either assume a world without financial frictions or focus on the debt versus
equity tradeoff assuming collateral constraints or possibility of strategic default. The former
line of research includes Bloom et al. (2007), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2014), Julio and
Yook (2012), Doshi et al. (2014), and Gulen and Ion (2015). And the latter consists of
Gilchrist et al. (2010), Arellano et al. (2011), Khan and Thomas (2011), Christiano et al.
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(2014), and McQuade (2014). While the latter ones have incorporated financial frictions
from the liability side of the firms, they do not model the liquidity decisions on the left hand
side. Both streams of literature speak little about the dynamics on corporate savings under
uncertainty shocks and how corporate savings feedback to the real investment.
In the intersection of these two literature, some papers investigate how cash holdings
and other financing activities are affected by uncertainty shocks. For example, Gao and
Grinstein (2014) find that cash holdings are affected by systematic uncertainty shocks but
not idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks. Chen et al. (2014) explore the effects of uncertainty on
cash holdings and capital structure. My paper differs from them in that this paper provides
a theoretical framework for firm behaviors under dynamic uncertainties, emphasizing the
real option effects due to irreversibilities and uncertainty shocks. Moreover, I investigate
the joint dynamics of issuance and payout. It turns out that the separation of the two
financing decisions has important implications.
The second contribution of this paper is to evaluate the conventional view that payout
is negative issuance. Conventionally, people tend to think that a firm that is less likely to
issue is more likely to distribute. This view is valid for individual firms or in aggregate
firms are mainly subject to first-moment (productivity) shocks or shocks to cash balance.
These shocks increase the likelihood of one type of financing activities but depress the
other. However, this conventional view is, false in aggregate when second-moment shocks
are important. Positive uncertainty shocks reduce issuance for high profitability firms and
payout for low profitability firms. As a result, the average issuance and payout are both
lower in high uncertainty states. This comovement emphasizes the divorce of issuance and
payout and it overturns the conventional belief. The divorce is a result of external financing
costs and becomes more evident under uncertainty shocks.
Joint consideration of issuance and payout are also explored in Dittmar and Dittmar
(2008) and Warusawitharana and Whited (2014). The former explores the effects of ag-
gregate productivity on repurchase, issuance, and merger waves.7 And the latter looks at
7In Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), the issuance and repurchase waves are positively correlated. But notice
that their measures of issuance and repurchase are different from mine. They use the logarithm of the total
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misvaluation. Both papers focus on first moment effects, which drive payout and issuance in
opposite directions. In this sense, this paper complements theirs by focusing on a different
and importance force, uncertainty shocks, and emphasizes the separation.
Uncertainty shocks are not the only force that pushes issuance and payout in the same
direction. Financing cost shock is another force. For example, Bolton et al. (2013) and
Eisfeldt and Muir (2014) show that adverse financing cost shocks also depress payout and
issuance simultaneously. My paper complements their findings in two ways. On the one
hand, uncertainty shocks affect the financing and investment activities through both the
real and financing side, and feedback to each other. But financing costs affect firm behaviors
mainly through financing side, and feedback to real investment through an indirect channel.
Therefore, uncertainty shocks tend to have larger impact on real investment than financing
cost shocks, holding their impacts to the equity issuance constant. On the other hand, I
show that uncertainty shocks and financing costs are positively correlated. This is consistent
with Stock and Watson (2012), who find that both financing and uncertainty shocks are
major contributor to the recent crisis. Studying both kind of shocks thus help us to better
understand the underlying mechanism of the recent crisis and its aftermath.
Finally, my paper also contributes to the literature on how risk premia can affect firms’
real and financing policies. While there are extensive literature on both asset pricing and
corporate decisions in finance, few has explored the asset pricing implications on corporate
finance, despite of its prevalence and importance. Almeida and Philippon (2007), Li et al.
(2009), Bhamra and Strebulaev (2011), Ai and Kiku (2012), Bolton et al. (2013), and Alti
and Tetlock (2014) are examples of such exceptions. My model incorporates a relatively
simple risk premia structure, motivated by the Capital Asset Pricing Model and variance
premium from Bekaert and Hoerova (2014). By a counterfactual experiment, I show that
state-dependent risk premia indeed play important roles in shaping corporate financing and
investment decisions.
amount of issuance and repurchase, while my key variables are the issuance and repurchase denominated by
a firm’s capital or illiquid assets. While their results can be contaminated by the increasing number of firms
over time, my measures here focus on the average corporate policies relative to the firm size.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents preliminary reduced-form
evidence to motivate the model. The next four sections estimate a dynamic model and inter-
pret the results. Section 3 proposes the dynamic model. Section 4 presents the solution and
estimation methods. Section 5 discusses the quantitative implications of the model. The
model not only explains the underlying mechanism of the impacts of uncertainty shocks, but
also predicts how heterogeneous firms respond to uncertainty shocks differently. Those het-
erogeneous responses are tested both in model and empirically in Section 6. Counterfactual
experiments are conducted to evaluate the importance of the modeling features in Section
7. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Do Uncertainty Shocks Matter?
This section provides preliminary empirical evidence on the impacts of aggregate uncertainty
shocks on investment and liquidity management. Here I describe data and present reduced
form evidence of the comovement of investment, equity issuance, payout, and cash ratios.
The results highlight a novel finding, higher uncertainty predicts simultaneous reduction
of issuance, payout, and investment in aggregate. This motivates a model to explain the
financing and investment decisions under uncertainty shocks.
1.2.1 Data Description
I obtain quarterly financial data of public firms in the United States from the Compustat
database. Cash is measured by cash and equivalents (CHE). Capital is total assets (AT)
net of cash.8 Cash flow is operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) plus Research and
Development expenditures (XRD); the latter are considered as a component of investment
rather than costs, as in Alti and Tetlock (2014). Investment is capital expenditure (CAPX)
net of sale of property, plant and equipment (SPPE), plus Research and Development ex-
8I also alternate the definitions of capital in this empirical session, finding similar results. I choose
this variable as a benchmark for capital because most existing empirical researches uses total assets as the
denominator, and total assets are the sum of cash and capital in the model.
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penditures (XRD) and acquisitions (AQC). Equity payout is the sum of equity dividends
payout (DVC) and the repurchase of common stocks.
The secondary equity offerings (SEOs) and repurchase data are extracted from Securi-
ties Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database.9 These two variables span from 1994Q1
through 2014Q2 because repurchase data became available in SDC starting in year 1994.
Repurchase data are matched into each completed deal and repurchase amount.10 Among
the deals of SEOs, rights issues and unit issues are excluded. Finally, both repurchase and
SEO data are matched to Compustat data by CUSIP number. The construction of these
key variables is summarized in Appendix A1.
Throughout the analysis, I exclude utilities (SIC 4900–4999), financial firms (SIC 6000–
6999), and government institutions (SIC 9000–9999), because they have different business
models from all other public firms. Firm-quarter observations are excluded if they have
missing or non-positive values in the book assets, book value of equity, sales, and capital.
Firms with missing values in cash or investment are also excluded as they are the key
variables I want to explain. To minimize the outlier effects, firms with real book assets less
than 10 million dollars, or firms with real sales lower than 2.5 million dollars are excluded.
In order to reduce the effects coming from new entry, I also require a firm to have a two-
year history to be included in the sample. The final sample consists of 230,801 firm-quarter
observations and 8,258 firms. Finally, I winsorize all the firm-level ratio variables at their
1st and 99th percentiles.
There are many measures that try to quantify macroeconomic uncertainties. The primary
proxy used in this paper is the S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX) from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE).11 The VIX is computed as the implied volatilities from the
9Those data in Compustat can be problematic proxies for active financing policies because Compustat
data include employee stock compensation in both issuance and repurchase, as suggested in McKeon (2014)
and Warusawitharana and Whited (2014).
10Repurchase data in SDC Platinum is reported in the unit of plan. Within each plan, there are multiple
authorization and completed deals. Warusawitharana and Whited (2014) apportion the total value repur-
chased within a plan to each authorization date. Instead, I match the date and amount of each completed
deals because these are more likely the actual repurchase realized. If the numbers of completed date are
different from the number of completed amounts, I supplement with the Compustat repurchase data to
supply the missing information.
11Bloom et al. (2014) show that stock return volatilities are tightly linked to plant-level productivity
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option trading prices in the S&P 500 indexes, and thus they can serve as a forward-looking
measure of stock price volatilities. The VIX is used as the primary measure for time-varying
uncertainties throughout the whole paper because it is the most widely used proxy for
uncertainties in both researches and practices.12
I also extract macroeconomic data from St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED), including the Consumer Price Index (CPI), quarterly GDP growth and NBER
business cycle dates. The CPI is used to adjust all dollar variables to real values. All my
variables are in year 2000 dollar values. Quarterly GDP growth and NBER business cycle
dates serve as control variables in my analysis.
1.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 summarizes the key variables describing the VIX, average firm financing, and in-
vestment policies. The first variable is the logarithm of the VIX in the last quarter. I use the
last quarter value instead of the current one because the VIX and the aggregate uncertainty
in my model are forward-looking. When a firm expects a high aggregate uncertainty at the
beginning of a given period, it may adjust its liquidity and capital stocks immediately, but
the effects of such adjustments cannot be observed until they are reported on the financial
statements at the end of that period. Therefore, the observed investment and financing
decisions lag one period behind the realization of the uncertainty state.13
The investment-to-capital ratio has the following characteristics. First, quarterly invest-
ment is highly skewed to the right. The mean is even higher than the 75th percentile. This
shocks.
12In addition to market-based measures of uncertainties, there are also other proxies for uncertainties. For
example, Baker et al. (2012) implement an Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), which is a weighted
average of frequencies of the words “uncertain” and “uncertainties” in the newspaper, the possible expiration
of the tax code provisions, and the forecast dispersion of monetary policy and government spending from
surveyed professionals. I also conduct analysis on EPU measures. The results are very similar but the
statistical significance varies.
13For example, November 2011 is considered as a high uncertainty month. This will be matched with the
fiscal quarter including the whole month of December 2011, which are quarterly statements disclosed in the
fiscal quarter end, i.e., December 2011, January and February 2012. Quarterly statements at the end of
November 2011 is not considered a match to November 2011 because a firm observing high uncertainty at
the end of November did not have time to adjust its decisions yet. This is also consistent with Gulen and
Ion (2015).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
The sample includes a total of 240,682 firm-quarter observations. Aggregate uncertainty is measured by the
logarithm of the VIX in the last quarter. Cash is denominated by current period end total assets. All the
remaining variables are denominated by last quarter end assets net of cash, which are denoted by Kt−1.
At the top row, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th denote the percentile value of the payout for the corresponding
variables.
Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th 90th
log[VIX(t-1)] 2.978 0.328 2.701 2.992 3.189 3.375
Investment /Kt−1 5.122% 10.493% 0.921% 2.255% 5.354% 11.781%
Issuance/Kt−1 0.930% 15.684% 0 0 0 0
Payout/Kt−1 0.569% 1.331% 0 0 0.423% 1.743%
Cash / asset 16.393% 19.201% 2.339% 8.442% 23.765% 45.474%
high skewness of investment is consistent with Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Further-
more, about 24% of firm-quarter observations have an absolute investment ratio of less than
1%.14 This implies a large inaction region on investment. As Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
point out, both the skewness and inaction region tend to suggest the existence of substan-
tial non-convex adjustment costs on capital. Finally, the high investment ratio compared to
previous literature is due to the inclusion of R&D expenditures in investment.
The next two rows describe firm equity financing policies. Issuance and payout are small
and infrequent events. Only 1.50% of firm-quarter observations have positive new issuance
in the sample, and only 39.23% of observations pay out. This implies a large inaction region
of liquidities, where firms neither issue nor distribute. This is consistent with Almeida et al.
(2004); Riddick and Whited (2009); and Bolton et al. (2011).
The last row reports cash-to-asset ratios. Public firms in the United States hoard sub-
stantial cash, with cash-to-asset ratios of 16.4%. This is consistent with a lot of empirical
research including Bates et al. (2009).
14About 1% of firm-quarter observations have negative values lower than -1%. So investment ratios less
than 1% accounts for (25%-1%)=24% of all firm-quarter observations .
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1.2.3 Defining Aggregate Uncertainty States
I first investigate the behavior of aggregate uncertainty, which is proxied by the VIX. Figure
1.1 plots the monthly VIX index from 1994 January through 2015 August. Large jumps in
the VIX are labeled with the corresponding events. Shaded areas indicate NBER economic
recessions in United States.
One can see that the VIX is time-varying. It is very volatile. In some periods, the VIX
can be as low as 11, suggesting that the implied volatility for the stock index one-month
ahead is only 11%. Occasionally it jumped after some extreme events. Such extreme events
include both economic ones, such as the recent Lehman collapse and the 2013 US debt ceiling
crisis, and political ones, such as 9/11 and the second Gulf War. The Lehman collapse has
the highest VIX value, about 61 and 62, in 2008 October and November. These spikes in
the VIX seem to suggest that fluctuations in the VIX track potentially a regime-switching


















































































































This figure plots the monthly VIX index from 1994 January through 2015 August. The shaded areas are the
NBER recession periods. The value of the VIX index is the implied volatility of S&P 500 in the following
month period, stated in terms of percentage point. For example, When Lehman collapsed in 2008 October,
the VIX has a value of 61. This means that the implied volatility of S&P 500 for 2008 November is 61%.
Figure 1.1: VIX Index 1994–2015
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In order to determine the different regimes of uncertainty states, I divide the whole
sample periods into low and high uncertainty states (hereafter, L and H states) using a simple
cutoff rule. The cutoff is the 90th percentile of the VIX. If the last quarter VIX is above
the cutoff, this quarter is classified as a high uncertainty state. Otherwise, it is classified as
a low uncertainty state.15 I also apply the Forward-Filtering-Backward-Smoothing (FFBS)
method to estimate the latent states and the probabilities of switching states. For details
on the classifications of low versus high uncertainty states and the related statistics, please
refer to Appendix A.2.
1.2.4 Corporate Behaviors under Low and High Uncertainty States
I then look at corporate investment and liquidity management behaviors under different
uncertainty states. Table 1.2 reports the moments that are conditional on different states.
L and H denote the low and high uncertainty states, respectively. The last column reports
the t-test statistics on whether two conditional moments are equal.16
The first row of Table 1.2 suggests that investment shrinks significantly in a high un-
certainty state.17 This is consistent with Bloom et al. (2007); Bloom (2009); Gulen and
Ion (2015); and Doshi et al. (2014). This result could be due to the aggregate uncertainty
shocks as well as the accompanying economic downturn.18
In the next four rows, issuance and payout both fall significantly in a high uncertainty
state, in terms of both magnitude and probabilities. Issuance level and probabilities in state
15Bloom (2009) uses a cutoff rule of 1.65 standard deviation above the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) trend,
which is equivalently 95th percentile of the filtered VIX if logVIX is assumed to be normally distributed. I
do not filter the VIX process because both financing and investment behaviors depend on the uncertainty
level, not the detrended residual. When I use filtered VIX, the timing of the uncertainty states are almost
identical and the conditional moments on financing and investment activities are almost the same. I also
tried 75th and 90th percentile of VIX as cutoff rules. The overall results on aggregate uncertainty shocks
become weaker or stronger but the qualitative implications are the same.
16The t-test assumes that the variances in two states are different.
17If one separates the investment into positive and negative accounts, they decrease simultaneously, with
magnitudes both economically and statistically significant. However, I do not push these results here because
the Compustat measures investment in firm level, which already aggregates the plant-level investments. As
mentioned in Bloom et al. (2007), it is difficult to detect investment inaction region on the firm level. In
this sense, the positive and negative accounts of investment may not be rightly accounted.
18Bloom et al. (2014) reject the hypothesis that high uncertainties are caused by lower economic growth
using natural experiment. But they cannot reject the hypothesis that heightened uncertainty causes reces-
sions.
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Table 1.2: Moments Conditional on Uncertainty States
L denotes low uncertainty states where the VIX index in the last quarter is below its 90th percentile value;
H denotes the high uncertainty states where the VIX is above its 90th percentile value. The heading t-stat
denotes the two-sided t-test statistics for the null hypothesis that H state variables minus L state variables
have the same mean. The t-test allows different variance across subsamples. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
L H t-stat
#obs 209,072 25,988
log[VIX(t-1)] 2.942 3.600 211***
Investment / K 5.168% 4.753% -6.561***
Issuance / K 0.986% 0.476% -6.075***
Issuance probability 1.497% 0.974% -7.873***
Payout / K 0.577% 0.504% -8.984***
Payout probability 40.239% 38.033% -6.900***
Cash-to-asset 16.229% 17.712% 11.291***
H are less than two-third of those in state L. Relative to state L, the payout level is 13%
lower and the payout probability is 6% lower in state H. The evidence here suggests that
uncertainty shocks may have a large impact on financing decisions.
The simultaneous reduction in issuance and payout also challenges the conventional
belief that they are two opposite transactions and are likely to be negatively correlated.
In later sections, I will show that these reductions are the results from the interaction of
the real options effects, a precautionary-savings motive, and higher risk premia in the high
uncertainty states. And the positive comovement between issuance and payout is a signature
of the interaction of uncertainty shocks and financing costs.
The last row is the cash-to-asset ratio. Consistent with Gao and Grinstein (2014), cash
holdings are higher in high aggregate uncertainty states. The table seems to suggest that
firms become more cautious and demand more money when aggregate uncertainty is high.
My results here add to the existing literature on financing policies, and suggest that
positive aggregate uncertainty shocks not only reduce investment, but also predict lower
financing activities including both equity issuance and payout.
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1.2.5 Panel Data Regressions
In this subsection I present the empirical evidence of the differential firm policies under
different uncertainty states with fixed effect regressions. These fixed effect regressions not
only control for firm-level time-invariant heterogeneities, but also for additional control
variables that might affect financing and investment policies. The results are very similar
to conditional moment results: higher VIX predicts lower equity issuance, payout, and
investment. It also predicts higher cash holdings in the next quarter.
In this analysis, control variables include the following: lag cash-to-capital ratio, lag
cash-flow-to-capital ratio, logarithm of firm’s size at the end of last quarter, firm age, lag
book leverage, last quarterly real GDP growth, dummy of time after 2003 May, and lag
average Q. Lag of cash to non-cash asset ratio is included because in a world with financial
frictions, the cash balance at the beginning of the period may affect the end of period
balance. Cash flows are included to control for productivity or demand shocks. Firm size
and age are included to control for financing costs, following Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
Book leverage is included to control for potential debt overhang problems. Last quarter
real GDP growth is to isolate the aggregate first moment effects. A dummy that indicates
time after 2003 May is also included, to take into account the impact of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 on payout and liquidity policies. Lag average
Q is included in the investment equation because in traditional q theory it is a proxy for
investment opportunities. Finally, quarterly time trends, seasonal dummies, and firm fixed
effects are included; coefficient standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarters.
Table 1.3 presents the regression results.19 The first column suggests that average firm
investment is lower in state H than in state L, by 0.47% of non-cash assets. This is a more
than 8% decrease of investment from its L-state level of 5.76%. This finding corroborates
the results in Bloom (2009); Bloom et al. (2014); Chen et al. (2014); and Gulen and Ion
19For levels of issuance and payout, I also try Tobit with lower bound 0. These regression methods include
control variables but not fixed effects as Tobit has no fixed-effect model. The effects of aggregate uncertainty
are much stronger. For issuance and payout probabilities, I try fixed-effect Logit. The effects of aggregate
uncertainty are more statistically and economically significant.
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(2015).
In column (2), the difference of issuance-to-capital ratio between two states is 0.54%,
which is about 44% of the issuance-to-capital ratio in state L. Column (3) confirms this
effect, by looking at the response in the probability of equity issuance. Moving from a low
to high uncertainty state, a firm reduces issuance probability by 0.39 percentage point, about
one-third of its L-state value.
Table 1.3: Panel Data Regressions
H is a dummy variable that is 1 if the average VIX index in the last 3 months exceeds the 90th percentile of the
sample. Net issuance is equity issuance net of payout. Control variables include lag of cash-to-capital ratios,
lag of sales-to-capital ratios, log book size of assets, firm age, lag of book leverage, lag quarterly real GDP
growth, dummy of time after 2003 May, lag average Q, time trend, and seasonal dummies. All regressions
are fixed effect regressions with two-way clustered standard errors over firm and quarter level. Standard
errors are in round parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All coefficient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[coef×100] Investment Issuance Iss. prob. Payout Pay. prob. Net issuance Cash
H -0.472*** -0.540*** -0.387*** -0.053*** -1.356*** -0.487*** 0.670***
(0.057) (0.099) (0.084) (0.009) (0.294) (0.099) (0.071)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.135 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.023 0.005 0.368
# Obs 228,175 230,801 230,801 230,801 230,801 230,801 230,801
# Firms 8,235 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258
The next two columns explore the impact of uncertainty on amount and probability
of equity payout, including both dividend payout and repurchase. The payout is lower in
state H than in state L, by 0.05% of non-cash assets. Although this number seems small, it
accounts for more than 9% of the payout in low uncertainty quarters. So it is economically
significant. Payout probabilities are 1.4 percentage points lower in state H than in state L,
where are both economically and statistically significant.
Column (6) reports the result for net issuance, which is equity issuance net of payout.
Both issuance and payout shrink, and issuance reduces even more than payout. As a re-
sult, the overall effects of uncertainty shocks are negative and significant. However, these
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results prompt a caveat on the usage of net issuance to summarize two different financing
activities.20 Although conventional views suggest that issuance and payout have different
directions of cash flows in the cash account, they are two financing decisions at different
margins. The fact that a firm reduces issuance may not suggest that it is more likely to dis-
tribute. This becomes evident in an environment with different uncertainty states. One can
see that by juxtaposing regression results (1) through (5): aggregate issuance and payout can
both shrink on positive uncertainty shocks simultaneously. This challenges the conventional
view that payout is negative issuance.
The last column describes the response of cash holdings (cash-to-asset ratios) to uncer-
tainty shocks. Switching from a low to high uncertainty state, US public firms see a 0.67%
increase in cash holdings. This is consistent with Gao and Grinstein (2014), which shows
that an increase in realized aggregate volatility induces firms to save more.
Overall, both evidence in conditional moments and panel data regressions suggest that
time-varying aggregate uncertainty has significant effects on firm financing and investment
activities. High uncertainty depresses equity issuance, payout, and investment simultane-
ously. However, no theory has taken account of this comovement of financing and investment
policies. The mechanism of this observed response is not investigated, and the potential im-
pacts are not quantified. Therefore, I propose a dynamic model and structurally estimate it
in the following sections.
1.3 A Model with Financial Frictions and Uncertainty Shocks
This section develops a discrete-time dynamic model of a representative firm. I add three
new ingredients onto an otherwise standard q-theory model of investment: (1) two regime-
switching states with different volatilities; (2) financial frictions, which consist of both the
external financing costs and the cash-carrying costs; and (3) risk premia for productivity risk
and regime-switching risk. This model provides a framework for analyzing firm financing
20Recent usage of net issuance includes Eisfeldt and Muir (2014) and Belo et al. (2014). Both papers try
to use net issuance to infer aggregate financing costs or activities.
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and investment under uncertainty shocks. I first describe a representative firm’s production
technology and aggregate uncertainty states. I then present its balance sheet and statement
of cash flows. Financial frictions and the pricing of risk are next. Lastly, I put them all
together and describe the firm’s objective function.
1.3.1 Production technology and uncertainty states
The representative firm generates operating revenue in terms of final product by combining
technology and productive capital stock,
Π = ZKα .
Here Π denotes the operating revenue, Z is technology or productivity of capital.21 K is
capital stock. α captures the curvature of production function.
The logarithm of productivity Z follows a random walk with drift and time-varying
volatilities,





In the above equation and throughout the whole paper, the superscript ′ is used to denote the
next period variables. Here, subscript s indicates the uncertainty states: s = H denotes high
uncertainty state and s = L means low uncertainty state. µs is the conditional productivity
growth rate. σs is the state-dependent total volatility of productivity growth, σH > σL.
ε′ denotes the total shocks to firm productivity growth and is assumed to be identically
and independently distributed with normal distribution over time. It can have arbitrary
correlation with the aggregate cash flow shocks ε′a. The Jensen correction term, −12σ
2
s ,
keeps the mean of marginal product of capital αZKα−1 invariant to the levels of uncertainty
except the conditional growth rate µs.
The uncertainty states s ∈ {L,H} are the first new ingredient of my model. They follow
21In a more general sense, it can incorporate both the supply side shocks (like productivity shocks) and
demand side shocks, as in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2014). In this case, a more appropriate name is
business condition. But technology is a more familiar term in the literature.
17








 pL 1− pL
1− pH pH
 . (1.2)
Here ps denotes the probability of staying in the same state starting from state s. As in
Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2014), I assume that both aggregate and idiosyncratic
uncertainty rise and fall at the same time, so a single regime-swtiching process determines
both the aggregate and idiosyncratic regimes.
This two-state Markov process is a simple but flexible way to model a time-varying
uncertainties. On the one hand, one can interpret these regime-switching states as jumps
in volatilities. This interpretation is consistent with Bloom (2009), who finds strong evi-
dence that stock-market volatility has jumps.22 A typical example is the Lehman Brother
bankruptcy raised the value of VIX index from around 20 in August to 60-80 in October
2008. On the other hand, this method also accommodates other stationary processes like
autoregressive processes, by the approximation technique introduced by Tauchen (1986).
For example, Eisfeldt and Muir (2014) use two-state Markov chain to capture an autore-
gressive process of linear financing costs. In the context of uncertainty shocks, both jump
and autoregressive components exist and I use this simple specification to capture both.
Nonetheless, it is flexible to extend the two-state process to include more states to capture
more complicated dynamics.
1.3.2 Balance sheet
My model relates tightly to the actual accounting system of a firm. Table 1.4 presents a
representative firm’s balance sheet in book values. On the asset side of the balance sheet,
a firm has two types of assets, cash W and capital stock K. The differences between these
two assets are their liquidity and return. Cash is liquid as it can be freely converted from/to
22See the Appendix A.1 in Bloom (2009), which rejects the null of no jump around 2% significance in
volatility index data using the methods proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006). I re-run such
tests with the updated data and find similar results.
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final products and readily distributed to shareholders. Capital stock is illiquid, because
it demands an adjustment costs to convert to/from final products, which are also called
technological irreversibilities. Cash earns a constant return rW and capital stock generates
real output per quarter.





The evolutions of cash and capital stock are as follows. Cash is accumulated through
the net cash flows generated by the firm. The latter can be classified as cash flows from
operating, investing, and financing activities, which will be detailed in the statement of cash
flows. The cash evolution is
W ′ −W = CFOP + CFINV + CFFIN . (1.3)
Capital stock depreciates over time and is replenished by new investment. It evolves
according to
K ′ = (1− δ)K + I . (1.4)
Here δ ≥ 0 is the depreciation rate of capital. I is gross investment rate of capital.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, a firm has book equity W + K. A firm in
my model is not allowed to finance through debt. This assumption not only simplifies my
model and but also narrows the focus on firm financing decisions on the equity issuance and
payout around uncertainty shocks. The latter is the emphasis of this paper and is relatively
under-explored compared to capital structure decisions.23
23This assumption narrows my model application as it cannot explain what happen to capital structure
around uncertainty shocks. Readers interested in capital structure decisions around uncertainty shocks can
refer to McQuade (2014) and Chen et al. (2014).
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1.3.3 Statement of cash flows
As in a standard statement of cash flows, a firm’s cash flows are classified into three sources,
net cash flows from operating, investing, and financing. They are discussed separately in
the following paragraphs.
Cash flows from operating activities Cash flows from operating activities after tax
are assumed to be
CFOP = ZK
α + rWW . (1.5)
This is the sum of after-tax profits from production and return on cash. Here rW is return
on cash.
Cash flows from investing activities Cash flows from investing activities are a standard
one from q-theory model, It has a fixed cost component and a quadratic cost component,
CFINV = −
(






Here, i is the investment-to-capital ratio. ξ0 is the fixed cost parameter, which is paid when
investment is not zero. ξ2 > 0 is the convex adjustment cost parameter of investment. All
those costs are assumed to be proportional to K for tractability.24
Cash flows from financing activities Cash flows from financing activities is the firm’s
net issuance F minus payout D,
CFFIN = F −D . (1.7)
Payout D here includes both dividend payment and repurchase, as my model does not
distinguish between them. The CFFIN itself will be the net issuance measure commonly
used in the empirical literature. A positive number of net issuance means a firm is issuing
24I also try including a fire-sale discount in the adjustment cost structure. It does not affect the estimation
results.
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new equities; while a negative number indicates payout to the existing shareholders, either
through dividends or stock repurchases. In my model, a firm never pays out and issues
simultaneously.
1.3.4 Financial frictions
The financial frictions in this economy consist of two parts. One is the external financing
costs, which is imposed on existing shareholders when raising new equities; the other is
cash-carrying costs.
When a firm issues new equities, i.e, F > 0, the existing shareholders have to give up
stake in book value of F to the new shareholders. In addition to that, the issuance itself
imposes costs to the existing shareholders. Such financing costs in reality are captured by
underwriting fees and adverse response of share prices after new issuance announcement,
with the latter being a majority part. I assume that the financing costs are25
1{F>0} (λ0K + λ1sF )
Here λ0 > 0 are the fixed cost parameters of equity issuance; and λ1s > 0 are the linear
financing cost parameters. s here denotes the uncertainty states. I allow the linear financing
costs to be dependent on the aggregate uncertainty state. This is motivated by the obser-
vation that during high uncertainty states, financing costs tend to be high. For empirical
evidence of this dependency, please refer to Appendix A.5.
The cash-carrying costs capture the idea that cash has a lower return than risk-free rate,
i.e.,
rW < r .
25The financing costs are directly imposed on the value of the existing shareholders, instead of a subtraction
from the financing cash flows. The former is adopted in Riddick and Whited (2009), Bolton et al. (2011),
Bolton et al. (2013), and Eisfeldt and Muir (2014); while the latter is used in Warusawitharana and Whited
(2014). I choose this structure of financing costs because the indirect costs, consisting of the negative
response of the share prices following the issuance announcement, are much more substantial for the existing
shareholders than the direct costs, which are gross spread, or underwriting fees.
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Because of this lower return of cash, a firm will have incentive to distribute its cash back
to the shareholders when the cash balance is sufficiently high. There are three observations
that motivate the carry costs of cash. The first are tax disadvantages on interest earned on
cash, which reduce the interest earned on cash by some tax rate, usually lower than the tax
rate on firm revenues (See Riddick and Whited (2009)). The second one are the convenience
yield, a wedges between return on the cash holdings and the cost of capital, motivated by
Azar et al. (2014). Finally, holding cash may have agency costs. Such agency costs include
moral hazard problems, like free cash flow pointed out by Jensen (1986), or the adverse
selection problems identified by Myers and Majluf (1984). All these suggest that cash inside
firm has an inferior return than risk-free assets.
1.3.5 The pricing of risks
The pricing of risk in this economy is captured by an exogenously given stochastic discount
factor (SDF hereafter). The SDF has the following structure
Ms,s′ = exp
(
− ln (1 + rs)−
1
2
η2 − ηε′a − Γs,s′
)
. (1.8)
where η is the constant market price of risk. ε′a is the same aggregate cash flow shock as
in the business condition equation. These terms are standard in many asset pricing models
including Bansal and Yaron (2004). Γs,s′ is the price of regime shift risk, with the following
properties26:
ΓLL, ΓHL ≥ 0 ,
ΓLH , ΓHH ≤ 0 .
These assumptions basically say that agents in this economy dislike the high uncertainty
state H, so marginal value of 1 dollar in the low uncertainty state L is higher than that
in the H state, whichever their current state is. For example, if one expects the economy




will switch from L to H, one dollar now is worth exp (−ΓLH) > 1 in the future. Such
specification is consistent with Dai et al. (2007) and Chen (2010).
The risk of regime shift here can be motivated by the variance risk premia, which is the
difference between implied and expected variance. The addition of variance risk premia is
new to the uncertainty shock literature in Macroeconomics27 and is based on two considera-
tion. First of all, this paper is about an aggregate state variable, uncertainty shocks, which
has to be shown to affect both aggregate investment and employment separately from the
aggregate cash flow channel, as in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2014). This implies that
the uncertainty shocks are likely to affect aggregate consumption and thus the marginal
utility of consumption. So aggregate uncertainty shocks are priced and such price will affect
corporate risk management decisions including savings and financing. Second, many asset
pricing papers include Bollerslev et al. (2009), Bollerslev et al. (2011), Drechsler and Yaron
(2011), and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) have documented that variance risk premia exist.
Therefore, to fully understand the impact of change in aggregate uncertainty to firm financ-
ing and investment decisions empirically or quantitatively, variance risk premium cannot be
assumed away. For more details of this motivation see Appendix A.4.
1.3.6 A Firm’s Problem and Simplification
An all equity firm maximizes the risk-adjusted present value for existing shareholders. The
recursive form of this problem can be written as
V (K,W,Z, s) = max
K′,W ′
{








This equation simply says that given the current states (K,Z,W, s), a firm chooses optimal
capital and cash for the next period, K ′ and W ′, respectively, to maximize the sum of the
current period cash flows and the discounted and risk-adjusted next period firm value.
The whole problem can be simplified using the constant-return-to-scale property. I can
27For example, variance risk premium is not in Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2007), Bloom et al. (2014),
Arellano et al. (2011), Christiano et al. (2014), and Gilchrist et al. (2010).
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reduce the number of state variables by dividing K to the whole problem. I denote the
sales-to-capital stock ratio by z ≡ Π/K. The other variables denominated by capital stock
K are all denoted by their corresponding lower cases. The problem is thereby simplified to
v (w, z, s) = max
{i,d,f}
{
d− f − 1{f>0} (λ0s + λ1sf) (1.10)
+


















(1− δ + i)w′ = (1 + rW )w + z −
(












Further simplification of this problem under risk-neutral measure and proof of the exis-
tence of solution are in Appendix A.6.
Finally, this model assumes no firm entry or exit, primarily for tractability reason. This
may underestimate or overestimate the impact of uncertainty shocks. On the one hand, entry
is usually costly, in both pecuniary and non pecuniary sense For example, going public costs
a firm some substantial underwriting fee and forces it to disclose its financial and operational
information. Therefore, allowing entry adds another level of real options, which will enhance
real options effects from financial and technological frictions. On the other hand, firms going
entry or exit usually have more extreme performance than the existing incumbents. And
according to the real option logic, the extreme cases are more likely to happen in the low
uncertainty state, when entry and exit are more frequent. As a result, one may observe more
extreme cases in the low uncertainty state. If one does not take this into account, he/she
might find the realized volatility level in the low uncertainty state even higher than that in
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the high uncertainty state.28
1.4 Solution and Estimation of the Model
This section describes the solution method and the structural estimation results. I first
explain the solution and estimation method, then discuss the identification strategy. Finally,
I present the estimation results. The resulted parameters are necessary to derive model
implications in Section 3 and the counterfactual experiments in next section.
1.4.1 Solution and Estimation Method
I estimate most of the model parameters using numerical generalized method of moments
(GMM). Some parameters are calibrated outside the structural estimation, because they can
either be directly inferred from data or are already well-established in the literature. Table
1.5.
Table 1.5: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Explanation Calibrated value
r Risk-free rate 0.007
α Curvature of profits with respect to capital 0.75
δ Depreciation rate 0.0371
η Price of market risk 0.24
γ Carry cost of cash 0.007
pL Physical probability to stay in state L 0.9125
pH Physical probability to stay in state H 0.3580
λ0 Fixed financing cost coefficient 0.0258
λ1L Linear financing cost coefficient in state L 0.2427
First are some parameters independent of uncertainty states. The risk-free rate r is
0.7% quarterly, which is the average 3-month T-bill rate during the sample period. I set the
28This is why in Bloom et al. (2014) and Jurado et al. (2015), only the plants and firms with substantial
presence in the data periods are included in the sample. For this reason, I only use firms with more than
20 quarters of observations in the sample when I construct the comparable data moments for the structural
estimation purpose. However, for the time series and panel data session, I use the full sample except the
screening criteria mentioned in the data section.
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curvature of production function α to 0.75, which is the same as Bloom (2009). Quarterly
depreciation rate δ is 3.71%, which is the average depreciation rate (DP/PPEGT) in the
sample. The market price of risk η is 0.25 quarterly or 0.5 annually, which is about the
Sharpe ratio of market returns in the United States during my sample period. The carry
cost of cash, γ, is assumed to be the same as the risk-free rate. That is, a firm does not earn
return on the cash it saves. When I structurally estimate γ, it has a corner solution that is
the same as the risk-free rate.
The transition probabilities in the low and high uncertainty states are estimated from
data using Bayesian estimation. The physical probabilities to stay in the same state from
States L and H are, respectively, pL = 0.9125 and pH = 0.3580. The first number means
that if current quarter is in low uncertainty state, there are probability of 0.91 that next
quarter the economy will stay in the low uncertainty state. Interpretation for the latter
is similar. For more details about the Bayesian estimation of the transition probabilities,
please refer to Appendix A.2.
The empirical average of the fixed and linear financing costs in the low uncertainty state
are λ0 = 0.0258 and λ1L = 0.2427, respectively, estimated from the data. These financing
costs seem to be high. But they reflect not only the underwriting costs but also the dilution
costs imposed on the market value of existing shares of common stocks.29 According to
Bolton et al. (2013) and Eisfeldt and Muir (2014), I assume the fixed cost of financing is
fixed but allow the linear financing costs to be state dependent. For more details about
magnitudes of the financing cost parameters and the correlation between the uncertainties
and financing costs, please see Appendix A.5.
After calibration, 9 parameters are left to be estimated: the expected volatilities of
productivities in the two states, σs; the state-dependent mean productivity growth, µs; the
fixed and convex adjustment cost coefficients of investment, ξ0 and ξ2; the change in linear
financing cost coefficients from low to high uncertainty state, 4λ1; and the prices of regime
29For example, a firm has 100 existing shares, market price is 1.5 per share. If it issues 20 new shares, my
current financing cost structure means that the new market value per share is now 1.45. The dilution cost
is about 3.25%, which is consistent with the magnitude of dilution costs.
26
shift risk, ΓLH and ΓHL.30
The GMM structural estimation proceeds as follows. I first guess a set of parameters θ,
and solve the model numerically using policy function iteration. Then I numerically compute
the stationary distribution of the state variables (z, w, s). With this stationary distribution,
the model moments can be directly computed without simulated artificial data. Next, GMM
will choose the parameters that minimized the weighted difference between the model and
data moments. The weighting matrix is the inverse of square of the corresponding moments
unconditional on uncertainty states. The economic intuition behind this weighting matrix
is that I am minimizing the squared sum of percentage deviations of model moments from
corresponding data moments.31 Appendix A.7 provides the details of the procedure and the
general idea of this GMM structural estimation.
1.4.2 Identification
Identification of the parameters relies on choosing moments sensitive to the parameter varia-
tions. I choose 16 state-dependent moments to estimate the 7 parameters. Below I describe
and rationalize the choice of these 16 moments.
First eight moments are cash flow variables related to financing activities in different
uncertainty states, including state-dependent issuance and payout probabilities, average
issuance, and the standard deviation of net issuance.32 They are selected because the main
interest of this paper is to understand the financing and investment decisions of firms in
different uncertainty states. All these variables are affected by the conditional mean of
productivity growth µs and σs.
30There are totally four prices of regime shift risks. However, there are two restrictions on those risk
prices. The two restrictions are that the two rows of risk-neutral probability transition matrix must sum to
1 in either row. See Dai et al. (2007) for more details about those restrictions.
31This weighting matrix is chosen over optimal weighting matrix because high uncertainty states have
relatively less observations and thus higher standard errors. Using optimal weighting matrix will put too
much weight on the low uncertainty states. This weighting matrix is also chosen over identity weighting
matrix because scale of moments are very different. Identity weighting matrix tends to overweight moments
with large magnitudes.
32Average payout is not included because the average payout in data is very low relative to the model.
This is also observed in Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), and Warusawitharana and Whited (2014). So
I use the payout probability instead.
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I then choose the moments related to investment. By matching the mean and standard
deviation of investment, I am able to estimate the fixed and convex cost parameters of
investment, ξ0 and ξ2. Investment is also informative about the return versus risk tradeoff
of the firm. Both the financing and investment variables are also helpful to pin down the
price of regime shift risk ΓHL because it affects all capital versus cash positions.
The next four moments are the conditional mean and standard deviation of cash-to-asset
ratio. These variables inform us about the risk management on the asset side of the balance
sheet. They are related to the conditional volatilities σs and the price of regime shift risks
ΓHL. They are connected because cash holdings are the key of risk management, which
respond to both the changing volatilities and risk premia.
1.4.3 Estimation Results
This subsection reports the estimation results of the moments and the parameters. Table 1.6
compares data moments and the estimated moments from model. It shows that the model
fits the data reasonably well. Only four out of sixteen estimated moments are statistically
different from the data moments at 5% level. Since the estimated system has many more
moments than the parameters to estimate, it means the 9 parameters can produce good fits
to the 16 moments of financing and investment.
Comparing the data versus fitted moments, I find that my model tends to have higher
issuance probability than the data but lower mean issuance than data in the low uncer-
tainty state. One potential explanation is that the fixed financing cost coefficient in the low
uncertainty state is low but the linear financing cost coefficient is too high. Since the two
parameters are estimated and fixed outside the estimation, the estimation itself cannot fix
this problem. However, other than these two moments, other financing moments are still
matched reasonably well as their deviation from the corresponding data moments are not
statistically significant from zero. My model has higher standard deviation of cash flows
than data. But notice that the standard deviation of investment and cash-to-asset ratio is
still below the data ones. Therefore, the estimation automatically chooses a higher volatility
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Table 1.6: Data and Fitted Moments
t-statistic is the test for whether the model moment is significant different from the data moments. SD. is
acronym for standard deviation. Cash ratio is cash over assets; other flow variable ratios are denominated
by last quarter assets net of cash. In data, all variables are winsorized at its 1th and 99th percentile values
each quarter. Only firms survive at least 8 quarters are included. ***,**, and * denotes the corresponding
model moment is different from data moment at statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
State L State H
Conditional Moments Data Model t-stat Data Model t-stat
Mean investment 0.0517 0.0481 -0.363 0.0475 0.0389 -2.431**
SD. investment 0.1063 0.1307 0.750 0.0945 0.1191 3.108***
Issuance probability 0.0150 0.0165 0.569 0.0097 0.0105 0.389
Mean issuance 0.0099 0.0086 -1.012 0.0048 0.0047 -0.076
Payout probability 0.4020 0.4432 0.615 0.3800 0.3980 0.298
SD. Net Issuance 0.1613 0.1353 -0.476 0.1236 0.1438 7.908***
Mean cash ratio 0.1623 0.1580 -0.153 0.1770 0.1657 -0.639
SD. cash ratio 0.1909 0.1616 -0.443 0.2007 0.1579 -1.545
χ27 =33.14
of cash flow in order to match the other four standard deviations.
Table 1.7 reports the parameter estimates of the model. The most important parameters
here are the two levels of expected volatilities. They are 0.05 and 0.10 in the low and high
uncertainty states, respectively. The low uncertainty state volatility is similar to the uncon-
ditional volatility estimated in Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), which have annualized
volatility around 0.10-0.12, or quarterly volatility of 0.05-0.06. The high uncertainty state
volatility is slightly higher than twice of the low uncertainty state one, which is consistent
with the relative VIX ratios in the high versus low uncertainty states. It is also consistent
with Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2014). Finally, notice that even though the underlying
cash flow volatility is high, it does not necessarily transmit to higher standard deviation in
the net issuance, investment, or cash. Just as in Table 1.6, those standard deviations in the
high uncertainty state are actually lower than those in the low uncertainty state, both in
the data and in the model. This is because a firm endogenously chooses optimal financing
and investment policies to smooth them out. This point will become clearer when I discuss
stationary distribution of productivities in the next section.
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Estimated mean productivity growth are 0.9% and -0.3% in the low and high uncertainty
state, respectively. The mean productivity in the low state seems to be higher than the
risk-free rate, which is 0.7%. But one has to take into account the capital depreciation,
Jensen’s correction term for variance, and risk-adjustment from both market risk and regime-
switching risk. For example, after Jensen’s correction, the mean productivity growth is only
0.39%. The mean productivity in the high uncertainty state seems to be low. But it is still
much higher than the estimates in Warusawitharana and Whited (2014).
Fixed investment adjustment cost is about 0.0071 in my model. This low fixed invest-
ment adjustment cost is consistent to the literature, including Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), Bloom (2009), Riddick and Whited (2009), and Lee (2013). The quadratic invest-
ment adjustment cost is high in my model. This high estimate is mainly because with
a higher frequency data, the adjustment cost parameters becomes higher. To be specific,
quarterly investment is averagely only a quarter of the annual one. To make the aggregation
of the convex adjustment costs of capital the same, the quarterly quadratic adjustment cost
coefficient must be 4 times of its annual counterpart. For example, an annual quadratic
adjustment cost of 1 implies an average quarterly quadratic adjustment cost of 4. In Waru-
sawitharana and Whited (2014), they have the convex adjustment costs of capital with very
similar magnitudes to mine.
Risk prices of regime shift from low to high uncertainty are ΓLH = −1.35 and ΓHL =
1.25. The former implies that a risk-averse agent perceives that the chance of switching
from low to high uncertainty states is 2.86 times more likely33 to happen than the physical
probability. The latter means that a risk-averse agent perceives the risk-adjusted probability
(or risk-neutral probability) of switching from high to low uncertainty state is 0.19, much
lower than the physical probability of 0.64. Both two suggest that people are seriously averse
to the high uncertainty state. Both numbers have their magnitudes close to the switching
risk premium in Bolton et al. (2013), which is ln 3 = 1.10.
33exp (1.35)− 1 = 2.86.
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Table 1.7: Estimated Parameters
All parameters are in quarterly frequency, not annualized. ***,**, and * denotes the corresponding parameter
is different from zero at statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Parameter Explanation Coefficient S.E.
σL Expected volatility of productivity in state L 0.0461 0.0109***
σH Expected volatility of productivity in state H 0.1049 0.0336***
µL Mean of productivity growth, state L 0.0086 0.0050*
µH Mean of productivity growth, state H -0.0033 0.0291
ξ0 Fixed cost parameter of investment 0.0784 0.0074***
ξ2 Convex cost parameter of investment 3.9332 0.4019***
ΓLH Price of regime shift risk, from state L to H -1.3522 0.9103
ΓHL Price of regime shift risk, from state H to L 1.2522 0.3403***
4λ1 Change in linear financing costs 0.0071 0.0078***
1.5 Model Implications
In this section, I present the implications of the model. To illustrate the effects and the
mechanism, I first discuss the intuition of real option effects. Then I present the model
implication in three perspectives: (1) when to invest or finance, which is the most important
and illustrative results of this paper; (2) how much to invest or finance; and (3) stationary
distributions of productivities and cash. Between the second and third perspectives, I insert
a subsection to discuss the separation of issuance and payout. And I discuss the real impacts
of aggregate uncertainty and liquidity at the last subsection. To single out the aggregate
uncertainty effects and to better understand the mechanism, in the section I assume that the
mean growth rates of productivity and financing costs are fixed to their low uncertainty state
levels. That is, the mean growth rates and financing cost parameters are not state-dependent
in this section.
1.5.1 Real Option, Irreversibilities, and Uncertainty Shocks
The key mechanism of this model hinges on the real option effects, as a result of the invest-
ment and financing irreversibilities. Real option values respond to change in uncertainties,
generating interesting dynamics on corporate investment and financing.
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There are three important implications of irreversibilities. First of all, because of irre-
versibilities, a firm has incentive to hoard resources inside firm. For example, because of
investment adjustment costs, capital inside the firm and capital outside are not perfect sub-
stitutes. Therefore, inside capital is an important state variable of a firm. In the same sense,
financing irreversibilities distinguish cash inside the firm from outside cash. This is why a
firm has incentive to hoard cash inside firm. This intuition is consistent with Hennessy and
Whited (2005), Riddick and Whited (2009), Bolton et al. (2011) and Nikolov et al. (2013).34
Second, in a dynamic setting, irreversibilities induce a real option to wait, or an inaction
region. Take equity issuance as an example. Equity issuance is irreversible due to financing
costs. A firm therefore tradeoffs whether to issue now or later. If it invests now, it pays the
financing costs now can finance its investment. If it invests later, it saves the time value of
the financing costs. And more importantly, a firm may find that it not longer needs so many
cash or it may need even more. In this sense, the ability to wait is an option and has positive
value. For this reason, a firm making issuance decision considers not only the financing cost
paid, but also the loss of the option to wait. As a result, a firm will become inactive in
issuance for considerable amount of cases. This option to wait is widely considered in the
literature, as in McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Stokey (2008).
It is worth to point out that not all types of irreversibilities create an inaction region.
For example, a model with only convex adjustment costs on investment and no financing
costs does not have an inaction region on capital. In this case, a firm has smooth marginal
value of investment. It can always a small amount of investment, with adjustment costs
close to zero. In this sense, there is not a substantial region of zero investment. However, a
firm still has the option to invest more or less, to time the investment. In more productive
time, a firm invests more; and in less productive scenarios, a firm invests less, waiting for
better investment opportunities in the future.
Finally, the value of option changes with time-varying uncertainties. An option has
convex payoff over its underlying. So it increases value when the volatilities of underlying
34In Gomes (2001), there is also financing costs. But the financing costs depend on the difference between
generated cash flows and desired investment. So cash is not a state variable in his paper.
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become higher. Therefore, when uncertainty is higher, so is the value of option. As a result,
a firm averse of losing the more valuable option will postpone the investment or financing
activities. It will require higher marginal benefits of action in order to compensate for the
higher value of option to wait. This will enlarge the inaction regions.
In sum, irreversibilities in investment and financing create options to wait, which gener-
ate interesting dynamics under uncertainty shocks. Because of these real options, a firm’s
decisions can be classified into two margins: (1) when to invest or finance; and (2) how
much. The following two sections present the model results and their implications.
1.5.2 When to Invest or Finance in L States
This subsection describes when does a firm finance or invest in different uncertainty states.
I represent the policy functions in action or inaction regions in financing or investment
activities, which are separated by some boundaries. The boundaries here are the cutoff lines
where a firm is indifferent between proactively managing its cash or capital and passively
sitting on them. Those regions and boundaries are presented in Figure 1.2 and 1.3.
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Figure 1.2: When to Finance or Invest in Low Uncertainty State
Figure 1.2 shows the action or inaction regions in the low uncertainty state (L). Panel
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(1.2a) plots capital investment. Cash-capital ratio is the horizontal axis while the log
earnings-capital ratio is the vertical axis. On the vertical axis, the median log earnings-
capital ratio in the L states is normalized to 0. So the numbers on the vertical axis can
be interpreted as the log-deviation of earnings-capital ratio from median. The vertical axis
measures the log marginal product of capital. Because the marginal product of capital is a
monotonic function of productivity Z, I will use these two terms interchangeably.
In this chart, the region above the solid blue line is where a firm is actively investing,
while the region below is where a firm is neither investing or disinvesting.35 There is an
inaction region between investment and disinvestment because of the fixed cost of capital.
Fixed cost of capital makes investment or disinvestment an real option, which a firm will
only exercise if the marginal benefits are higher than the cost of losing this option. This
inaction region is consistent with Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Stokey (2008).
The line between investing and inaction regions is an investment boundary, where a firm
is indifferent between investment or inaction. This line is downward sloping. It means that
a firm will invest either because the productivity is high or cash is high. The intuition will
be more obvious if one looks at the Euler equation for real investment,36






, if i 6= 0. (1.11)
This equation says that investment (on the left-hand side) is increasing with the marginal
value of capital (the right-hand side numerator) but decreasing in the marginal value of
cash (the right-hand side denominator). And generally speaking, marginal value of capital
is higher when productivity is higher, and marginal value of cash is lower if cash holdings are
higher. This explains why investment boundary is downward sloping. It is also consistent
with Riddick and Whited (2009), Asvanunt et al. (2009), and Bolton et al. (2011).
35If the marginal product of capital is further lower, a firm may disinvest (when log earnings-capital ratio
is about -2). Because in both data and model, the probability of disinvesting is very low, I do not plot it
here. The disinvestment boundary is a flat line independent of cash because a firm does not need to hoard
cash when disinvestment is optimal than investment or inaction.
36Note that because of fixed costs of investment, this formula only applies when a firm invests or disinvest.
It is not valid within the inaction region.
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Panel (1.2b) plots the financing regions and boundaries. The uppermost region is is-
suance region, the bottom one is payout region, while the middle one is liquidity inaction.
Again, the liquidity inaction region exists because the financing costs make equity issuance
a costly real option. A firm will only exercise this costly option if the marginal benefits of
issuance are higher than losing the option value of the financing option. On the other hand,
because issuance is costly, distributing money also becomes irreversible, because the cost of
collecting the same amount of cash back is higher than that of paying it out. So a firm does
not immediately distribute even if it does not need cash immediately. In sum, the financing
cost creates a wedge, or inaction region, between issuance and payout.
In Panel (1.2b) of Figure 1.2, the upper red line is called the issuance boundary, where
a firm is indifferent between issuance and inaction. It is upward sloping. This suggests that
a firm is more likely to issue equity if current cash balance is low or current productivity is
high. A firm with low cash balance may not have sufficient liquidity to fund its investment
and thus has need for issuance. If a firm has high current productivity, it will have larger
investment outflows but also higher operating inflows. In the estimated parameters from
structural estimation, the effects from investment outflow dominate that from operating
inflow. As a result, a firm with higher productivity has a low net inflow and is thus more
likely to resort to outside financing.
The lower magenta line is the payout boundary, where a firm is indifferent between
payout and inaction. Similar to the issuance boundary, it is upward sloping. This implies
that a firm is less likely to distribute cash if its cash balance is low or productivity is
high. The slope of payout boundary is flatter than that of issuance boundary, because the
irreversibility of payout is not a direct one, but indirectly coming from the issuance costs.
1.5.3 When to Invest or Finance in H States
This subsection explores the corporate policies in H states and compares them with L states
to interpret the effects of uncertainty shocks. These are the central results of this paper. The
action/inaction regions and boundaries in both states are plotted in Figure 1.3. Solid lines
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denote the boundaries in the low uncertainty state, and dash lines denote the boundaries in
the high uncertainty state. Overall, the increased uncertainty moves the boundaries away
from inaction regions, due to the real option effects.
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Figure 1.3: When to Finance or Invest in Both States
Panel (1.3a) of Figure 1.3 plots the investment boundary. The investment boundary in
the high uncertainty state (dash line) is higher than the one in the low state (solid line).
This implies that firm now requires a higher productivity level to invest in high uncertainty
state. So the investment region is now smaller and inaction region is larger. It can be
explained by the real option effects. Investment is an real option because of irreversibility of
investment and also financing. This convex real option has higher value when uncertainty
is high. As a result, a firm now postpones the exercise of this real option, requiring a higher
benefits of investment to compensate the loss of the more valuable investment option. This
investment real option effect is consistent with McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Bloom
(2009). Sometimes this is also called the wait-and-see option, where a firm chooses to wait
longer when uncertainty is high.
Panel (1.3b) of Figure 1.3 plots the financing boundaries. Both issuance and payout
boundaries move away from the liquidity inaction regions, suggesting that firms postpone
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both issuance and payout. Focus on the issuance first. The high uncertainty issuance bound-
ary (red dash line) is higher than low uncertainty one (red solid line) due to both postponed
investment and real option effects of financing. On the one hand, because investment is post-
poned, the need to issue to fund investment is also postponed. On the other hand, similar to
investment costs, financing costs make issuance a real option. As a result, a firm will delay
issuance if uncertainty is high, requiring a higher productivity and thus higher marginal
benefits to issue. The increased financing costs during high uncertainty state aggravate this
real option effect as it means now exercising real option is more costly.
The payout is also postponed in high uncertainty state. This is evident in the figure as
the payout boundary in the high uncertainty state (magenta dash line) is lower than that in
the low uncertainty state. The procrastination of distribution when uncertainty is high is a
result of higher precautionary savings motive and an indirect consequence of the real option
effects on issuance. Because firms want to save more in high uncertainty state, without
issuance or cutting investment, the marginal thing the firms can do is to delay payout. Also,
in order to reduce of the probability of future issuance to lose the more valuable real option,
a firm will also hoard more cash and delay payout. These explain why payout is postponed.
Notice that the delay of issuance also feedback to investment. When a firm postpones
issuance, the marginal value of cash is likely higher, conditional on the same productivity
and cash. As a result, a firm may invest less or even not invest. So the real option effects of
investment and financing interact and reinforce each other.
Moreover, discount rates in the high uncertainty state are likely to be higher than in the
low uncertainty state. As a result, a firm will invest less in risky capital and hoard more
cash. This also reinforces the delay of firm investment and financing activities.
The conclusion that firms are more likely to delay issuance and payout does not mean
that one firm will cut issuance and payout simultaneously. The model here allows firms to
be heterogeneous on the dimension of productivity and cash ratios. Firms with different
state variables correspond to different points on the figures. Depending on a firm’s current
state, one will observe different reaction of the firm to increased uncertainty. For example,
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one will observe that a firm with high productivity and low cash level, i.e., near the issuance
boundary, is more likely to cut issuance. While a firm with low productivity and high
cash is more likely to be detected that it is cutting payout. But if one aggregates all
those heterogeneous firms on productivity and cash ratio dimensions, one will observed
simultaneous reduction on issuance and payout, as suggested in the data.
Finally, the conclusion that high uncertainty delays both issuance and payout challenges
the conventional understanding of the relationship between issuance and payout. Conven-
tionally, people think that issuance and payout are negatively correlated, a firm that is more
likely to issue is less likely to distribute. This is true if a firm moves from one state to another
state along with the change in productivity or cash. But once we also allow the uncertainty
state to be time-varying, issuance and payout can now be positively correlated, along with
changing volatilities. This phenomenon emphasizes to treat issuance and payout separately
into two accounts, not netting them into one as the net issuance measure, especially in the
context with uncertainty shocks. The net of two decreasing accounts may blur the total
effects of uncertainty shocks on the financing decisions.
1.5.4 How Much to Invest or Finance
In this subsection, I look at how much does a firm invest or finance in different uncertainty
states. I have described when do firms invest, issue, and distribute in the last subsection,
which presents the investment and financing policies in the sense of extensive margin. In the
sense of intensive margin, I need to describe the optimal policy functions. The results confirm
those of last subsection and present more quantitative information about firm behaviors. The
key results are presented in Figure 1.4 and 1.5.
Figure 1.4 plots the case when cash-capital ratio is fixed at 10%. Here I focus on how
policies react to productivity and aggregate uncertainty shocks with the cash ratio fixed.
Panel 1.4a shows that in both states investment is increasing in production. However,
investment is relatively lower in State H, in both the extensive and intensive margin. In the
sense of extensive margin, a firm starts to invest when log earnings-capital ratio is higher
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than 0.36 from its median in State L. In State H, a firm only starts to invest if log earnings-
capital ratio is higher than 0.37. This extensive margin results are consistent with those in
Panel 1.3a of Figure 1.3. On the other hand, conditioning on the same level of productivity,
the high uncertainty state investment is no more than the low uncertainty state investment,
sometimes much lower. Therefore, the investment in State H is less than that in State L
even in the intensive margin sense.
(a) Investment when w = 0.10
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Figure 1.4: Policy Functions along Profitability
Panel 1.4b plots the equity issuance and payout with the same cash-capital ratio. In
both states, a firm is paying out cash to existing shareholders when productivity is very
low, so net issuance is negative. When log earnings-capital ratio is higher than -0.06, a firm
becomes inactive in liquidity in the low uncertainty state. But in State H, a firm enters
into inaction region soon, at a lower cutoff value of log earnings-capital ratio, -0.10. This
is consistent with the results in last subsection that a firm is less likely to payout in high
uncertainty state. It also shows that the payout is lower in State H than in State L.
The right end of Panel 1.4b shows that the issuance is unambiguously lower in the high
uncertainty state than in the low uncertainty state. In the sense of extensive margin, a firm
requires a higher marginal product of capital to start to issue in State H. While in the sense
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of intensive margin, the amount of issuance is always in State H. Again, this is due to the
joint effects of investment irreversibility, financing costs, and time-varying discount rates.
These two figures generate cross section implications of firm behaviors under uncertainty
shocks. They predict that conditioning on the same level of cash-capital ratio, a firm with
high productivity will reduce investment and issuance more after a positive uncertainty
shock. While a firm with relatively low productivity will cut payout more in response to
more uncertain environment.
Figure 1.5 presents policy functions over cash with two different productivity levels.
Panel (1.5a) and (1.5b) illustrate a case where earnings-capital ratio is 0.36, near the issuance
boundaries of a firm. And Panel (1.5c) and (1.5d) illustrate the case where earnings-to-
capital ratio is -0.02, near the payout boundaries.
In Panel 1.5a, one can see that investment is weakly increasing in cash-capital ratio. In
State L, investment is relatively flat, so the firm investment does not depend on cash holding
so much.37 But in the State H, when cash is too low, a firm chooses not to invest because
of the real option effects. These effects are corroborated in Panel 1.5b. When cash is low, a
firm chooses to fund the investment by issuing new equities in State L. While in State H, a
firm chooses not to issue and not to invest when cash is low.
The remaining two panels show the case when a firm is near its payout boundary. In
both states, a firm does not invest, staying inactive on the real side (Panel 1.5c). In contrast,
a firm pays out when cash-ratio is more than 0.1 (Panel 1.5d blue solid line) in State L; but
it stays inactive on financing in State H (Panel 1.5d red dash line).
Note that Figure 1.5 also has rich cross-section implications of firm response to uncer-
tainty shocks with different cash-capital ratio. They predict that, firms with high produc-
tivity but low cash ratios will be more to cut issuance in the high uncertainty state relative
to the low one; while firms with low productivity but high cash ratios will be more likely
to postpone payout. The investment response to aggregate uncertainty shocks is nonlinear
37This policy function is flat along all levels of cash-capital ratio. When cash-capital ratio is high enough,
this firm starts to invest more. The flatness here is a product of the discretization of the cash state. But it
also tells the reader that investment is more sensitive to productivity than to cash.
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on cash holdings, as it depends on whether a firm finances its investment by issuing new
equities (Panel 1.5a) or by cutting payout (Panel 1.5c).
Overall, the policy functions show that higher aggregate uncertainty not only postpones
investment and financing activities, but also lower their magnitudes.
1.5.5 Separation of Issuance and Payout
In the previous two subsections, I have shown that both issuance and payout are lower
in high uncertainty state. This challenges the conventional view that issuance is negative
payout.
Conventionally, people think that issuance and payout are two opposite accounts. Since
one is inflow to cash and the other is outflow, they seem to be the negative action of the
other. Use of net issuance in the literature is consistent with this view.38 Even though the
presence of financial frictions creates a liquidity inaction region between the two actions,
they might still seem to be negatively correlated.
Shocks to productivity and shocks to cash balance seem to confirm this negative cor-
relation between issuance and payout. For example, in Panel 1.2b, a firm with higher
productivity moves upward and becomes more likely to issue but less likely to distribute.
Shocks to cash are likewise. A firm with higher cash balance is more likely to distribute but
less likely to issue.
This view is violated in the setting of uncertainty shocks. As in Figure 1.3b, issuance and
payout are postponed in high uncertainty state. Figure 1.4b also confirms this result. These
results suggest a positive correlation of aggregate issuance and payout around uncertainty
shocks, which are also confirmed by data. This positive correlation emphasizes the divorce of
issuance and payout and overturns the conventional belief. It is a result of financial frictions,
and made evident by uncertainty shocks.
38For example, Eisfeldt and Muir (2014) and Belo et al. (2014) employ net issuance measure to infer
aggregate issuance costs. Chen et al. (2014) use net issuance to describe the equity financing activities
under uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 1.5: Policy Functions along Cash
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1.5.6 Stationary Distribution of Capital and Cash
A final set of results present the stationary distribution of the two state variables, earnings-
capital and cash-capital ratios in Figure 1.6 and 1.7. They show that the stationary distri-
bution of the state variables can match to those in previous literature or the histogram of
sample.
Figure 1.6 presents the stationary distribution of the logarithm of the earnings-capital
ratio (log z). Blue solid and red dash lines denote the densities for the corresponding vari-
ables in states L and H, respectively. The shape of the stationary distribution is similar
to the normal distribution. Even though the logarithm of Z follows a random walk, a firm
will optimally invest when the productivity is high and disinvest when the productivity is
low, trapping the earnings-capital ratio within a narrow band. For this reason, the capi-
tal to business condition itself is still well-defined and stationary. And as expected, in the
high uncertainty state, the distribution has larger variance and fatter tail. This station-
ary distribution of productivity has similar shapes to the distribution of establishment-level
productivity shown in Bloom et al. (2014).
log(earnings/capital)













Figure 1.6: Stationary Distribution of Profitability
Panel 1.7a of Figure 1.7 plots the stationary distribution of the cash to capital ratio. In
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both states, the densities of cash decreases with the cash ratio. The two humps are due to
non-linearity of investment and financing options, especially when the investment boundaries
intersect the issuance or payout boundaries. In the high uncertainty state, the distribution
of cash-capital ratios has less mass at zero and more on the large values. These results
are consistent with the empirical histogram of cash-capital ratio in sample, as presented in
Panel 1.7b. In Bolton et al. (2011), the densities of cash ratio cluster around the payout
boundary, which is very different from the empirical distribution. The improvement on this
stationary distribution comes from the fact that firms in my estimation has lower average
productivities and are often trapped in low productivities due to persistence.
(a) Stationary Distribution of Cash
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Figure 1.7: Stationary Distribution of Cash
1.5.7 The Real Impact of Aggregate Uncertainty Shocks and Liquidities
This subsection investigates how aggregate uncertainty shocks and liquidities affect real
investment and output growth. Table 1.8 reports the results.
In Panel (a), I investigate the investment-to-capital ratios i, across different aggregate
uncertainty states and over different levels of liquidities. From the first three columns, con-
ditional on the same uncertainty state and cash-to-capital ratio, we can see that, investment
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is increasing with marginal product of capital, proxied by logarithm of earnings to capital
ratio. The investment is high when marginal product of capital is low, and becomes zero
when marginal product of capital is low. At extremely low marginal products of capital,
which is not reported here, investment can be negative. This means that a firm conducts
fire-sale to reduce its capital stock. Across uncertainty states, the investment ratios are
lower in state H, because of the real options to wait, the precautionary savings motive, and
the risk premia. With similar marginal values of product, the investment ratios across differ-
ent uncertainty states are not significantly different except near the edge of the investment
boundary, like log π = 0.356 and w = 0.05, and log π = −0.061 and w = 0.25. This sug-
gests that aggregate uncertainty shocks affect firm investment mainly through the external
margin, which is consistent with Bloom (2009).
The effects of cash holdings on real investment are not monotonic. For example, in the
highest marginal product to capital levels, the investment ratios at a cash-to-capital ratio
of 0.15 are higher than those in the low or high cash ratios.39 This non-monotonicity is
due to the real options to wait in investment and issuance. Take state L for example and
log π = 0.356 for example. When cash ratios are really low, like 0.05, the firm would like to
issue new equities and invest immediately. At this moment, the exercises of the investment
and issuance options synchronize. However, when cash is slightly higher, the firm is near
the issuance boundary but not worth to issue now because of the financial frictions. So the
firm chooses not to issue but has to invest less in this case.
In Panel (b) of Table1.8. I report the average investment and output growth across all
potential states of marginal product of capital. One can infer that the average investment
increases with liquidities and decreases with uncertainty states. The difference of invest-
ment between two states is widening as liquidities increase. When liquidities increase, the
sensitivity of investment to marginal product of capital is higher.40 Therefore, the difference
39But when the cash-to-capital ratios ar high enough, the investment ratios at high cash-to-capital ratios
become higher than the investment ratios here.
40The marginal value of cash measures how much a firm’s value changes with an extra dollar of cash
inside the firm. The marginal value of cash determines the sensitivity of investment to marginal q and is
generally increasing with cash, as suggested in Bolton et al. (2011). Chen (2014) has empirically estimated
the marginal value of cash using public firm data from US.
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between the investment ratios in the two uncertainty states is higher in larger cash ratio.
The next row quantifies the average of output growth conditional on different liquidities







= exp (µs) (1 + i− δ)α ,
The first component is the mean growth rate of productivity. This component is assumed
to be the same in this exercise for expositional reasons. The second component is related
to investment. This component can be interpreted as the reallocation component of the
growth rate because it is due to the difference between investment rates. From Table 1.8,
we can infer that the reallocation component of the output growth is large, suggesting that
aggregate uncertainties have large real impacts and such impacts vary with the position of
liquidities. The higher the liquidity is, the larger the impacts of aggregate uncertainties are
on the average output growth.
Table 1.8: The Real Impact of Aggregate Uncertainty Shocks and Liquidities
w is cash-to-capital ratio W/K. π is earnings-to-capital ratio, Π/K, which captures marginal product of
capital. log π is normalized by the median cash-flow-to-capital ratio at state L. So log π = -0.061 means
that the cash-flow-to-capital ratio is about -0.06 percent lower than the median cash-flow-to-capital ratio at
state L.
L H
w 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.05 0.15 0.25
(a) Investment Ratio i
log π
0.356 0.2215 0.2069 0.2040 0 0.2044 0.2016
0.023 0 0 0.1830 0 0 0
-0.061 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Aggregate over π
average(i) 0.0256 0.0272 0.0586 0.0251 0.0255 0.0285
average(output growth) -0.0040 -0.0028 0.0207 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0018
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1.6 How Different Firms Respond to Uncertainty Shocks
This section describes differential response to uncertainty shocks for heterogeneous firms.
Firm heterogeneity is investigated through two state variables in the model, profitability and
cash. In either dimension, I contrast the model predictions and the empirical results. Overall,
the empirical evidence confirms the model predictions. Especially, the results echo to the
model implications that uncertainty shocks affect different firms differently and issuance and
payout are different margins of firm financing behaviors.
1.6.1 Heterogeneous Productivities
This subsection investigates the impact of uncertainties on firms with different productivities.
The cross-sectional implications emerge naturally from the policy functions of my model.
For example, Figure 1.4a predicts that high profitability firms tend to reduce investment
and issuance more when uncertainty moves up, but their payout are less affected. Therefore,
I juxtaposes the model regression results and the panel data regressions with respect to the
proxies of the state variables. In this subsection, I use last quarter sales to capital ratio as
a proxy for profitability.41
Three points need to be clarified before moving on. First, fixed effect regressions are good
comparison to the structural estimation results. Fixed effect regressions control for time-
invariant firm heterogeneous effects while the structural estimation has to assume that firms
are the same except their different histories of state variables. Therefore, they are both
estimating the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable within similar
firms. Second, in the fixed effect regressions, even though I include control variables as
much as possible,42 the regression is still not able to conditional on the exact values of other
state variables. For example, Figure 1.9 is conditional on a specific value of the cash state.
But real data are not able to do that. In the regression, cash variables and other control
41I also try alternative proxies for productivities like cash flow. It yields similar results.
42Control variables in this section are the same as in Section 1.2. They include lag of cash to non-cash
asset ratio, lag of sales to capital ratio, log book size of assets, firm age, lag of book leverage, lag quarterly
real GDP growth, dummy of time after 2003 May, lag average Q, time trend, and seasonal dummies.
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variables are included in a linear form. So there might be discrepancy between the model
and data regressions. Finally, sales in data may not be a perfect proxy for profitability in
the model.43 As a result, model and data regression results can differ.
Table 1.9 reports the model and regression results. In Panel (A), I list the effects of
aggregate uncertainty shocks on investment and financing variables across firms with differ-
ent profitability levels. And the differential responses of heterogeneous firms to uncertainty
shocks are captured by the interaction between the indicator of H state and profitability
level. For investment, the interaction term is ambiguous. Because Figure 1.4a in Section
1.5 shows that the maximum differential response happens around the investment bound-
ary. For productivities lower than the investment boundary, the firms remain inaction in
both states; while for the productivities higher than the investment boundary, the invest-
ment difference increases with profitability but remains lower than the the difference near
the investment boundaries. On the other hand, for issuance and issuance probability, the
interaction term has negative coefficients, meaning that uncertainty shocks have larger im-
pact on high profitability firms. Positive coefficients of the interaction term on payout and
its probability imply that payout in low profitability firms is more affected by uncertainty
shocks. These model regression coefficients are consistent with Figure 1.4b in Section 1.5.
Panel (B) reports coefficients of the interaction between uncertainty and last quarter sales
in fixed effect regressions. For investment, the effect of the interaction term is negative, but
not statistically significant. This is consistent with the model prediction.
For issuance and its probabilities, the interaction term has negative coefficients; and
positive coefficients on equations with payout and its probabilities as the dependent variables.
These results are very economically significant and except the payout equation, they all
statistically significant,.
Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the model predictions. They suggest
firms with different productivities have different responses to uncertainty shocks on those
43For example, in reality, sales also depend on labor input. And labor input also has adjustment costs
and is therefore a state variable in a broader model. Such omitted state variable can produce discrepancy
between model and data regression results. I also use income before extraordinary items as proxy for cash
flows, the results are similar.
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financing activities. These implications corroborate the claim that issuance and payout are
two different margins.
Table 1.9: Cross-Sectional Implications: Profitability
This table juxtaposes the model prediction and the data about the impact of uncertainties on firms with
different productivities. In data, sales are used to proxy profitability. Data FE means fixed effect regressions
with a full set of control. Control variables include lag of cash to non-cash asset ratio, lag of sales to capital
ratio, log book size of assets, firm age, lag of book leverage, lag quarterly real GDP growth, dummy of time
after 2003 May, lag average Q, time trend, and seasonal dummies. All regressions are fixed effect regressions
with two-way clustered standard errors over firm and quarter level. Standard errors are in round parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. All coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. ***, **,
and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
[coef×100] Investment Issuance Issue. Prob. Payout Pay. Prob
(A) Model
H×Profitability[t-1] ? - - + +
(B) Data FE: Two States
H×Sale/K[t-1] -0.058 -0.984** -0.912*** 0.042 3.004***
(1.290) (0.451) (0.280) (0.035) (1.037)
1.6.2 Heterogeneous Cash Balance
This subsection investigates the impacts of uncertainty shocks on firms with different cash
ratios. Overall, the cross-sectional results over heterogeneous cash balance are weaker than
those across heterogeneous productivities. Table 1.10 reports the results.
First, in Panel (A), model regressions predict that investment of firms may be ambiguous.
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Table 1.10: Cross-Sectional Implications: Cash
This table juxtaposes the model prediction and the data about the impact of uncertainties on firms with
different cash to capital ratios. Data FE means fixed effect regressions with a full set of control as in Table
1.9. Cash[t-1] in Panel (B) is the excess cash, which was estimated as the error from regressing last period
cash from other other variables. Standard errors are in round parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
All coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * denote significance level
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
[coef×100] Investment Issuance Issue. Prob. Payout Pay. Prob.
(A) Model
H×Cash/K[t-1] ? + + - -
(B) Data FE: Two States
H×Cash/K[t-1] -0.008 4.326*** 1.448*** -0.004 -0.531
(0.356) (1.057) (0.253) (0.031) (0.600)
1.7 Counterfactual Experiments
In order to evaluate the importance of the model ingredients and understand the mechanism,
I conduct counterfactual experiments. These counterfactual experiments shut down the
parameters related to the model ingredients one at a time and contrast these restricted
models to the full model.
I here conduct several sets of counterfactual experiments. The first one compares the
dynamic model to a static uncertainty model. The second experiment considers a world
without financing costs. In the third set of experiments, I remove the state-dependent fea-
tures on volatility and financing costs, respectively, in order to determine their quantitative
importance. Finally, the experiments evaluate the importance of market risk and variance
risk. Table 1.11-1.15 present the counterfactual experiment results. Panel (a) of these tables
list the moments of the benchmark model for the purpose of comparison.
1.7.1 A World without Financial Frictions
In this subsection, I conduct a counterfactual experiment in a world without financing costs.
This helps one to understand why a firm needs to hoard cash and how financial frictions
insert a liquidity inaction region between payout and issuance. Without financial frictions,
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positive uncertainty shocks are not possible to depress payout and issuance simultaneously.
In this experiment, I retain all estimated parameter values from the estimated one, except
that all financing cost to zero. In mathematics notation, it is
λNoFriction0 = λ
NoFriction
1,s = 0, s ∈ {L,H} .
I then solve this restricted model and compare it to the benchmark model. The results are
presented in both Figure 1.8 and Panel (b) of Table 1.11.
Figure 1.8 plots the investment boundaries. Three points emerge when one compares it to
Figure 1.3a. First, investment and disinvestment boundaries in both states are independent
on cash ratios, shown as flat lines in the figure. Because a firm can now issue equities to
raise cash without additional cost, it does not need to hoard cash inside and investment does
not depend on internal cash savings. Second, the productivity thresholds for investment
are higher than the asymptotic limit in the benchmark model due to the carry-cost of
cash. Third, a positive uncertainty shock shifts the investment boundary up and shifts
the disinvestment boundary down, enlarging the inaction region on capital. This is purely
due to real option effects on investment. Fixed costs of investment make investment a real
option and option value increases when uncertainty is high. As a result, a firm postpones
investment and disinvestment.
Table 1.11: Counterfactual Experiments - If Financing is Costless
Benchmark model is the dynamic model I estimated in Section 5. No Fin. Cost denotes the case where
I assume financing costs are zero when a firm raises outside equity. All moments in this table have been
multiplied by 100 already.
(a) Benchmark (b) No Fin. Cost
L H L H
Investment 4.73 3.80 5.03 1.65
Issuance 0.91 0.41 ? ?
Issuance Prob. 1.76 0.99 ? ?
Payout 6.28 6.09 ? ?
Payout Prob. 42.69 37.52 ? ?
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Investing, i > 0
Inaction, i = 0
Figure 1.8: Investment Boundaries without Financial Frictions
Panel (b) of Table 1.11 presents the moment values and provides more information of
this experiment. Two important observations stand out. First of all, investment in high
uncertainty state is still much lower than in low uncertainty state, but the difference is now
much larger than that in the benchmark model. This suggests that financial friction matters
for real investment, and it is particularly important when uncertainty is high. Second, the
MM case does not provide clear predictions on corporate savings and financing decisions.
For example, a firm is indifferent between the following two financing policies: (1) issuing
0.2, paying out nothing; and (2) issuing 0.5, paying out 0.3. This is exactly because external
financing is costless. Therefore, in a MM-world, financing policies are irrelevant.
1.7.2 The Effects of Credit Lines
In the real world, lots of firms have access to bank line of credit, or credit lines. Because I
don’t data on credit lines, I cannot directly test the effects of credit lines using real data.
However, my model is readily extended to account for firms with credit lines. Here I achieve
that by using counterfactual experiment.
In this experiment, I assume that all firms have a line of credit up to 10% of its book
capital. The interest rate on credit line is assumed to be the risk-free rate plus 0.5% quarterly
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rate. The results are documented in Figure 1.9 and Table 1.12. Basically, we can see that the
results are qualitatively similar except that: (1) Now firms can negative liquidity position
up to -0.1, as shown in Panel (a), (b), and (d) in Figure 1.9. (2) Credit lines have significant
impacts on payout decisions. When firms are relying on their credit lines, because of the
higher costs of maintaining the negative liquidity position, they will postpone their payout
decisions a lot to a point where investment opportunity is really bad. (3) The negative cash
positions have non-trivial density, meaning that firms resort to credit lines very often.
Table 1.12: Counterfactual Experiments - Effects of Credit Lines
Benchmark model is the dynamic model I estimated in Section 5. Credit Line denotes the case where firms
have a line of credit up to 10% of its book capital. The interest rate on credit line is assumed to be the
risk-free rate plus 0.5% quarterly rate. All moments in this table have been multiplied by 100 already.
(A) Benchmark (B) Credit Line
L H L H
Investment 4.73 3.80 4.80 3.93
Issuance 0.91 0.41 0.70 0.46
Issuance Prob. 1.76 0.99 1.67 1.26
Payout 6.28 6.09 6.18 5.90
Payout Prob. 42.69 37.52 43.89 43.24
Cash Ratio 16.53 17.72 12.52 13.05
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(a) Investment Boundaries
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Firms have a line of credit up to 10% of its book capital. The interest rate on credit line is assumed to be
the risk-free rate plus 0.5% quarterly rate.
Figure 1.9: Policy Functions and Stationary Distribution When Firms Have Credit Lines
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1.7.3 Why Dynamic Instead of Static Uncertainty?
This counterfactual experiment compares the dynamic model to one with static uncertainty.
It answers the question that why dynamic uncertainty model is necessary to explain the
reality. Furthermore, this experiment finds that about 6% of cash holdings in the low
uncertainty state act as buffer against potential high uncertainty shocks.
In this counterfactual experiment, I assume that the state of the economy does not
switch. If an economy is in low uncertainty state, it will stay in this low uncertainty state
forever; similarly, an economy with high uncertainty will stay in this high uncertainty state.
I keep the parameters the same in either single uncertainty state economy but forbid them to
switch to the other state. I then solve the optimal firm policies in these two economies with
different uncertainty level, and compare it to the benchmark model. Benchmark of such
static uncertainty models includes Riddick and Whited (2009) and Bolton et al. (2011).
Overall, my results suggest that static uncertainty models omit the probability of switching
state and fail to explain what happen under uncertainty shocks.
Table 1.13: Counterfactual Experiments - Dynamic versus Static States
Benchmark model is the dynamic model I estimated in Section 5. “No Dyn. States” is the case where an
economy have constant low or high uncertainty level. L denotes low uncertainty state and H denotes high
uncertainty state. All moments in this table have been multiplied by 100 already.
(a) Benchmark (b) No Dyn. States
L H L H
Investment 4.73 3.80 6.27 0.00
Issuance 0.91 0.41 12.70 0.00
Issuance Prob. 1.76 0.99 10.90 0.00
Payout 6.28 6.09 24.38 0.95
Payout Prob. 42.69 37.52 76.61 100.00
Cash Ratio 16.53 17.72 13.97 0.00
Panel (b) of Table 1.13 reports the results. I first compare the low uncertainty states in
static uncertainty economy and in the dynamic model. Because firm in the static economy
bears no risk to a bad state with high uncertainty, its expected productivity is high. So
a firm invests more and issues more. Also, because its expected uncertainty is low, it will
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hoard less cash and distribute more to its equity holders. The extra cash ratio hoards in
the state L in the benchmark model relative to the static one is about 2.5% of capital, or
about 15% of cash. This can be considered as an excess precautionary savings due to the
uncertainty shocks.
The difference between the static and dynamic model is more evident when uncertainty
is high. In the high uncertainty state with static uncertainty, capital investment is not
attractive. Because the economy has low productivity and high uncertainty. Even worse, it
will never switch back to a profitable state. Therefore, a firm has no incentive to invest and
save in the static H state. It has zero investment and cash holdings, and it pays dividends
to the equity holders with probability 1.
This experiment illustrates the key difference between dynamic versus static uncertainty
models. In dynamic model, a firm expects what can happen in the future and rationally
prepares for potential good or bad shocks. A static model ignores such possibility and
therefore fails to explain firm behaviors. In this case, rational expectation plays a key role
in dynamic model and produces consistent results to the reality, as suggested by Lucas
(1976).
1.7.4 Uncertainty versus Financing Cost Shocks
The following two counterfactual experiments investigate the importance of specific shocks.
This paper investigates the effects of uncertainty shocks. But financing cost shocks seem to
be positively correlated with uncertainty shocks and it can also depress investment, issuance,
and payout simultaneously, as suggested in Bolton et al. (2013). Therefore, the comovement
can be due to uncertainty shocks, financing cost shocks, or both. This subsection removes
one shock at a time and compares them to the benchmark model.
The counterfactual experiments proceed as follow. For the no volatility shock case, I
assume that the level of volatility in the high uncertainty state is the same as the one in the
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Table 1.14: Counterfactual Experiments - Uncertainty versus Financing Cost Shocks
Benchmark model is the dynamic model I estimated in Section 5. No Vol. Shock is the case where the cash
flow volatilities stay at the low level, keeping other parameters unchanged. No Fin. Shock is the case a firm
has constant financing costs as that in the low uncertainty state, other parameters unchanged. L denotes
low uncertainty state and H denotes high uncertainty state. All moments in this table have been multiplied
by 100 already.
(a) Benchmark (b) No Vol. Shock (c) No Fin. Shock
L H L H L H
Investment 4.73 3.80 4.97 4.19 4.72 3.91
Issuance 0.91 0.41 0.95 0.30 0.86 0.50
Issuance Prob. 1.76 0.99 1.83 0.52 1.51 1.14
Payout 6.28 6.09 4.39 5.33 6.16 6.64
Payout Prob. 42.69 37.52 34.47 42.74 42.22 37.54
Cash Ratio 16.53 17.72 17.91 17.67 16.67 17.32
low uncertainty state,44 i.e.,
σNoV olShockj,H = σ
NoV olShock
j,L = σj,L ,
where j denotes either aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks. At the same time, I am keeping
other parameters unchanged.
Panel (b) of Table 1.14 reports the results of the counterfactual experiment without
volatility shocks. Three points emerges from the comparison with the Benchmark case
in Panel (a). First, investment in this counterfactual case is uniformly higher. And the
discrepancy between two states is much narrower in this counterfactual economy. This
suggests that without time-varying volatility, the model fails to take into account the real
option effects from investment and thus unable to explain the large drop in investment.
Second, with volatility level fixed, payout is higher but issuance is lower. So it fails to
reproduce the simultaneous reduction in payout and issuance in the data. Third, in this
counterfactual case, payout is higher, issuance and cash ratios are lower than the benchmark
case in both low and high uncertainty states. This suggests that in a world with volatility
44In this sense, the name “high uncertainty state” is abused here. But I just want to keep the names
consistent for the ease of comparison.
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shocks, a firm has additional incentive to save more liquidity than the case without volatility
shock, to insure itself against the potential high volatility. This accounts for about 10% of
the average cash holdings in both states.
The next experiment assumes constant financing costs in both uncertainty states. In this
case, I force the high uncertainty state financing costs to be the same as the low uncertainty
state one while keeping other parameters fixed. The new specification is
4λNoFinShock0 = 4λNoFinShock1 = 0 .
Panel (c) of Table 1.14 reports the results of the experiment without financing cost
shocks. By juxtaposing these results with the benchmark and the no volatility shock cases,
I find that both average payout and issuance increase. (Graphs) shows that a firm still
postpones payout and issuance decisions, conditional on the same level of productivity and
cash ratios. But this effect is subsumed by more disperse payout of firm states, which makes
a firm more likely to reach extreme states on both ends of payout and issuance.
The next noticeable result is about investment. Without financing cost shocks, invest-
ment still drops in high uncertainty state. But the magnitude of this drop is larger than that
in the no volatility shock case. This suggests that volatility shocks have relatively larger
impact than financing cost shocks.
In sum, this subsection shows that (1) combination of volatility and financing cost shocks
are indispensable to explain the simultaneous reduction in payout and issuance following
positive uncertainty shocks; (2) volatility shocks have more significant impacts on real in-
vestment, while financing cost shocks have more important impacts on financing activities;
(3) firms have extra precautionary saving motive against the uncertainty shocks, accounting
for about 10% of average cash holdings.
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1.7.5 How Important Are Risk Premia?
I then investigate the impacts of risk premia in three counterfactual experiments. In the
first experiment, I assume market risk is not priced, naming it “no market risk”. This is
achieved by assuming that the price parameter associated to the market risk is zero, or
ηNoMarketRisk = 0 .
In the second experiment, I assume the risk prices of state switching are zero, i.e.,
ΓNoSwitchingRisks,,s′ = 0, s, s
′ ∈ {L,H} .
Finally, I look at the case where both risks are not priced. This case can be considered as a
special case where all uncertainty shocks are idiosyncratic so they are not priced.
Table 1.15 presents the counterfactual experiments which remove the risk premia. Over-
all, one can see the risk premia have less substantial impacts on firm investment but relatively
large impact on financing, especially on cash holdings. Panel (b) shows that, if market risk
is not priced, cash ratios will be higher than the benchmark case because capital has higher
risk-adjusted returns and firms are willing to hold more cash to finance potential investment
opportunities. Firms also pay out more in the H state in this counterfactual case. Because
If the switching risk is not priced, cash ratios would have been much higher than the
benchmark case. Because a firm now perceives lower probability of the H state to happen.
As a result, it hoards more cash in both states in order to invest more.
Finally, in Panel (d), when both risks are not priced, cash ratios are also lower, suggesting
that the effects from the risk price of state switching dominates those from market risk
premium.
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Table 1.15: Counterfactual Experiments: Roles of Risk Premia
Benchmark model is the dynamic model I estimated in Section 5. No MK RP case assumes that the risk
price for market cash flow risk is zero. RP here is short for risk premium. No SW RP is the case where the
risk price of switching states is zero. No Both RP case assumes that both risks are not priced. All moments
in this table have been multiplied by 100 already.
(a) Benchmark (b) No MK RP (c) No SW RP (d) No Both RP
L H L H L H L H
Investment 4.73 3.80 4.70 4.02 4.73 4.52 4.70 4.04
Issuance 0.91 0.41 0.66 0.49 3.72 2.85 1.49 0.36
Iss. Prob. 1.76 0.99 1.60 1.32 6.88 5.92 1.14 0.99
Payout 6.28 6.09 4.94 8.39 12.29 6.26 3.54 7.26
Pay. Prob. 42.69 37.52 39.16 46.73 54.29 40.39 29.75 37.34
Cash Ratio 16.53 17.72 17.17 14.72 25.35 29.80 21.72 18.87
1.8 Conclusion
This paper develops a parsimonious dynamic model to investigate the corporate financing
and investment behaviors under uncertainty shocks. Four novel results are established. (1)
A positive uncertainty shock predicts a substantial lower amount in issuance, distribution,
and investment in a following quarter. (2) Such a comovement can be explained by a model
with financial frictions and investment irreversibility, which generate real option effects and
delay both financing and real investment during high uncertainty periods. Time varying
risk premia are quantitatively important to match the large impacts. (3) The impact of
uncertainty shocks depends on individual firm’s productivity and liquidity. A more liquid
or less productive firm is less affected and less likely to depress distribution and investment
in high uncertainty episode, but it is more likely to delay issuance as it is more financially
flexible. (4) Comparative statics in constant volatility models cannot explain the observed
simultaneous reduction in issuance and distribution.
This paper adopts a reduced form approach on the financing costs because it focuses on
the endogenous financing and investment behaviors under uncertainty shocks. The model
is not able to derive whether higher financing costs are a result of higher uncertainty or the
opposite, or both are the outcome of another source, like asymmetric information. In a more
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sophisticated model, the level and change of financing costs can endogenously emerge as an
equilibrium outcome and therefore is able to explain the source of the positive correlation
between uncertainty shocks and financing costs. I leave this question for future research.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Investment and Risk




Exchange rate collapses constitute dramatic changes of relative circumstances for firms de-
pending on whether they produce for the domestic or foreign markets. Nontradable produc-
ers see the costs of imported inputs rising dramatically in units of domestic currency, while
tradable producers face relatively unchanging dollar-denominated markets for the products
and reduced hard-currency denominated costs of labor, real estate, and other domestically
supplied inputs. These different consequences for tradable and nontradable producers should
be reflected in different asset investment and corporate financing for firms subsequent to ex-
change rate collapses.
To the extent that exchange rate collapses are anticipated, differences in the dynamic
paths of asset allocation (especially cash savings versus real investment), investment timing,
and capital structure choice may be visible prior to devaluation, as tradable and nontradable
producers anticipate the consequences of devaluation. Indeed, there is substantial evidence
that the most dramatic exchange rate collapses that occurred in emerging market countries
during the 1990s – including the Mexican devaluation of 1994, the Thai, Korean, and In-
donesian devaluations of 1997, the Brazil devaluation in 1999, and the Argentine devaluation
of 2002 – were anticipated by markets. Those market expectations were reflected in large
interest rate differentials between domestic-denominated and foreign-denominated deposits
or loans prior to the devaluations, as well as prominent commentaries expressing the belief
that the real exchange rates of each of these countries was overvalued. For example, Rudi-
ger Dornbusch famously predicted the Mexican currency collapse roughly a year before it
occurred (see also Whitt (1996)). The April 12 edition of the Economist (1997) featured a
special section on weaknesses in East Asian economies, and predicted “twin crises” in Thai-
land, Korea, and Indonesia that would result from their unsustainable policy paths. The
Argentine crisis of 2002 was widely predicted as many as three years prior to its collapse.
Furthermore, there are deeper structural drivers that explain the asymmetric nature of
exchange rate collapses in emerging markets, which also explain why those collapses are
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anticipated: the political economy of pegged exchange rates typically takes the form of
combining pegs with inconsistent expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (e.g., in Mexico
pre-1994 and Argentina pre-2002) or unsustainable implicit support for the debts of ineffi-
cient “crony” enterprises by the state (e.g., in Thailand, Korea, or Indonesia prior to 1997).
Those visible inconsistencies explain why the countries’ pegs were so clearly unsustainable.
Political payoffs from pursuing expansionary policies, or from protecting crony enterprises,
explain both why emerging market countries only exit their pegs in the direction of devalu-
ation, and why those exits typically are long-anticipated by market participants.
Here we develop a model of corporate investment and savings behavior that analyzes
how firms in different circumstances respond differently to an anticipated devaluation. We
consider differences in firms’ product markets (tradable versus nontradable), resulting with
different cash flows, as well as differences in firms’ current cash positions. We analyze two
key aspects of firm behaviors in our model: the timing of investment spending, and the
cash savings in a related way. We show that tradable firms have an incentive to expand
investment prior to an anticipated devaluation, as a means for smoothing the adjustment
costs of investment to the new equilibrium. Conversely, nontradable firms anticipate lower
post-devaluation investment, and will consequently begin to reduce investment prior to
devaluation. Cash accumulation paths for the two producer types also differ, but those
differences depend crucially on the marginal sources of their financing. When the marginal
source of funding is internal funds, increase in investment reduces cash balance.
Our model highlights the two relationships between real investment and cash savings.
Anticipating favorable cash flows in the future, a tradable firm may want to expand its
existing business to smooth investment and at the same time save more for future investment.
In this sense, investment and cash savings are complimentary. However, in a world with
financial frictions, a firm cannot do both. Its current cash balance posts budget constraint
on their ability to allocate resources. A higher investment will cause lower cash savings in
the future, when the marginal source of funding is internal funds. In this sense, investment
and cash savings are substitute. These two relationships help us to understand the firm
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behaviors around devaluations.
Our paper contributes to two existing literature. The first one investigates how de-
valuation affects firm investment behaviors, including Calomiris (2007) and Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2010). However, most of them focus on the post-evaluation analysis on earnings and
investment. We complement them by studying the investment and cash savings behavior
before anticipated devaluation events. The second literature is concerned about the cash
flow sensitivity of cash, which is still a debate between Almeida et al. (2004) and Riddick
and Whited (2009). They differ mainly about the correlation between the current and fu-
ture cash flows. We exploit the unique setting of pre-devaluation episodes to disentangle the
debate both theoretically and empirically. The pre-devaluation episodes provide a unique
setting where current cash flows differ from expected future cash flows. Thus they allow us
to examine the cash flow sensitivity of cash in a cleaner setting.
The remainder of our paper is organized in three parts. Section 2 provides a model of
investment timing and cash accumulation for tradable and nontradable producers with dif-
fering external finance costs. Section 3 presents some data from the Mexican and Argentine
experiences with devaluation as a preliminary test of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 A Model of Firm Behaviors with Devaluation Risks
We present a parsimonious model here to study firm investment and risk management de-
cisions in the context of an small open economy. The economy in this model is a small one
with currency-peg policy. It has two stages: the before and after devaluation stage. Before
devaluation, the local currency is pegged. The only risk in this stage is the possibility that
the economy steps into devaluation.
As we will see, the optimal investment policies in this framework follow a cutoff rule,
as in standard real option theories of investment. Firms are trading off its financing costs
and the benefits of investing. But the benefits of investing today are to save tomorrow’s
investment costs, not about enjoying a higher profit today. Also, our model is able to
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generate implications on the cash flow sensitivity of cash. Finally, it will generate testable
hypotheses in the devaluation event context.
2.2.1 The economy
We consider the economy to have two states and three dates, as plotted in Figure 2.1. There
are two states, pre-devaluation (P ) or devaluation (D). The exchange rate ξs denotes how
much one U.S. dollar is worth in terms of local currencies. Before devaluation, the exchange
is fixed at ξP > 0. After devaluation, the exchange is fixed at ξD > ξP .
Figure 2.1: Dates and States around Devaluation
The economy starts at date 0 with pre-devaluation state P and ends up with devaluation
state D. The date at which the economy steps into state D is random. Starting from date 0,
there is probability p for the economy to go to state D at date 1. At date 1, the probability
to end up in state D at date 2 is 1. Once the economy ends up in state D, it will remain
in that state forever. In each date, a firm chooses optimally its investment and cash saving
policies.
In this economy, a firm has profit per unit of capital stock as
πis = θisRi − ϑisCi (2.1)
Here, π is the profit rates per unit of capital. R and C are the unit revenues and costs, respec-
tively. They are assumed to be constant over time in their operating currencies throughout
the model. θ and ϑ are the conversion rates of those costs into local currency. i ∈ {T,N} de-
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notes the type of the firm, tradable or nontradable. s ∈ {P,D} is the state of pre-devaluation
(P ) or devaluation (D). For a tradable firm, θTs = ξs and ϑTs = 1. For a nontradable firm,
θNs = 1, ϑNs = 1/ξs. Because ξD > ξP , we have πTD > πTP and πND < πNP .
We also assume that a firm faces a constant discount rate r. We assume constant return
to scale, and normalized all date-0 capital stock to 1. The cash-to-capital ratio is w.
Finally, a firm can save in cash. Cash inside firm earns a zero return. But a firm may
still want to save in cash because external financing is costly. Whenever a firm raises funds
from outside, it pays an additional linear cost λ. We assume λ > r, so that financing costs
are still meaningful after discounted by 1 period.
2.2.2 A tradable firm problem
We focus on a tradable firm first. Suppose the firm has investment opportunity to scale up
its business: by paying unit cost of capital c, the firm can enlarge its business by a factor i.
Here, we assume c and i are fixed constant to simplify our analysis. In essence, all we need
is that a firm cannot pool all its investment all at once, it must spread out its investment
over different periods. Our assumption restricts the firm’s ability to scale up per period.
In order to solve the firm’s problem, we need to move from backward. We assume that
at date 2, a firm must meet a cash ratio target w. Once it has achieved that, it can reinvest






for every future period. For conciseness, we omit the firm type subscript T for the following
cases.
2.2.2.1 Date-1 problem
At date 1, the firm knows next period is devaluation state for sure. But the current cash
flows differ by state. Suppose the firm has a cash-to-capital ratio w1, and it chooses the
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optimal investment and financing to maximize the next period value as well as fulfilling the
cash requirement w. The firm problem is
v1s (w1) = max
d1s,φ1s
{d1s (1 + λφ1s) + (1 + i1s) vT }
s.t.
d1s = w1 + π1s − i1s −
θ
2
i21s − (1 + i1s)w .
Notice that, the budget constraint is actually a firm’s financial statement if we re-arrange
it into
(1 + i1s)w − w1 = π1s − i1s −
θ
2
i21s − d12 . (2.2)
The left-hand side
We have the optimal investment policies
i∗1s (w1) =





(1 + w)2 + 2θ (w1 + π1s − w)− (1 + w)
]
if w1 ≤ w1 < w1s
1
1+λ i1 if w1 ≤ w1
where

























We already observe the following properties of firm decisions. First, investment and
value of the firm are increasing and concave functions of current cash holding w1. Second,
there is a substantial inaction region on cash, where a firm neither pays out or finances. The
inaction region is larger when financing cost λ is larger. Both results are consistent with
Bolton et al. (2011).
In the sense of comparative statics, we already see that optimal investment is increasing
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with future cash flows πTD, which appears in the future discounted cash flows vT in both
states as well as directly in the state D at date 1. Investment is also increasing with cash
ratio w1, and decreasing with financing costs λ. However, we have not seen the effects of
devaluation probability p and the change of cash savings yet. We will investigate these
effects at date-0 problem.
Finally, it is clear that w1D > w1P and w1D > w1P . We assume that the difference
between πD and πP is large enough that w1D > w1P . This condition is also satisfied when
financing cost parameter λ is small enough. In all the following derivation, we have
w1D > w1D > w1P > w1P .
2.2.2.2 Date-0 problem
The date-0 problem is
v0 (w0) = max
d0,i0
d0 (1 + λφ0) +
1 + i0
1 + r
[pv1D (w1) + (1− p) v1P (w1)]
s.t.
d0 = w0 + πP − i0 −
θ
2
i20 − (1 + i0)w1 .
We first note that, there is a pecking-order of financing by our assumption of equity
returns and financing costs. Because of the lower return on cash balance than the discount
rate, a firm always prefers to pay out earlier rather than later, ceteris paribus. On the other
hand, because of the linear financing costs and the positive discount rate, a firm always
prefers to delay financing if it can. As a result, ranking from high to low cash balance, a
firm finances its potential investment by cutting dividends first. A firm with no dividends
to cut starts to use its internal funding. Only when all its cash are depleted a firm will seek
for outside financing. This pecking-order of financing corresponds to the three cash regions:
payout region, cash inaction region, and external financing region.
The solution of the model is followed.
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Proposition 1. There are three regions of cash actions.
1. If w0 ≥ w0 (p, λ), the firm is in the payout region. The firm pays out at date 0 and the
optimal investment and saving policies are defined by
w∗1 = argw1
[
Ev′1 (w1) = 1 + r
]
)






Ev1 (w∗1 (p, λ))− 1− w∗1 (p, λ)
)
w0 (p, λ) ≡ i∗0 +
θ
2





Here w∗1 and w0 are decreasing in the devaluation probability p. i
∗
0 is independent of
p. The effects of financing cost parameter λ has ambiguous effects.
(a) If w0 < w0, the firm is in the financing region. The firm has the following optimal
policies:
w∗1 = 0
i∗0 = i0 ≡
1








In this case, p has no effect on the optimal policies and λ has ambiguous effects.
(b) When w0 ∈ (w0, w0), a firm does not pay out or finance. The optimal policies









(1 + w1) ,
CFS: 0 = w0 + πP − i0 −
θ
2
i20 − (1 + i0)w0 .
We have i0 increasing with w0 and p. w1 is increasing with w0 but decreasing
with p. λ has ambiguous effects.
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We focus the policy making in the cash inaction region, because it is more likely to
happen in the reality. The rest of the proof can be found in the Appendix. In the cash
inaction region, the optimal conditions with respect to cash is:
1
1 + r
Ev′1 (w1) = v′0 (w0) . (2.3)
This simply says the firm is smoothing its cash saving policies by equating their present
marginal values in different periods.






Ev′1 (w1) (1 + θi0 + w1) . (2.4)
Note that we actually denominate everything by capital already. If we bring the capital


























Ev′1 (w1) (1 + θi0) (2.5)
This optimal condition says, marginal benefits of capital (left hand side) equals to the
marginal value of cash ( 11+rEv
′
1 (w1)) multiplied by the marginal cost of investment (1+θi0).
The extra marginal value of cash term compared to frictionless investment model, is the key
implication of investment theory with financial frictions.
Rewrite Equation (2.4) and the Cash Flow Statement, we have two relationship between
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(1 + w1) ,
CFS: 0 = w0 + πP − i0 −
θ
2
i20 − (1 + i0)w0 .
These two equations constitute the main analysis framework for our model.








(1 + w1) ,
CFS: 0 = w0 + πP − i0 −
θ
2
i20 − (1 + i0)w0 .
The chart is for illustration only. It is not accurately plotted with a particular set of parameters.
Figure 2.2: Complementarity and Substitution of Investment and Cash Savings
These two relationships characterize our equilibrium. They are plotted in Figure 2.2.
The FOC is an upward sloping curve, because a higher cash balance tomorrow means a
higher value tomorrow, thus the marginal benefits of capital in tomorrow are higher. A firm
thus wants to invest more. We call this a complementarity relationship between investment
and future cash balance. On the other hand, the allocation between investment and cash
savings are limited by current cash balance in a world with financial frictions. We call
it Cash Flow Statement (CFS) constraint.1 Therefore, investing more could simply mean
1The CFS here does not have the cash flows from financing because it is in the inaction region. We should
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savings less for tomorrow because of this constraint. This substitution relationship therefore
implies a downward sloping curve, as in Figure 2.2.
The readers should be aware of the left and right boundary of the CFS curve. The left
boundary denotes the financing boundary, where a tradable firm resorts to external financing
and saves zero.2 The right boundary is the payout boundary, where the cash today already
exceeds the need for investment and savings.
We are now ready to discuss the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect
to i0 and w1. An increase in current cash ratio w0 increases the available resources to be
allocated, alleviating the substitution effects. The budget constraint curve shifts up, as in
Panel (a) of Figure (2.3). Current cash ratio does not alter the FOC curve directly, so it
has no direct effect on the complementarity relationship. Both investment and future cash
savings go up along the FOC curve.
On the other hand, a higher devaluation probability p means better investment opportu-
nity in the future. It shifts up the FOC curve. (See Appendix for proof.) Intuitively, better
investment opportunities means that a firm wants to invest in both the immediate future
and the remote future, while the latter implies a firm wants to save more cash. A higher
devaluation probability p also increases the w∗1 because the higher expected cash need in the
future. This changes the right boundary of the CFS curve, as shown in Panel (b) of Figure
2.3. But it does not change the remaining part of the CFS. So locally, the current invest-
ment and cash savings move along inside the CFS line. To sum up, a higher devaluation
probability p generally implies a higher investment but lower cash savings, because of the
substitution effect.
therefore be really careful that the implications here only apply to cash inaction region locally.
2The conclusion of saving zero here is due to the linear financing cost assumption. With additional fixed
costs, the cash savings behavior around the financing boundary is more complicated and usually not zero in
most cases. Adding convex costs of financing, however, does not alter the conclusion here.
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(a) Effects of w0
(b) Effects of p
Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics
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2.2.3 The cash flow sensitivities of cash and investment
Now we are ready to investigate the cash flow sensitivities of cash and investment. Our spe-
cial context of devaluation has the following features: Pre-devaluation cash flows were fixed
because the local government pegged their currencies to other currencies or benchmarks. On
the other hand, one-side anticipation of future devaluation instead of further over-valuation
meant the firms’ future investment demand was well defined even at the pre-devaluation
stage. The separation of the current and future cash flows thus provides a good way to
understand the cash flow sensitivity of cash.
Our model results suggest that the cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSoC) differs by the
timing of cash flow shocks. A current cash flow shock is equivalent to the shock to the current
cash ratio, which results in a complementarity between investment and future cash savings,
so the CFSoC is positive. When expected future cash flow is high, in our context, a positive
probability of high future cash flow, a tradable firm wants to invest more and save more.
If we believe that the majority of firms use internal funds as their marginal resources of
funding, the investment and future cash savings are competing for limited current resources.
Substitution effects between investment and cash savings dominate, and we should expect
the next period cash balance to be lower when investment is higher. In another word, cash
savings are complementary to future investment needs but substitutes to current investment.
This complementarity-substitution switch between cash savings and investment is crucial
to understand the debate on the CFSoC. In Almeida et al. (2004), they propose that the
CFSoC is positive. But Riddick and Whited (2009) instead claim the CFSoC is negative.
They both look at current CFSoC, both empirically and theoretically. While their empirical
results differ because of the measurement errors of Tobin’s Q, their theories differ at the
degree of correlation between current and future cash flows. In Almeida et al. (2004), future
cash flows are not correlated with current cash flows, so they are considering a problem
shifting the CFS curve, which results in higher next period cash balance. So under their
framework, current CFSoC is positive. On the other hand, Riddick and Whited (2009) has
mean-reverting cash flows, which means current cash flows are highly correlated with cash
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flows in the immediate future but not the remote future. As a result, they are shifting both
the FOC and CFS curve, the total effect is ambiguous and the CFSoC is undetermined.3
Our model and the following empirical tests complement their predictions and try to
resolve this puzzle. We do not look at the current CFSoC because in our context the current
cash flows of firms are fixed due to the currency-peg policy before devaluation. Instead, we
look at the expected arrival of future cash flows. This isolates the future cash flows shocks
from the current cash flows. It helps to identify the CFSoC through the interaction of cash
savings and investment. Devaluation events of emerging markets, especially the expected
divergence of the cash flows between tradable and nontradable firms, provide ideal natural
experiments to address this issue.
Our framework also provides answer to the cash flow sensitivity of investment, a long
and influential literature since Fazzari et al. (1988). Undoubtedly, our model predicts that
the cash flow sensitivity of investment is positive, either because of higher current cash flow
πP (an increase in current πP is equivalent to current cash ratio w0) or higher future cash
flow, increases of p. But it tells nothing about whether more or less financially constrained
firms have higher or lower sensitivity, because the effects of λ here are ambiguous. This is
consistent with Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Bolton et al. (2011). Our contribution here
is to separate the current and future cash flows effects, which helps to better understanding
the complementarity and substitution effects between investment and cash savings.
2.2.4 A nontradable firm problem
We now turn to look at nontradable firms. For nontradable firms like services, their rev-
enues are generated mainly from local. They may or may not subject to higher input prices,
depending on whether they import inputs or not. So relative to their current cash flows,
nontradable producers can only have worse cash flows once devaluation happens. Anticipat-
ing this, nontradable producers may lower their investment beforehand, if they would like
3Riddick and Whited (2009) also point out that higher next period cash may not be equivalent to higher
cash savings, i.e., how the savings (1 + i0)w1 − w0 respond to an increase in w0 is a quantitative question.
We do not discuss it at the current stage.
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to do anything with their capital stock. To be conservative, we assume that a nontradable
firm does not change its existing investment level.
The cash savings on a nontradable firm are not ambiguous in our model. Our model
assumes once devaluation happens, the new currency exchange rate will apply forever. The
investment opportunity is permanently worse for nontradable firms in the model. So a
nontradable firms have lower cash needs. In reality, however, a nontradable firm may expect
the devaluation to be temporary. To survive through the temporary bad period and to
thrive from the normal period afterward, a nontradable firms may choose to prepare more
cash savings for the devaluation. This is beyond our model at the current stage.
2.2.5 Extensions
We observe that a lot of firms in the emerging markets, Latin American countries in partic-
ular, borrowed heavily abroad. (Calomiris (2007)) This creates a balance sheet mismatch
problem and can affect their investment and financing decisions. In order to accommodate
this balance sheet mismatch problem, we can extend our model to have different parameters
within the sectors. A higher foreign debt means a relatively higher interest rate coming
from the future, so the operating costs Ci is higher in Equation (2.1). Also, the requirement
for future cash ratio of a sustainable long-term growth path w will be higher. At the same
time, if we adopt the net debt interpretation, it acts like the current cash balance is lower.
Therefore, we can interpret the effects of higher foreign debt balance as reducing both the
future cash flow after devaluation and the current net cash ratio, and increasing future cash
needs. The effects of foreign debt on investment seem to be uniform for both tradable and
nontradable firms: higher foreign debt reduces investment in both types of firms. But the
effect of foreign debt on cash management is ambiguous to both types of firms, as higher
foreign debt means lower future investment opportunity and higher future cash needs.4
4These arguments relies on an assumption that firms are taking their foreign debt ratios unchanged over
time. If the firms are allowed to raise or retire existing debt, the conclusions will be different. For example,
nontradable firms may want to pay back their foreign debt before devaluation. However, from the our data
sample, we do not observe such foreign debt retirement behaviors.
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2.3 Empirical Testing
In this section, we are going to first lay out the testable hypotheses from our model. We
then discuss whether the expectation of the arrival of devaluations and their consequences
are justified in the following two subsections. We use the Mexico 1999 and Argentina 2002
as two devaluation events for our analysis. Subsection 2.3.4 describes data and Subsection
2.3.5 presents the results.
2.3.1 Testable hypotheses and methodology
We hereby summarize our model implications for behaviors of tradable relative to nontrad-
able firms, which serve as testable hypotheses for our empirical session.
H1 The closer the devaluation was, the more tradable firms invested relative to nontradable
firms.
H2 Tradable firms tend to save less in cash when devaluation were approaching.
H3 For both tradable and nontradable firms, higher foreign debt tends to reduce investment
before devaluation.
Notice that both H1 and H2 are difference-in-difference statement. The first difference is
between tradable and nontradable firms. The second one is between far from and very close
to the devaluations. A key assumption behind the second difference is that, we assume that
devaluation probabilities became higher when the economy is closer to actual devaluation.
This is generally true in the history, as we will see in Subsection 2.3.2. It would be better if
we can have an ex ante measure of devaluation probabilities. We are trying to cover such ex
ante measure from interest rate spreads using covered interest rate parity formula. At the
current stage, we use time to devaluation as our primary measure.
We are going to empirically test our model. Because our model only considers devalua-
tion shocks, many other factors can be left out that can potentially affect firm investment
and financing behaviors. Fortunately, the differential behaviors between tradable and non-
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tradable firms can eliminate a lot of such shocks. For a potential shock to undermine the
validity of our test, it must affect the tradable and nontradable firms systematically in the
same direction as we predict here.
2.3.2 Devaluation events and anticipation of them
Our model and tests rely on two key assumptions: First, devaluations change the post-
devaluation cash flows of firms but not the pre-devaluation ones. This is equivalent to
say that exchange rates before devaluations were pegged to almost a constant rate, and a
large jump in the event of devaluation. Second, firms anticipate such devaluation events
beforehand.
Throughout this whole empirical session, we will use two major devaluation events,
Mexico 1999 and Argentina 2002 for our analysis. Historical exchange rate data and other
macroeconomic indexes are from tradingeconomics.com, which allows retrieving charts for
free but not the raw data. In order to confirm that the pre-devaluation currencies were
pegged, we plot the historical exchange rates of the local currencies around these two events
in Figure 2.4.
(a) Exchange Rates - MEX (b) Exchange Rates - ARG
All charts here are produced from www.tradingeconomics.com. Exchange rates are defined as the amount
of local currencies equivalent to 1 U.S. dollar.
Figure 2.4: Exchange Rates around Devaluations
From Panel (a) of Figure 2.4, we can see that, before December 1994, the USD-Mexico
peso exchange rate was relatively flat. In March 1994 there is a surge, but not comparable
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to the huge jump after devaluation. Panel (b) of Argentina shows a similar pattern. The
exchange rate was totally flat before January 2002 devaluation, and jumped to a new level,
more than tripling the pre-devaluation exchange rates. These pattern justify our assumption
that pre-devaluation cash flows are relatively stable for the difference between the tradable
and nontradable sectors.
Now we want to answer another question: are such devaluations anticipated? We
have mentioned some examples in the introduction, but here we want to see how the pre-
devaluation data told firms to anticipate devaluation. Because we do not have Mexico
macroeconomic data go back to before 1994, we focus on Argentina devaluation episode
here. For the anticipation of the Mexico devaluation event, the readers can refer to Whitt
(1996). For more details of the predictability of Argentina devaluation, see Calomiris (2007).
We first provide a little background of the reason for devaluation. A pegged currency
needs devaluation because the market believes it is over-valued relative to the country’s
long-run economic fundamental. And the most direct measure of the market’s perception
of the devaluation risk is the interest rate differential between the U.S. dollar-denominated
and Argentina peso-denominated deposits. According to covered interest rate parity, we can
establish the following relationship (Calomiris (2007)):
ipeso − idollar = (perceived probability of devaluation)× (% expected devaluation)
+(devaluation risk premium) .
For this reason, we plot the 15 days interbank borrowing rate of Argentina in Panel
(a) of Figure2.5. Dollar interbank borrowing rates were very flat during this period and
not plotted here. We can see that this interest rate started to climb at the end of 2000.
It fluctuated over time because of government intervention, but generally climbed up and
persisted even after devaluation. Based on such observation, a firm before 2002 could predict
a positive probability of devaluation going on in the future.
Another indicator of devaluation probability is the foreign exchange reserves, which
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(a) Interbank Borrowing Rate (b) Foreign Exchange Reserves
All charts here are produced from www.tradingeconomics.com. Interbank rates are annualized and expressed
in units of percentage points. Reserves are in units of million U.S. dollars.
Figure 2.5: Argentina: Is the Devaluation Predictable?
is presented in Panel (b) of Figure 2.5. Foreign exchange reserves reflect the degree of
international capital flight and also the ability of the government to intervene the currency
market. When local currency is overvalued, international capital will flow out of the local
market. In order to sustain the overvalued currency, a local government will pay the fleeing
capital with reserves and receive local currencies at its pegged exchange rate. When the
government is unable to do so, it must devalue its currency that is able to support the
foreign exchange reserves.
In Panel (b) of Figure 2.5, we see that Argentina’s foreign exchange reserves had been
going down since 2001. Both the government and the firms anticipated that, it the currency
did not devalue, the reserves would keep fall down. This generated pressure for currency
devaluation. In fact, the currency devalued in January 2002, but the reserves were not
stabilized until late 2002. A firm in Argentina before 2002 should rationally anticipate the
devaluation based on the decline of the reserves.
2.3.3 Were tradable firms really better after devaluation?
Having established that devaluation is anticipated, we now turn to the question who should
different firms anticipate after devaluation. In theory, we expect tradable sectors benefit
from devaluation because their demand from foreign market is higher due to a cheaper price
in the foreign market, and the competition from abroad they face in the local market also
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declines because of the relative high price in the local market. Thus, in macroeconomic
historical data, we should observe that export went up after devaluation and import went
down.
(a) Exports - MEX (b) Exports - ARG
(c) Imports - MEX (d) Imports - ARG
(e) GDP Growth - MEX (f) GDP Growth - ARG
All graphs here are produced from www.tradingeconomics.com. GDP growth are in percentage points.
Exports and imports are in units of million U.S. dollars.
Figure 2.6: GDP Growth, Exports, and Imports around Devaluations
Figure 2.6 supports this hypothesis. From Panel (a) and (b), we can see that exports
in both countries went up after devaluation. While Mexico had their exports steadily going
up, Argentina has a much more volatile growth path. Panel (c) and (d) plot the imports.
we see both imports collapsed at the point of devaluation, and then took a long time to
recover. All these observations support our hypothesis that tradable firms expect relatively
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better cash flows than nontradable ones after devaluation.
Finally, we present the GDP growth of the two countries around devaluation events in
Panel (e) and (f). The GDP growth rate plummeted at devaluation. So both tradable
firms and nontradable firms suffered from this aggregate bad shock. However, our empirical
testing does not require that tradable firms have to expect higher cash flows after devaluation
than itself before devaluation. We only need the tradable firms to have better investment
opportunities than the non-tradable ones after the devaluation.
2.3.4 Data descriptions
We use a commercial dataset, Economatica, as our main dataset. This dataset covers
quarterly financial statements for publicly traded firms in Latin American countries since
1990. Besides regular financial accounting variables, foreign debt is also covered. For our
purpose, we are using two devaluation episodes for our analysis, December 1994 in Mexico
and January 2002 in Argentina.5 We look at three years before and after the devaluation
events, that is, 1992Q1 to 1996Q4 for Mexico and 1999Q1 to 2003Q4 for Argentina.
In the sample, we exclude financial firms, which have 2-digit NAICS codes being 52
(Finance and Insurance). Following Calomiris (2007), we classify a firm as tradable if its
NAICS code is 11 (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting), 21 (Mining), or 31-33
(Manufacturing). All other firms are defined as “non-tradable”.
The key variables are defined in Table 2.1 and summarized in Table 2.2. From the
summary statistics in Table 2.2, we can learn that Mexican public firms had lower cash
savings compared to US firms in the comparable period, while Argentine firms had even
lower. We also find that those public firms had substantial borrowing from foreign countries.
Mexico had 19% on average and Argentina had 40% in terms of book assets. Finally, there
are a lot of missing variables of earnings ratio (EBITDA over book assets. For this reason,
most of our analysis uses return on assets instead of earnings to measure cash flows.
5January 1999 in Brazil is also a devaluation episode that is covered by this dataset. However, Brazilian
firms each has four sets of financial statements and different accounting standards across different statements
and relative to other countries like Mexico and Argentina. We haven’t got that part of data ready by this
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Table 2.1: Description of Variables
Note: All accounting variables in level are in million U.S. dollars and in unit of million.
Variable Description
Total assets Total book assets in unit of million U.S. dollars.
Capital Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT).
Investment Quarterly change in PPENT plus depreciation.
Cash Cash and short-term investment.
Earnings Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).
Foreign debt Liabilities denominated in other countries’ currencies.
Tradability Tradable dummy: equal to 1 if the firm is in a tradable sector, 0 otherwise.
Tradable sectors are defined to be agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.
Investment ratio Investment over last quarter PPENT.
Cash ratio Cash over total assets.
Capital ratio PPENT over total assets.
Earnings ratios EBITDA over last quarter total assets.
Return on assets Sales over last quarter total assets.
Book leverage Book liabilities over total assets.
Foreign debt ratio Foreign debt over total assets.
We next split our samples into tradable and nontradable firms. These two groups of
firms are compared in Table 2.3. Overall, we see that these two groups differ a lot in the
two countries. In Mexico, nontradable firms invested less, saved more in cash, made more
revenues, and borrowed less from abroad. On the contrary, Argentine nontradable firms
invested more, saved less, and most strikingly, borrowed almost entirely from abroad.6 The
tremendous foreign debt could be one potential reason for Argentina’s debt redenomination
after its devaluation in 2002. (Calomiris (2007))
time.
6Such differences raise a concern that we may not define the tradable sectors across countries appropri-
ately.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics by Tradability
Note: All accounting variables in level are in million U.S. dollars and in unit of million. All ratio
variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentiles. For definition of variables, please refer to
Table 2.1.
(a) Mexico 1992Q1-1996Q4
Non-tradable (NT) Tradable (T)
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total assets 899 1146.3 356.7 2574.5 994 982.5 357.8 1595.9
Investment 794 0.0396 0.0294 0.0686 915 0.0509 0.0393 0.0753
Cash ratio 899 0.0807 0.0476 0.0980 994 0.0675 0.0370 0.0743
Capital ratio 899 0.4332 0.4425 0.2410 994 0.5943 0.6066 0.1447
Earnings ratio 395 0.0270 0.0246 0.0437 471 0.0316 0.0313 0.0478
ROA 861 0.2830 0.1882 0.2827 960 0.2078 0.1828 0.1327
Book leverage 899 0.4246 0.4261 0.2094 1000 0.4291 0.4400 0.2018
Foreign debt 763 0.1458 0.0824 0.1770 841 0.2378 0.2234 0.1945
(b) Argentina 1999Q1 - 2003Q4
Non-tradable (NT) Tradable (T)
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total assets 578 915.0 542.1 1273.2 846 633.8 117.8 1853.1
Investment 578 0.0242 0.0072 0.0730 846 0.0200 0.0056 0.0616
Cash ratio 578 0.0326 0.0191 0.0408 846 0.0481 0.0279 0.0592
Capital ratio 578 0.5043 0.7086 0.3719 846 0.3930 0.4025 0.2141
Earnings ratio 578 0.0208 0.0221 0.0329 846 0.0199 0.0148 0.0328
ROA 558 0.1040 0.0721 0.1049 838 0.1430 0.1314 0.1024
Book leverage 578 0.4988 0.5070 0.2428 846 0.4742 0.4715 0.2557
Foreign debt 578 0.4920 0.4590 0.3194 846 0.3340 0.2876 0.2843
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Note: All accounting variables in level are in million U.S. dollars and in unit of million. All ratio variables
are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentiles. For definition of variables, please refer to Table 2.1.
(a) Mexico 1992Q1 - 1996Q4
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 1893 1060.2858 357.0446 2118.7992 3.5185 25360.260
Investment ratio 1709 0.0457 0.0339 0.0725 -0.1591 0.3309
Cash ratio 1893 0.0737 0.0422 0.0866 0.0006 0.5005
Capital ratio 1893 0.5178 0.5611 0.2122 0 0.9147
Earnings ratio 866 0.0295 0.0284 0.046 -0.1005 0.232
Return on assets 1821 0.2434 0.1852 0.2201 0.0011 1.3518
Book leverage 1899 0.4270 0.4324 0.2054 0.0009 1
Foreign debt ratio 1604 0.1940 0.1372 0.1919 0 0.7056
Num. Firms 140
(b) Argentina 1999Q1 - 2003Q4
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 1424 747.9810 199.7398 1647.8884 1.6150 14855.0000
Investment ratio 1424 0.0217 0.006 0.0665 -0.0854 0.443
Cash ratio 1424 0.0418 0.0229 0.053 0 0.2871
Capital ratio 1424 0.4382 0.4491 0.2938 0 0.9279
Earnings ratio 1424 0.0203 0.018 0.0328 -0.1063 0.1233
Return on assets 1396 0.1274 0.1066 0.1051 0 0.5222
Book leverage 1424 0.4842 0.4889 0.2508 0.0058 1





We first look at investment and cash ratios of the two types of firms in the two countries
along different periods. Figure 2.7 plot the time series of investment and cash ratios. Tables
2.4 through 2.7 report the results. In Tables 2.4 through 2.7, we report both the results in the
full sample as well as those in the consistent sample, which we define as the sample of firms
that existed throughout the beginning period to at least four quarters after devaluations.
We also report the consistent sample results because we think that represents the within
firm dynamics better than the full sample.
In Panel (a) of Figure 2.7, we see that tradable firms (T) did not invest more than
nontradable firms (NT) in Mexico before 1994, sometimes even lower. But in 1994, within
one year before the devaluation, investment in the tradable sector has climbed up and
outnumbered the nontradable sector. Such trend persisted after devaluation. Table 2.4
confirm these observations. T invested more than NT by about 3.4 percentage points during
the year before devaluation. This is both statistically and economically significant. This
result is consistent with our hypothesis H1.
If we look at investment in Argentina around its 2002 devaluation, we do not observe
such pattern. In both Panel (b) of Figure 2.7 and Table 2.5, we see that NT always out-
invested T, and the gap did not converge as devaluation approaches, though in the full
sample the gap narrowed during year 2000. We conjecture that there might be other factors
systematically affecting the firm investment during that time. For example, the commodity
price decline during 2000-2002 may be affect tradable firms’ current cash flows and their
ability to invest. Another observation is that, from Panel (b) of Figure 2.6, Argentina
exports were going down from middle 2001 until the devaluation. That could also explain
why we do not observe a higher investment for the tradable sector before the devaluation.
The current cash flows for tradable firms were not constant now but falling down. For this
reason, our model may not well apply to Argentina case.
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Table 2.4: Investment Ratios - Mexico
Devaluation denotes the devaluation period and the quarter afterward. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The consistent sample is the sample
of firms that existed throughout the beginning period to at least four quarters after devaluations. The
t-test allows different variance across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(a) Full Sample (b) Consistent Sample
NT T t-stat (T-NT) NT T t-stat (T-NT)
1992Q1 - 1992Q3 0.0377 0.0393 0.1484 0.0405 0.0421 0.1198
(0.0734) (0.0597) (0.0808) (0.0583)
1992Q4 - 1993Q3 0.0360 0.0212 -1.7928* 0.0320 0.0197 -1.5199
(0.065) (0.0567) (0.0527) (0.0508)
1993Q4 - 1994Q3 0.0573 0.0915 4.1384*** 0.0504 0.0838 2.9599***
(0.0646) (0.0851) (0.0686) (0.0794)
Devaluation
1995Q2 - 1996Q4 0.0368 0.0481 2.8039*** 0.0450 0.0502 0.7214
(0.0595) (0.0535) (0.0619) (0.0605)
Num. Firms 17 27
We now turn to cash ratios. Panel (c) of Figure2.7 and Table 2.6 report the cash ratio
time series for Mexico tradable and nontradable firms. We observe that for the full sample,
cash savings declined for T relative to NT within a year before devaluation, in particular
in the middle of year 1994. So this supports our hypothesis H2. But the consistent sample
results, as well as the results in Argentina, are not very supportive.
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Table 2.5: Investment Ratios - Argentina
Devaluation denotes the devaluation period and the quarter afterward. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The consistent sample is the sample
of firms that existed throughout the beginning period to at least four quarters after devaluations. The
t-test allows different variance across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(a) Full Sample (b) Consistent Sample
NT T t-stat (T-NT) NT T t-stat (T-NT)
1999Q1 - 1999Q4 0.0132 0.0126 -0.1597 0.0142 0.0136 -0.1115
(0.0179) (0.0491) (0.0189) (0.0533)
2000Q1 - 2000Q4 0.0154 0.0053 -2.3251** 0.0109 0.0057 -2.1671**
(0.0437) (0.0219) (0.0121) (0.0217)
2001Q1 - 2001Q4 0.0096 0.0057 -1.5108 0.0113 0.0041 -2.9545***
(0.0177) (0.0271) (0.0167) (0.0182)
Devaluation
2002Q3 - 2003Q4 0.0078 0.0170 2.2299** 0.0065 0.0142 1.6610
(0.0397) (0.0437) (0.0429) (0.0349)
Num. Firms 22 29
Table 2.6: Cash Ratios - Mexico
Devaluation denotes the devaluation period and the quarter afterward. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The consistent sample is the sample
of firms that existed throughout the beginning period to at least four quarters after devaluations. The
t-test allows different variance across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(a) Full Sample (b) Consistent Sample
NT T t-stat (T-NT) NT T t-stat (T-NT)
1992Q1 - 1992Q3 0.0929 0.0784 -0.9969 0.0722 0.0854 0.9329
(0.1081) (0.0886) (0.0662) (0.0961)
1992Q4 - 1993Q3 0.0785 0.0767 -0.199 0.0761 0.0795 0.2946
(0.0833) (0.0794) (0.0646) (0.089)
1993Q4 - 1994Q3 0.0877 0.0688 -2.0527** 0.0727 0.0749 0.1962
(0.0947) (0.0777) (0.0652) (0.0862)
Devaluation
1995Q2 - 1996Q4 0.0748 0.0620 -2.1132** 0.0693 0.0633 -0.8983
(0.0999) (0.0693) (0.0502) (0.0665)
Num. Firms 17 27
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(a) Investment ratio - MEX (b) Investment ratio - ARG
(c) Cash ratio - MEX (d) Cash ratio - ARG
Blue sold lines are for tradable sectors and red dash lines are for nontradable sector. Shaded bars denote
the devaluation period and the quarter afterward. These two quarters are taken out because their irregular
investment and other patterns during the devaluations, both of which involved crises. Mexico Peso Crisis
happened in December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002.
Figure 2.7: Firm Behaviors in Two Sectors and Two Countries
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Table 2.7: Cash Ratios - Argentina
Devaluation denotes the devaluation period and the quarter afterward. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The consistent sample is the sample
of firms that existed throughout the beginning period to at least four quarters after devaluations. The
t-test allows different variance across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(a) Full Sample (b) Consistent Sample
NT T t-stat (T-NT) NT T t-stat (T-NT)
1999Q1 - 1999Q4 0.0262 0.0398 2.9428*** 0.0284 0.0374 1.7599*
(0.0297) (0.0476) (0.031) (0.0421)
2000Q1 - 2000Q4 0.0253 0.0411 2.9245*** 0.0265 0.0456 2.6914***
(0.0318) (0.06) (0.0326) (0.0665)
2001Q1 - 2001Q4 0.0255 0.0418 2.8784*** 0.0206 0.0480 3.9887***
(0.0382) (0.0589) (0.0281) (0.0668)
Devaluation
2002Q3 - 2003Q4 0.0462 0.0628 3.0039*** 0.0519 0.0649 1.9509*
(0.0487) (0.0635) (0.0528) (0.0608)
Num. Firms 22 29
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2.3.5.2 Regression results
We then look at the regression results, which can actually test the difference in difference
effects and control for important variables. In Table 2.8, we report the regression results
about investment, pooling both Mexico and Argentina together. The dummy B1Y Deval
denotes the observations that are during the period from one year before through a quarter
before the devaluations. The interaction between the tradability and this B1Y Deval (a*b)
is our main interest. Overall, this variable is significantly positive in both the full sample
and the consistent sample. This means that tradable firms invested more in the later periods
before devaluation. This supports our model hypothesis H1.
We also look at foreign debt. We find that lag foreign debt is positively correlated with
investment before we include the post-devaluation periods (3)-(6). This suggests that firms
borrow a lot in order to invest before devaluation. The interaction of high foreign debt and
the tradability dummy (a*c) is negative, meaning that high foreign debt was restricting the
tradable firms’ ability to invest even more than the nontradable firms. But this effect is not
statistically significant. Moreover, high foreign debt and the B1Y Deval dummy is negative
(b*c in the table), suggesting that the high foreign debt ratio starts to hinder investment.
Finally, we do not find evidence that high foreign debt is restricting tradable firms’ desire to
expand 1 year before devaluation, as suggested by the insignificance of the triple interaction
term (a*b*c).
Table 2.9 reports the regression results about cash ratio. First of all, we find that the
tradable firms save less in cash in 1 year before the devaluation (a*b term). This supports
our model hypothesis H2. Other interaction involving foreign debt ratios are not
statistically significant, except the interaction between the date dummy and the high
foreign debt dummy (b*c). The negative significant sign on it suggests that firms with
higher foreign debt are saving less one year before the devaluation. It could be due to
increase in investment or simply the high debt started to drain their cash.
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Table 2.8: Regression Results - Investment Ratio
B1Y Deval means the observations are during the period from one year before through a quarter before
the devaluations. High ForDebt is equal to one if the company had last quarter foreign debt ratio higher
than the median foreign debt ratio of the country tradable firms, otherwise 0. Post DVL means at least
two quarters after devaluation. Report ForDebt is one if last quarter the company reported foreign debt,
otherwise zero. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. Devaluation periods, i.e., the quarter
with announcement of devaluation and the quarter afterward, are excluded. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The t-test allows different variance
across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
Full Sample Consistent Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a: Tradability -0.00347 -0.00113 -0.00416 -0.00283 -0.00268 -0.00408
(0.00385) (0.00512) (0.00379) (0.00428) (0.00413) (0.00487)
b: B1Y Deval 5.95e-05 0.0144** -0.000218 0.00714 0.000569 0.0149**
(0.00456) (0.00602) (0.00450) (0.00557) (0.00528) (0.00711)
a*b 0.0163*** 0.0140* 0.0169*** 0.0155** 0.0126* 0.00924
(0.00602) (0.00791) (0.00594) (0.00736) (0.00691) (0.00900)
c: High ForDebt 0.0213*** 0.00397 0.00292
(0.00585) (0.00370) (0.00473)
a*c -0.00854 -0.00558 -0.00168
(0.00727) (0.00474) (0.00582)
b*c -0.0221** -0.00781 -0.0181*
(0.00860) (0.00741) (0.00926)
a*b*c 0.0131 0.00993 0.0120
(0.0113) (0.00989) (0.0120)
d: Post Deval -0.00738* -0.00596 -0.00318 -0.00212
(0.00379) (0.00371) (0.00455) (0.00451)
a*d 0.0131*** 0.0147*** 0.00883 0.0115**
(0.00488) (0.00471) (0.00585) (0.00574)
Lag ForDebt 0.0140** -0.00172 -0.00476
(0.00691) (0.00470) (0.00613)
Report ForDebt -0.000364 0.00233 0.00461
(0.00495) (0.00465) (0.00517)
Lag Investment 0.0837*** 0.0544** 0.0902*** 0.0793*** 0.104*** 0.0846***
(0.0259) (0.0246) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0182) (0.0179)
Lag Leverage -0.00224 -0.00947 -0.00264 -0.00508 0.00348 -0.000159
(0.00796) (0.00796) (0.00539) (0.00529) (0.00732) (0.00712)
Lag ROA -0.00620 -0.00572 -0.00402 -0.00364 -0.00615 0.000169
(0.00382) (0.00381) (0.00338) (0.00338) (0.00981) (0.00935)
Lag Cash Ratio 0.0321 0.0251 -0.00564 -0.00477 0.0457** 0.0392*
(0.0237) (0.0213) (0.0155) (0.0148) (0.0220) (0.0206)
Observations 1,318 1,492 2,476 2,650 1,529 1,673
R-squared 0.151 0.162 0.126 0.128 0.147 0.148
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Table 2.9: Regression Results - Cash Ratio
B1Y Deval means the observations are during the period from one year before through a quarter before
the devaluations. High ForDebt is equal to one if the company had last quarter foreign debt ratio higher
than the median foreign debt ratio of the country tradable firms, otherwise 0. Post DVL means at least
two quarters after devaluation. Report ForDebt is one if last quarter the company reported foreign debt,
otherwise zero. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. Devaluation periods, i.e., the quarter
with announcement of devaluation and the quarter afterward, are excluded. Mexico Peso Crisis happened in
December 1994 and Argentina devaluation happened in January 2002. The t-test allows different variance
across non-tradable and tradable sectors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
Full Sample Consistent Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a: Tradability 0.00260 0.00320 0.00270 0.00225 0.00531** 0.00507
(0.00287) (0.00385) (0.00269) (0.00307) (0.00267) (0.00324)
b: B1Y Deval 0.00524 0.00854* 0.00543* 0.00963** -0.000895 0.000904
(0.00342) (0.00455) (0.00321) (0.00401) (0.00342) (0.00473)
a*b -0.00636 -0.0111* -0.00655 -0.0102* -0.000613 -0.00196
(0.00452) (0.00599) (0.00425) (0.00532) (0.00448) (0.00599)
c: High ForDebt -0.00335 -0.000119 0.00207
(0.00440) (0.00267) (0.00315)
a*c -0.00343 -0.00140 -0.00353
(0.00548) (0.00342) (0.00387)
b*c -0.00780 -0.00986* -0.00302
(0.00651) (0.00536) (0.00616)
a*b*c 0.0114 0.00945 0.00394
(0.00861) (0.00716) (0.00799)
d: Post Deval 0.00805*** 0.00721*** 0.0106*** 0.00946***
(0.00270) (0.00266) (0.00295) (0.00300)
a*d -0.00531 -0.00411 -0.00907** -0.00705*
(0.00349) (0.00339) (0.00379) (0.00382)
Lag ForDebt -0.00547 0.000885 0.00359
(0.00520) (0.00337) (0.00397)
Report ForDebt -0.00731* -0.00880*** -0.0112***
(0.00374) (0.00334) (0.00344)
Lag Investment -0.0126 -0.00729 -0.00828 -0.00676 -0.00869 -0.00609
(0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0119)
Lag Leverage -0.0134** -0.00943 -0.0115*** -0.00948** -0.0177*** -0.0151***
(0.00599) (0.00603) (0.00387) (0.00382) (0.00474) (0.00474)
Lag ROA 0.00100 0.000228 0.00281 0.00211 0.0178*** 0.0142**
(0.00284) (0.00286) (0.00239) (0.00241) (0.00636) (0.00622)
Lag Cash Ratio 0.832*** 0.832*** 0.873*** 0.868*** 0.834*** 0.837***
(0.0173) (0.0158) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0143) (0.0137)
Observations 1,332 1,509 2,490 2,667 1,529 1,673
R-squared 0.683 0.704 0.746 0.749 0.735 0.743
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2.4 Conclusions
This paper tries to kill two birds with one stone. The first is to investigate firm investment
and cash saving behaviors around major devaluation events in emerging markets. The other
is to resolve the cash flow sensitivity of cash debate. We address these two issues by building
a theoretical model and testing it empirically use two devaluation events in Mexico 1994
and Argentina 2002.
Our model solves the equilibrium between investment and cash savings, highlighting
the complementarity and substitution relationship between them. This not only provides a
model to understand corporate behaviors before devaluation events, but also sheds like on
the debate concerning the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The advantage of our model hinges
crucially on the unique setting of pre-devaluation episodes, which allow us to separate the
current cash flows from the future ones.
We then develop testable hypotheses and test them empirically. While we find strong
evidence supporting our model from the Mexico episode, we fail to find significant supporting
results from Argentina. We propose the following things to do in the future.
First, our tests depend crucially on the definition of tradable versus nontradable sectors.
While in theory it is not a concern, in practice such sectors vary by countries. So a unified
rough definition of tradable sectors may not rightly divide the sample as we intend to. So
we are going to collect more data, either on firm-specific exporting data or better definition
of country-specific tradable sectors.
Second, our difference-in-difference approach assumes that except the expectation of de-
valuation, no other factors are affecting the tradable versus nontradable firms systematically.
In reality, there could be other confounding factors. For example, during year 2000 through
2002, there was a commodity price decline in Argentina. Tradable firms who are exporters
of those commodities may suffer as their current cash flows at that moment were low. This
would reduce their cash savings and investment. So we need to find ways to control such
events.
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Finally, we will enlarge our sample size so we have more statistical power to test our
theory. We already have two countries. We are going to also include the Brazil 1999
devaluation and those in Asia. This will enlarge our sample size a lot and enhance the









This paper intends to answer two puzzles with a general equilibrium model with production:
where does stochastic volatility on consumption growth come from and why it is persistent.
The answer is dynamic asset allocation.
In this model, two key assumptions are: (1) representative households have Duffie and
Epstein (1992a,b) type recursive preference; and (2) there are two risky assets and produced
inputs, capital and technology. Representative households maximize their life-time consump-
tion by optimally allocating between these two inputs, balancing both their contribution to
output and their relative risks.
Our model generates both time-varying endogenous growth and endogenously persistent
consumption volatilities. As in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), recursive preference
with consumption smoothing motive generates persistent and risky consumption growth.
In addition to this, our model finds that, with the dynamic allocation in the two assets,
consumption volatility is also time-varying. Such time-varying consumption volatility share
the same persistence as consumption growth, due to consumption smoothing and investment
adjustment costs.
In our model, the shocks to the two assets are endogenously priced by marginal utility
of consumption. As a result, the economy in our model have two priced factors. We show
that these two priced factors mean both the consumption growth and volatility can have
independently priced components. This microfounds the long-run risk model as in Bansal
and Yaron (2004), which requires persistent component in consumption growth to generate
high risk premia, and time-varying volatility to explain the return predictability.
Although this long run risk model generates high Sharpe ratios, it does not generate high
equity risk premium. Because to match consumption growth volatility, the volatilities on
capital and technology cannot be too high. With a modest leverage ratio, like debt-to-equity
ratio of 0.5, equity risk premium and its volatility is in an order of magnitude lower than US
risk premium. And the low time-varying volatility of equity risk premium also implies that
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our model does not generate sufficient return predictability. This is also called a new risk
premium puzzle in production-based models demonstrated in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer
(2010). Our paper shows that introducing another produced input, the technology here, does
not solve this puzzle. To solve this puzzle, one needs to introduce frictions like operating
leverage, labor market search, or financial constraint.
Our model also generates implications on the relationship between investment and firm
valuations. In contrast to standard q theory without frictions, capital investment in our
model is not a monotonic function of a firm’s q. This is because firms can now invest in ei-
ther capital or technology, and their q is a weighted average of the two assets’ marginal q. As
a result, when firm’s marginal q goes up, it could either lead the firm to invest more in capital
or technology. This finding has important implications on empirical researches. Mainstream
empirical researches focus on observables to fit marginal q. Starting with quadratic adjust-
ment costs, they typically find that the firm’s marginal q is linear on capital expenditure in
a frictionless world, as in Liu et al. (2009) and Belo et al. (2012). However, our results cast
doubt on this assumption. Our results suggest that, if the firm has not only capital but also
technology investment, which can move differently, then capital expenditure is no longer a
linear function of firm valuation.
Finally, we employ our model to explain the recent secular trend in the rising in intangible
capital share in output, risking uncertainty, and lower growth from 1990 until the 2008
financial crisis. We compare the optimal allocations and related paths of consumption
growth and volatility with different values of the intangible capital shares to product. We
are able to show that, when the the intangible capital share is higher, aggregate consumption
growth becomes lower because of higher depreciation rate of the intangible asset. At the
same time, the consumption volatility is higher because intangible asset has higher volatility.
After the jump at the time of switch, the economy travels slowly to the new optimal point,
due to the consumption smoothing and investment adjustment costs. As a result, both
slow growth and high aggregate volatility are persistent after this switching of production




Our model is closely related to endogenous growth models starting from Romer (1990). Re-
cently, Comin and Gertler (2006) use endogenous growth model to explore medium business
cycle fluctuation; a follow-up paper, Comin et al. (2009) finds that innovation shocks ac-
count for important part of the output and stock prices over business cycles. Perhaps our
paper is most close to Kung and Schmid (2012), which micro-founds the Bansal and Yaron
(2004) long run risk model using endogenous growth model. But they do not discuss the
effects on consumption volatility. Another difference is that they use a local approximation
approach around the steady state, so they can only discuss what happen near the steady
state. Instead, we solve the model continuously and globally using dynamic programming
approach.
Other papers attempting to link long run risk in consumption model to production-
based model include Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) and Croce (2012), among others.
The former shows that optimal consumption smoothing endogenously induces long run risk
when there are persistent exogenous shocks in production technology. The latter finds that
conditional mean of production determines macroeconomic quantities and asset prices and
a production economy model with long-run productivity risk and Epstein and Zin (1989)
can rationalize this.
Finally, our modeling framework is also closely related to Eberly and Wang (2009) and
Wang and Eberly (2011). These papers feature an economy with two sectors, which are
additive to each other in output. Our model also has two sectors. But capital and technology
sectors in our model are substitutes in producing outputs, which stems naturally from the
endogenous growth framework. As a result, our results and implications are very different
from theirs. For example, at the boundaries, additive roles of sectors mean that the economy
degenerates to a one sector model. However, at the boundaries of our model, output will be
zero due to the substitution roles of the factors in our model and thus the agents can only
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disinvest to consume. Also, while their papers stress the diversification effects of capital
investment, we focus on the relative allocation on capital and technology, and the asset
pricing implications on consumption with long run risk.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe our model and
the equilibrium. Section 3 solves the model numerically and explore its asset allocation
implications. Section 4 investigates how changes in production technology affect consump-
tion growth and volatility. Asset pricing implications are studied in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
3.2 Model
This economy has two types of goods. One is final product, which can be used to consume
and to invest into tangible capital (capital hereafter) or technologies. The other type is in-
termediate goods, which are the output of intermediate firms and the input of final products.
In this endogenous growth model, the number of intermediate goods, Nt, is determined by
the R&D process and represents the level of endogenous technologies.
There are three types of representative agents, consumers, final goods producers (“pro-
ducers” hereafter), and researchers, each of which have a unit mass. Consumers and produc-
ers are price takers, but researchers are not. When a researcher invents a new technology,
i.e., she creates a new intermediate good, she becomes the monopolist of this intermediate
good.
3.2.1 Final goods producer’s problem














Here Yt is the final output of this economy, which is produced from capital (Kt), labor
















, Nt is the number of
available intermediate goods at time t, i.e., the level of the endogenous technology; Xjt is the
number of type j intermediate goods used as input in the final goods production. Parameter
α ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative substitution effect between capital and labor; v > 1 represents
the elasticity of relative substitution between different intermediate products. ξ is a Cobb-
Douglas type substitution coefficient, which decides the intermediate goods share in final
production. Following Kung and Schmid (2012), we assume ξ = 1−αv−α ∈ (0, 1) to make the
problem homogeneous of degree one with respect to (Kt, Nt).
Within the firm, current period output Yt can be used to invest itKt in capital, to pay
out dividend with the dividend-capital ratio dt, to pay wages WtLt, and to pay the costs of









where Pjt is the price of the type j intermediate goods at time t.
The dynamics of capital Kt is assumed to be
dKt
Kt
= (Λ (it)− δ) dt+ σKdBKt . (3.2)
In the above equation, it is the investment-capital ratio; Λ (it) is the effective investment-
capital ratio after a convex adjustment costs; δ is depreciation rate of capital. σK is the
constant volatility of capital growth, and BKt is a standard Brownian motion associated
with shocks to capital growth. In our model, we assume two kinds of exogenous shocks,
one is the shock to capital growth, captured by BKt here, and the other is the shock to
technology growth, represented by another standard Brownian motion BNt . We allow these
two Brownian motions to be correlated with a coefficient ϕ ∈ [−1, 1]. Dynamics of the
technology will be specified in a later subsection.
1We denote dividend symbol dt with an upper bar in order to avoid confusion with the derivative symbol
d.
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Finally, a representative producer takes the stochastic discount factor (SDF) process
{Mτ}∞τ=t as given and maximize its value at time t:
MtV
F








In the objective function, V Ft denotes firm value at time t.
3.2.2 Intermediate goods sector
The creation and utilization of technologies are interrelated to each other in this economy.
Ex ante, researchers need to invest to invent new intermediate goods. Ex post, once the
new intermediate goods are invented, innovators have exclusive rights on the proceedings
generated from this new technology. Finally, following Romer (1990), we allow free entry in
this sector, which requires the ex ante marginal expenditure to equal the marginal ex post
profits in the equilibrium.
3.2.2.1 Ex ante creation
Researchers can convert final goods into technologies, or the varieties of the intermediate











is the effective investment-technology
ratio after a convex adjustment costs in the R&D sector and is therefore concave.
We assume evolution of technology level Nt is
dNt
Nt
= (Θ (st)− φ) dt+ σNdBNt . (3.3)




is the R&D expenditure to technology level ratio. We also assume
that at each point in time, the existing technologies become obsolete with probability φdt.
BNt is some standard Brownian motion which captures shocks to the intermediate goods
sector.
Equation (3.3) plays a central role in the endogenous growth model. In the endogenous
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growth model, expected growth of technology, Θ (st) − φ, is no longer constant but time-
varying and depends on current R&D investment-technology ratio, st. When current R&D
investment-technology ratio is high, future expected productivity growth will be high, so is
the consumption growth. Combining with recursive preference with early-resolution, this
lays out the micro-foundation of long-run risk model in asset pricing. Details will be shown
in later sections.
3.2.2.2 Ex post utilization
After a new intermediate product is innovated, the innovator of this product becomes a
monopolizer of the intermediate good she invented. Facing the demand from final goods
sector, she sets the monopoly price and produces Xjt units of intermediate goods with
marginal cost of 1 final good in each period t:
max{Pjt,Xjt} Πjt ≡ PjtXjt −Xjt (3.4)
s.t. equation (23) .
Denote the cumulative value of the exclusive rights to produce type j intermediate good









where τφ is a random stopping time with constant intensity φ, because the technology will
retire in next instant with probability φdt.
Finally, following the endogenous growth literature, we allow free entry in the R&D
sector. Therefore, in the equilibrium, there will be no free entry, which says that no more
monopolizer will invest and enter this market. We will later show that the no free entry
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Here Ct is the consumption of the final goods at time t. γ is the relative risk-aversion. ψ is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution; ψ > 1 implies people prefer early resolution, and that
intertemporal substitution effect dominates the wealth effect, i.e., when the representative
agent expects higher production growth next year, she wants to consume less and save more
this year.2
The representative household decides how much labors to supply and how much to invest
in capital and technology. For simplicity, we assume the households have no dis-utility in
supplying labor, so they always sell all their labors at any positive wage rate:
LSt = L̄ = 1 .
3.2.4 Resource constraints
In equilibrium, both final goods market and labor market should be cleared:
Yt = Ct + itKt +NtXt + St (3.5)
LDt = L̄ = 1 .
And intermediate market is also cleared, in the sense that monopoly intermediate goods
producer chooses the optimal prices and supply of the intermediate goods given the demand
2The intertemporal substitution effect refers that a higher growth in the future will lead to higher savings
today; the wealth effect means that a higher growth in the future leads to a higher consumption-wealth ratio
today.
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from the final goods production. To be specific, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given the demand of intermediate goods from final goods sector, the optimal
monopoly prices, quantities, and profits of any type of intermediate good j are
Pjt = v, (3.6)









Πjt = Πt = (v − 1)Xt (3.8)
Lemma 1 says that prices of the intermediate goods are always v, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between contemporaneous intermediate goods. This is a common feature of Dixit-
Stiglitz (1997) type monopolistic competition. As a result, the quantities of each type of
intermediate goods are the same function of contemporaneous capital and technologies.
Given the monopoly pricing rule in the intermediate sector, we have the following optimal
conditions in the final goods market:












PjtXjtdi = ξYt ,
Wt = (1− α) (1− ξ)Yt ,(
it + dt
)
Kt = α (1− ξ)Yt .
Lemma 2 says current period output only depends on current level of capital and tech-
nology. The costs of each of the three inputs, intermediate goods, labor, and capital, account
for a constant share of the current final output. This is a result from the Cobb-Douglas type
revenue function and the constant elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
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3.2.5 General equilibrium
We first consider the general equilibrium in an unconstrained economy. To start with, we
consider a semi-central planner’s problem. A semi-central planner here takes the monopoly
pricing rules (Pjt (Kt, Nt) , Xjt (Kt, Nt))Ntj=1 as given and solves the optimal allocation of all
goods and assets. To be specific, below is the definition:
Definition 1. The semi-central planner’s problem in an unconstrained economy is that,
given (Pjτ (Kτ , Nτ ) , Xjτ (Kτ , Nτ )) for all j = 1 to Nτ and for all τ ∈ [t,∞), a planner
solves the below problem:






Cτ , J (Kτ , Nτ )
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Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3)
The semi-central planner is different from the conventional central planner because they
take the optimal monopoly pricing rule as given. Intuitively, the semi-central planner’s
optimal is inferior to the conventional central planner’s path in social welfare due to the
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market. We will later prove that this
semi-central planner’s problem is equivalent to the decentralized competitive equilibrium.
To proceed, we need to specify the effective investment functions on capital and tech-












1 + 2θs− 1
)
.
And we also assume the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ = 2. This value
3The readers can verify that the effective investment functions below are the inverse of the usual quadratic
adjustment costs function i = ie + λ2 i
2
e, where i is the total investment and ie is the effective investment.
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is close to many quantitative calibration in asset pricing literature4 and, when combined
with the effective investment functions we specify, greatly simplifies the numerical solution
process.
We employ the stochastic dynamic programming approach to express the problem in
terms of state variables. One state variable is Kt ≡ Kt + Nt, which is the total stock
of all produced input and thus captures the “scale” of the economy. We normalize all
variables by Kt and denote them by a lower case letters except it and st, which are defined
earlier as capital and technology investment ratios, respectively. The other state variable
is nt ≡ NtKt+Nt , which is defined over domain [0, 1] and captures the relative allocation of
resources.5 According to Ito’s Lemma, the dynamics of the two state variables are
dK
K










t − σKdBKt .
And we find that the original problem has the scale-invariant property, suggesting that
the optimal value function takes the following form:










We first solve the problem with this form of value function and then verify it. As a result,
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. In an unconstrained economy, the semi-central planner’s equilibrium dynamic
is characterized by z (n) as in Equation (3.11), which solves the following second-order or-
4Ai et al. (2012) uses the same EIS as here, 2.0; Kung and Schmid (2012) use EIS of 1.85; Bansal and
Yaron (2004) assume an EIS of 1.5.
5Another pair of state variables, K and N
K
, will make more economic sense. However, N
K
is defined on
[0,+∞) and therefore the ODE defined on this variable is harder to solve. Since these pairs of state variables
have one-to-one mapping relationship, we keep our the pair that is easier to solve.
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Finally, the two boundary conditions are









)2 − 1 ,









)2 − 1 .
Our boundary conditions at n = 0 or n = 1 are very different from Eberly and Wang
(2009). In their model, they have complementary sectors, so a vanishing sector does not
eliminate output. However, due to substitution roles of capital and technology in our model,
output will be zero at the boundaries. Yet the economy does not have zero consumption
as long as there are positive capitals or technologies. Because the agents in this economy
can still disinvest capital or technologies in order to consume. These cases are unrealistic
extreme but show that people can still live without capitals or technologies. See Appendix
A.3 for detailed mathematical proof.
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3.3 Numerical Solution and Asset Allocation Implications
To solve the model numerically and conduct quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model
with parameters shown in Table 3.1. Some parameters are directly borrowed from Kung and
Schmid (2012), like β, v, α, ξ, etc. Elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to 2 for
numerical convenience. γ is chosen to match Sharpe ratios of aggregate market. Adjustment
costs coefficients λ and θ are chosen to be 10, consistent with Eberly and Wang (2009) and
Wang and Eberly (2011). The correlation coefficient ϕ is 0.5, because the authors think the
capital and technology growth shocks seem to be highly correlated. σK is 3% and σN is
6.41%, which is chosen to keep the output growth volatility around 5%.
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Meaning Value
β subjective discount factor 0.04
ψ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 2
γ risk-aversion 15
v elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 1.65
α capital share 0.30
ξ intermediate goods share 1−αv−α = 0.5
λ adjustment costs coefficient for capital 10
θ adjustment costs coefficient for technology 10
δ capital depreciation rate 2%
φ obsolete speed of technologies 3.75%
σK volatility of capital growth shock 3%
σN volatility of technology growth shock 6.41%
ϕ correlation coefficient of two shocks 50%
3.3.1 Solution
With such parameters, we are able to solve the value and policy functions, as shown in
Figure 3.1.
Panel (a) shows that the value function z (n) (denominated by K + N) is an inverse
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(a) Value Function
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Figure 3.1: Value and Policy Functions
U-shape function. It attains its highest value at n∗ = 0.6406 and decreases toward the
boundaries 0 and 1. We call this point an value maximization state (or just “maximization
state” when their is no ambiguity). This maximization state is close but not exactly as the
elasticity parameter of technology, 1− α = 0.70. This because the households also take the
risks of the two assets into account. As technology has higher volatility than capital, the
household will underweight the allocation into technology than simply maximizing the to
the revenue.
Except the value maximization states, we are also interested in the extreme points, 0
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and 1, whose values determine the equilibrium path of the value function. The values there
are small but still positive. Because with positive capital or technology stock, even though
the output is zero, the representative agent can still disinvest and consume, as we discussed
in the previous section and can also be seen in the consumption function in Panel (b).
Panel (b) of Figure 3.1 presents consumption c (n) and output y (n) (both denominated
by K+N). Readers can see that both consumption and output are inverse hump-shape. Yet
consumption is flat compared to output. This implies that consumption is procyclical but
very smooth over time, as suggested by stylized facts in empirical business cycle theories.
On the other hand, individual sector investments ratios are monotonic on the state
variable n, as shown in Panel (c). For example, capital investment ratio i (n) is negative
when n is zero. Because it is the negative consumption when there is no production but
capital stocks only. When n turns positive, i (n) starts to increase monotonically with n.
When n approaches 1, where there will be no capital stocks, i (n) goes to infinity to prevent
the economy from reaching absorbing boundary n = 1, where there is no capital.6 Similar
analysis applies to technology investment ratio. Combining these two patterns, we can see
the balance effect of investment on n: when n is lower than the maximization state, people
invest more in technology than in capital to increase n; when n is higher, people invest
more into capital. This is because the Cobb-Douglas type substitution implies diminishing
marginal returns to either factor K or N .
Finally, Panel (d) suggests that the total investment ratio, (1− n) i (n) + ns (n), is
hump-shaped. It also shows the contribution of investments from capital and technology,
(1− n) i (n) and ns (n), respectively7. Both of them are concave in n even though their
investment-capital or investment-technology ratios are convex in n. This suggests that
although investors tend to balance the two produced input factors, K and N , they are not
able to adjust them in a speed fast enough to correct the shocks in a short run due to the
convex adjustment costs. To be specific, consider a negative shock in N , which lowers n
6Technically, when n approaches 1, i (n) goes to infinity in a speed slower than 1
1−n . Therefore, even
though the capital investment ratio becomes unbounded at n = 1, the capital investment itself Ki (n) =
K (1− n) i (n) is now.
7Which are the investments denominated by K +N .
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around the maximization state. As a result, technology investment increases and capital
investment decreases, intending to drive the the state variable back to the optimal point
n∗. However, given a same technology investment S, a smaller N makes adjustment costs
higher. As a result, such investment adjustment process is slow. This induces a lower n and
a higher consumption growth volatility in a longer term. This pattern will be shown clearer
in next subsection.
3.3.2 Growth and volatility
We first investigate sectoral and aggregate growth. From the specification of the dynamics
of capital and technology, Equation (3.2) and (3.3) give
dKt
Kt
= (Λ (i (n))− δ) dt+ σKdBKt ,
dNt
Nt
= (Θ (s (n))− φ) dt+ σNdBNt .
So we have constant volatility in sectoral growth but time-varying expected grow rates,
Λ (i (n))− δ and Θ (s (n))− φ, for capital and technology, respectively.















+ (1− α) dNt
Nt






















= gY (nt) dt+ ασKdB
K
t + (1− α)σNdBNt .
Here the expected growth of output is





α2σ2K + (1− α)
2 σ2N − 2α (1− α)ϕσKσN
]
,
which is the weighted growth in the two inputs with volatility correction.
113









































where the volatility term is




























Figure 3.2 shows these growth patterns. Panel (a) plots the expected growth of capital
and technology, which are their effective investments minus depreciation. Just as their
investment ratios, capital (technology) expected growth is high when the stock of capital
(technology) is relatively low, and its expected growth becomes low or even negative at the
extreme.
Panel (b) presents the expected growth of the two transformed state variables. The
expected growth on the scale state variable, K, is concave, because there is a state that
maximizes the expected growth of the economy scale. On the other hand, the expected
growth on the relative allocation state variable, n, is convex, indicating the balancing mech-
anism of investment we mentioned before. While the expected growth on scale is relatively
flat, the expected growth on n is steep. This suggests that the incentive to balance the
investment is strong.
Expected output and consumption growth are plotted in Panel (c). They have largely the
same convex shape, because of our two factors are substitutes. But expected output growth
is much steeper than consumption growth, suggesting consumption is procyclical but has
a correlation coefficient with output growth less than one. Expected consumption growth
bends back toward zero around extremes, because the economy now would like to input
everything into the relative scarce factor to prevent the economy falling into the absorbing
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(a) Growth of Capital and Technology
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Figure 3.2: Endogenous Growth and Volatility
boundaries.
Finally, Panel (d) plots the volatility of consumption. We can infer from the figure that
the consumption volatility is also state-dependent. It is increasing with state n because
technology has more volatile shocks than capital.
3.4 Stationary Distribution and Transitions
In this section, we first present the stationary distribution of the state variables. We then
show the evidence of long run risks, i.e., consumption growth deviation from the optimal
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path can take a long time. Finally, we show what can happen when an economy transits
from a low technology share of production to a high one. We hope this experiment can shed
lights on what happen in the past thirty years in the U.S. economy.
3.4.1 Stationary distribution
We have presented the solution of our model and its implications on asset allocation and
pricing. As we mentioned, there is no steady state in our approach. We can, however,
find the stationary distribution of the variables. To do this, we perform a simulation of
1050 years, each year contains 60 periods. And then we drop the first 50 years to minimize
the impact of the initial values. The stationary distribution of the relative allocation state
variable n is presented in Figure 3.3 and the stationary distribution of the log growth of key
policy variables are in Figure 3.4.







Figure 3.3: Stationary Distribution of n
From Figure 3.3, we can see that n follows a skewed distribution, with its mode lower than
1−α = 0.70. Also, the probabilities that n falls below 0.5 or moves above 0.70 are negligible.
From Figure 3.4, we can see the log growth of output, consumption, capital investment,
and technology investment are close to normally distributed. Consumption growth is the
least volatile, output and technology investment growth have similar volatilities, and capital
investment growth is the most volatile.
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(a) Output Growth















(c) Capital Investment Growth

















Figure 3.4: Stationary Distribution of Policies
Table 3.2 reports the first and second moments of these variables, as well as some asset
pricing moments. Consistent with the histogram, consumption growth volatility is about
half of that of the output and technology investment growth; capital investment growth is
40% more volatile than the output growth.
Finally, the mean risk-free rate in our economy is about 1.75%, with standard deviation
0.07%, which is close to the United States data. Sharpe ratios associated with capital and
technology are 17.05% and 59.74%, respectively. This means our model has no problem
generating high Sharpe ratios. However, combined with the low volatilities of capital and
technology growth, the two assets have relatively low risk premia and return volatilities.
With this low risk premia and volatilities, we need a debt-to-equity ratio of about 2.4 to
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Table 3.2: Simulated Moments
All statistics here are annualized.
Growth Mean Std.Dev
log Yt − log Yt−1 1.45% 1.23%
logCt − logCt−1 0.62% 0.63%
log It − log It−1 1.36% 1.68%








match the U.S. risk premium puzzle, where the equity risk premium is 6.33% and return
volatility is 19.42%. Moreover, this lack of return volatility also implies lack of return
prediction, as observed in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010).
3.4.2 Long run risk in consumption
One attractive property of endogenous growth model is that it generates endogenous growth
and consumption volatility. This microfounds Bansal and Yaron (2004)’s long run risk model.
Kung and Schmid (2012) document the risky endogenous growth. But we would like to show
it along with the endogenous volatility and in a more tractable way as we have the ODE
solution.
Since we solve the model continuously in a stochastic framework, we do not assume
away the risks. Instead, we implement an experiment. We construct artificial paths of
realized growth shocks, in which there is a negative shock on capital (technology) of one
standard deviation at each point in time in the first year, and no shocks at all thereafter.
We still assume that all agents believe that there is capital and technology growth shocks
generated by Brownian motions BKt and BNt , so they still form their consumption growth
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expectation and make optimal investment decisions as in the model we solve. As a result, we
have the impulse response function of expected consumption growth, as well as the realized
consumption path, in a world that people expect uncertainty.
Figure 3.5 report these experiment results. In the first experiment, we start the econ-
omy where the technology ratio n is at its value maximization point n∗. The evolution of
variables in this experiment serve as benchmark to other paths and are normalize to 0. In
the second and the third, we start the economy from technology ratios 0.05 lower or higher
than the value maximization state. We present the results of these two paths relative to the
benchmark path. In Figure 3.5, we show the evolution of the following variables, the tech-
nology ratio n, its growth, the growth of technology and capital respectively, consumption
growth, and consumption volatility.
Figure 3.5 Panel (a) plots the evolution path of the state variable n with the three cases.
First of all, we observe that, when the resources are not allocated optimally on the value
maximization state, the households will optimally allocate their resources and make the
economy converging to the maximization state. Second, the converging process is very slow.
After more than 30 years, the economy still cannot reach the optimal ratio if there were no
other exogenous shocks. This is consistent with what Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010)
find, intertemporal smoothing and investment adjustment costs can endogenously generate
persistent component in the growth.
Panel (b) presents the growth of technology ratio n. It conveys the same message as
Panel (a): optimal allocation tends to force the economy to converge to the maximization
state. It increases n if it is too low and reduces it if its starting level is too high. Panel (c)
and (d) show how the agents in this economy allocate their investment into technology and
capital and confirm what we observe in the previous two panels.
Panel (e) plots the consumption growth paths. The case where the economy starts from
a lower technology ratio (red dash line) is monotonically decreasing. The consumption is
growing at a lower speed as the technology ratio n is increasing over time, converging to
the value maximization state. This can also be seen in Panel (c) of Figure 3.2. The case
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where the economy starts from a higher technology ratio is not monotonic. The consumption
growth first decreases in the first four years and then starts to increases and converges to the
value maximization state. The reason is that, the maximization of consumption growth is
not obtained at the value maximization state, but a value higher than it. So the consumption
growth decreases first, reaches the maximum growth after four quarters, and then converges
to the long-run value maximization state. The persistent deviation of the consumption
growth from the stationary point is consistent with the long-run risk theories, as in Bansal
and Yaron (2004), Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), and Kung and Schmid (2012).
Panel (f) plots the volatility of consumption. Because technology has higher volatility
than capital, the consumption in the path with higher technology ratio has higher volatility
than the benchmark and the one with lower technology ratio. Both volatility paths converge
to the benchmark case in the long run, but it is very persistent. This shows that our model
not only generates persistent growth path but also endogenous persistence in volatilities.
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(a) Evolution of Technology Ratio n
















(b) Growth of Technology Ratio n


















(c) Growth of Technology N
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(f) Volatility of Consumption






















All panels here plot three path of the evolution of variables. The black dotted line is the one where the
economy starts from the value maximization state n∗ = 0.6404. This serves as a benchmark case and is
normalized to 0. The red dash line and the blue solid line are the case where the economy starts from n∗−0.05
and n∗ + 0.05. In all Panels here, we present all other sequence as the difference from the benchmark path.
Figure 3.5: Long-Run Risks: Impulse Response of Growth and Consumption
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3.4.3 Transition from the old to the new economy
U.S. economy has recently gone through a secular trend during the last 30 years. We have
seen that the shares of intangible assets inside firm have gone up dramatically. At the same
time, we observe lower growth rates and higher aggregate volatility before the financial crisis.
We thus explore whether all these can be explained in a unified framework.
Here we conduct an experiment. We assume that the economy was originally at an “old
economy” with technology share of product of 0.65. And there is a structural improvement
that the economy enters into a “new economy” with technology share of product of 0.7,
our benchmark calibration. Suppose the economy starts from the value maximization state
of the old economy. What will the transition path look like? Figure 3.6 describes such
transitions.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 describes the transition of the state variable n. The black dotted
line and the red dotted line are the long-run stationary paths of the new economy and the
old economy, respectively. Between them is the transition path, plotted as a blue solid curve.
We can see that the technology ratio has gradually climbed up and converges to the new
economy path in the long run. And since the transition happens, the technology ration n is
becoming higher and higher than the old long-run path.
Panel (b) confirms what happens in Panel (a) by looking at the growth of technology
ratio. We can see that the economy starts with a jump in the growth of technology. And
then the growth of technology becomes lower and lower until it converges to the new long-run
path.
Panel (c) plots the consumption growth. Here we can see that the long-run consumption
growth in the new economy is lower than that in the old economy. The reason here is
technology has a higher depreciation rate. While output growth eventually is the effective
investment minus depreciation of the two assets, weighted by their ratios in the economy’s
portfolio, more reliant on technology will end up with a lower output growth. And this
directly induces lower consumption growth. As a result, the transition path has a lower
consumption growth than the old economy when the transition starts, but still higher than
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the long-run path of the new economy. In the long run, this transition path converges to
the new path.
Panel (d) presents the volatility of consumption. Because technology has higher volatil-
ity, we observe the new long-run path has higher volatility than the old long-run path.
As a result, the transition path have much higher volatility than the old economy. And
this volatility keeps growing until it converges to the more risky long-run path of the new
economy.
In sum, the experiment here shows that our model is able to show that when the economy
transits from a low-technology-share one to a high-technology-share one, the transition will
have lower consumption growth and high consumption volatility. The transition is very
long, due to the intertemporal smoothing in consumption and the convex adjustment costs
in investments of technology and capital.
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(a) Evolution of Technology Ratio n
















(b) Growth of Technology Ratio






























(d) Volatility of Consumption














The old and new economy differ in their technology share of production, with αold = 0.65 and αnew =
0.70. The value maximization states in the old and new economies are n∗old = 0.5921 and n
∗
new = 0.6404,
respectively. The new SS denotes the path where the economy starts from n∗new in the new economy and
stay there forever. The transition curve denotes the path where the economy starts from n∗old but with the
new technology share of production. The old SS is the path where the economy starts from n∗old in the old
economy. In all Panels here, we normalize the values in the new economy to zero, and present all other
sequence as the difference from the new economy path.
Figure 3.6: Transition from the Old to the New Economy
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3.5 Asset Pricing Implications
3.5.1 Stochastic Discount Factor
We now turn to the model’s asset pricing implications. Denote the stochastic discount factor
(SDF) by Mt. According to Duffie and Epstein (1992a,b), we have the following theorem:
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This theorem says that the Sharpe ratios of the two shocks are respectively










































Figure 3.7 Panel (a) plots the risk-free rate. We can see that risk-free rate is monotoni-
cally increasing in n. This is because the volatility of technology is much smaller than that
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(a) Risk-free Rate



























Figure 3.7: Risk free rate and Sharpe ratios
of capital. When capital accounts for most of the economy’s assets, consumers perceive that
remote future is less risky than current states, and they would like to save more. As a result,
risk-free rates are low when n is low.
Panel (b) describes the Sharpe ratios for the shocks to the capital growth and technology
growth, respectively. In our calibration, SRK is averagely higher than SRN . This is again
due to our assumption that volatility of capital growth σK is much higher than the volatility
of technology growth σN in our calibration. Also, we can observe that Sharpe ratio of capital
is higher when n is lower, because investors now prefer to invest more in technology than in
capital. Similar analysis applies to the Sharpe ratio of technology, which is increasing in n.
3.5.2 Asset returns
With the SDF of this economy specify, we can now investigate the asset returns. Investing
one unit of final goods into capital means reducing one unit of consumption today and






8Formal proof is in appendix.
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And since our model is homogeneous of degree one and assumes no frictions, average q is
the same as the marginal q, as in Hayashi (1982).
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and the rate of return in technology
dRN (n) =
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Before computing the market returns, we would like to first explain how the Equation
(3.13) is equivalent to no free entry in technology sector. No free entry condition requires
the marginal cost of entry is no less than the marginal benefit in equilibrium, i.e.
Θ′ (s (n))V NNj (Nj ;K,N) ≤ 1 .
On the left hand side, the first term, Θ′ (s (n)) is the marginal rate of converting one final
goods into effective technology investment. The second term V NNj (Nj ;K,N) is the marginal
benefit of increasing one unit of Nj for researcher j, which is exactly marginal q of technology
by definition. Finally, since we allow disinvestment, the above inequality must be binding.
Otherwise the researcher will disinvest. As a result, the no free entry condition is exactly
the same as Equation (3.13). This is intuitive: Entry is just a type of investment and thus
without fixed costs, no free entry will be the same as no arbitrage in investment.
In case of the market returns, because there are only two fundamental assets, capital
and technology, the unit price of market portfolio is
qm (n) ≡ (1− n) qK (n) + nqN (n) .




[(1− n) qK (n) dRK (n) + nqN (n) dRN (n)] .
Panel (a) of Figure 3.8 shows the marginal q of capital, technology, and market. Marginal
q of capital is decreasing in n and that of technology is increasing in n. As a weighted
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average of the two, market’s q is inverse U-shaped and attains its maximum at n = 0.6697.
Comparing these results with the investment ratios in Panel (c) and (d) of Figure 3.1, we can
see that all investments closely track their corresponding marginal q, as standard q theories
predict.
Figure 3.8: Marginal Q and Risk Premia
(a) Marginal q





























The non-monotonic shape of the market’s q has empirical implications on recent studies
of the cross-section of Tobin’s q. In Liu et al. (2009) and Belo et al. (2012), they fit a model
in which firm’s Tobin’s q is a linear function of capital expenditure. But our model implies
that, if a firm has a mix of capital and technology, like invented patents, then this linear
relationship is unlikely true. In fact, they are not even monotonic. Our model suggests that
one needs to take the technology-capital ratio into account.
Panel (B) presents capital, technology, and market risk premia. Since capital and tech-
nology risk premia are just their corresponding Sharpe ratios multiplied by their constant
volatilities, their patterns are exactly the same as their Sharpe ratios, except that now their
difference is even larger due to the magnitudes of the volatilities. As a weighted average of
the two, market risk premia are moving between them. Since the effect of capital risk pre-
mium dominates that of technology risk premium in our calibration, market risk premium
is decreasing with technology-total produced input ratio, n.
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The monotonicity of market risk premium with respect to state variable n has an in-
teresting implication. A negative shock on either capital or technology undoubtedly reduce
output, consumption, and welfare. But their effects on market risk premia are totally dif-
ferent: while a negative shock on capital increases n, it reduces the market risk premium;
but a negative shock on technology increases market risk premium as it decreases n.
3.6 Conclusion
Our model shows that an endogenous growth model with investment can generate volatile
and persistent growth and endogenous stochastic volatility of consumption. The stochastic
volatility is persistent because of consumption smoothing and the adjustment costs. We
also study the asset pricing implications and show that our model micro-founds Bansal
and Yaron (2004). However, our model does not generate significantly time-varying Sharpe
ratios. Possible remedies would be to introduce some of frictions, coming from labor rigidity
or financing to solve this problem.
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Appendix
A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Definition of Key Variables in Model and Data
This appendix subsection lists the definition of key variables in model and their construction
in data in Table 3.
Table 3: Definition of Key Variables in Model and Data
This table juxtaposes the definition of key variables in the model and in data. Strings inside round paren-
theses indicates the acronym of the corresponding accounts in Compustat or whether it is from Security
Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. All variables are adjusted by inflation.
Variable Model Data
Cash W Cash and equivalents (CHE)
Capital K Total assets (AT) − cash
Investment I Capital expenditure (CAPX) - sale of property, plant
and equipment (SPPE), + Research and Development
expenditures (XRD) + acquisitions (AQC)
Distribution −F1{F<0} Dividends payout (DVC) + Repurchase (from SDC)
Issuance F1{F>0} Secondary equity offerings (from SDC)
Net issuance F Issuance - Distribution
Cash flow CFOP Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) + XRD
A.2 Bayesian Estimation of Regime Switching
This appendix subsection describes the Bayesian estimation of regime switching in VIX
and reports the results. I first illustrate the model to be estimated. Then I describe the
procedure of Forward-Filtering-Backward-Smoothing (FFBS) algorithm, and briefly discuss
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the estimation results at the end.
In my estimation, I assume that VIX follows a stationary Markov switching process with
two regimes. Within each regime, the logarithm of VIX is normally distributed:







where vs,t is VIX at state s at time t, s is low or high uncertainty states {LU,HU}. µvs and
σvs are the conditional mean and volatility of log-VIX. εvt is a time-t standard normal shock.






 pLU 1− pLU
1− pHU pHU
 .
Given a time series of realization of VIX, {vt}t, I have six parameters to estimate, {ps, µvs , σvs}
s ∈ {LU,HU}, and also the latent states {st}t of the realized VIX.
The estimation of the regime switching is implemented using Bayesian estimation. I
define the realized observations of VIX as Y ≡ {vt}t, given some prior on the parameters








, I want to estimate the posterior distribution
p (θv|Y ). To estimate the system, I construct prior as follows: a VIX is considered to be
in high uncertainty state if it is higher than its 90th percentile in the whole sample, and in
low uncertainty state otherwise. I then use Forward-Filtering-Backward-Smoothing (FFBS)
algorithm to estimate the system.9
The estimation results of parameters are reported in Table 4. According to Table 4, the





This implies that the quarterly transition probability matrix is the monthly one raised to











These are the numbers I use as the transition probability matrix in physical probability
measure in the structural estimation. The steady state distribution for the low and high
Table 4: Bayesian Estimation Results for Regime Switching
This table reports the Bayesian estimation results of regime switching in monthly VIX, from 1994 January
through 2014 September. Prior of this estimation is that a VIX is considered to be in high uncertainty
state if it is higher than its 90th percentile in the whole sample, and in low uncertainty state otherwise.
Probability ps|s is the probability of staying in the same state conditioning on current state s. Numbers
inside the round parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated numbers.
Probability ps′|s Cond. Mean of log(VIX) Cond. Vol. of log(VIX)
L 0.9576 2.8799 0.2762
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0028)
H 0.6891 3.5835 0.2160
(0.0295) (0.0162) (0.0063)
uncertainty state implied in this transition matrix is
[πLU , πHU ] = [0.8800, 0.1200] .
Figure 9 and Table 5 report the estimated latent states of each month. The left panel
reports high uncertainty states in my prior, i.e., if it is higher than the 90th percentile. The
right panel of the figure reports the posterior estimation of the high uncertainty state. It
is considered as a high uncertainty state here if the estimated probability of being in high
uncertainty state exceeds 50%. Comparing these two latent states, I find that some isolated
spikes are considered as high uncertainty states in the prior but not in the posterior. Two
examples are the Asian in November 1997 and Flash Crash of stock market in May 2010.
They are not considered as high uncertainty states because the probability of them being
in which state depends on their neighborhood states. The fact that their neighborhood are
not in the same state reduces their likelihood. For the same reason, some months with
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relative lower VIX in the middle of high VIX months are considered as in high uncertainty
states. Examples of this kind include the months from November 2011 through January














































































































These figures report the Bayesian estimation results of latent states in monthly VIX, from 1994 January
through 2014 September. Prior of this estimation is that a VIX is considered to be in high uncertainty state
if it is higher than its 90th percentile in the whole sample, and in low uncertainty state otherwise. Posterior
is estimated using Forward-Filtering-Backward-Smoothing (FFBS) algorithm.
Figure 9: Prior vs. Posterior States of Uncertainties
Finally, note that in both my empirical and model specification, I match the last period
end uncertainty state with current period end financial variables. I do it in this way because
the uncertainty measure is forward-looking, decisions made by a firm conditional on last
period end uncertainty level can only be observed in this period end. For example, November
2011 is considered as a high uncertainty month. This will be matched with the fiscal quarter
including the whole month of December 2011, which are quarterly statements disclosed in the
fiscal quarter end, i.e., December 2011, January and February 2012. Quarterly statements
at the end of November 2011 is not considered a match to November 2011 because a firm
observing high uncertainty at the end of November did not have time to adjust its decisions
yet. This is also consistent with Gulen and Ion (2015).
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Table 5: High Uncertainty States in Prior and Posterior
Periods during recession are italicized .
Year Month VIX Prior HU Posterior HU Event
1997 11 32.206 1 0 Asian Crisis
1998 8 31.588 1 1 Russian Debt Crisis
1998 9 38.205 1 1
1998 10 36.608 1 1
2001 9 35.065 1 1 9/11
2001 10 32.721 1 1 Enron Scandal
2002 7 34.050 1 1 Corporate Scandal
2002 8 33.743 1 1
2002 9 37.648 1 1
2002 10 35.243 1 1
2002 11 28.175 0 1
2002 12 28.210 0 1
2003 1 27.424 0 1
2003 2 32.218 1 1 Gulf War II
2003 3 30.634 1 1
2008 9 30.239 0 1
2008 10 61.177 1 1 Lehman Collapse
2008 11 62.639 1 1
2008 12 52.405 1 1
2009 1 44.683 1 1
2009 2 45.571 1 1
2009 3 44.795 1 1
2009 4 38.064 1 1
2009 5 31.978 1 1
2009 6 29.140 0 1
2010 5 31.930 1 0 Flash Crash
2011 8 35.029 1 1
2011 9 36.530 1 1 Euro debt crisis
2011 10 32.829 1 1
2011 11 31.942 1 1
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A.3 Repurchase and Debt Financing
This subsection presents evidence that higher uncertainty also predicts lower activities in
equity repurchase, new debt issuance, and debt repurchase. Equity repurchase results con-
firm that my model predictions also apply to repurchase alone. And results on debt issuance
and repurchase suggest that there could also be some debt issuance costs so the real options
to wait argument also applies to debt. Results are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Repurchase and Debt Financing under Uncertainty Shocks
(a) Conditional Moments
Overall L H t-stat
Repurchase 0.392% 0.390% 0.340% -5.01***
Debt issuance 2.871% 2.914% 2.526% -8.40***
Debt repurchase 2.073% 2.069% 2.107% 1.33
(b) Fixed Effect Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
[coef×100] Repurchase Debt Iss. Debt Repur.
High H -0.014 -0.409*** -0.067**
(0.013) (0.051) (0.030)
Control Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.010 0.000 0.026
# Obs 230,801 230,801 230,801
# Firms 8,258 8,258 8,258
A.4 Variance Risk Premium
Figure 10 plots the forecasted variance by VIX and the variance premium, the difference
between squared VIX and the forecasted variance from 1994 January through 2010 August.
Data are provided by Bekaert and Hoerova (2014).
Variance premium is positive most of the time. It is also highly correlated with VIX,
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with a correlation coefficient of 0.72. In my model specification, this implies that in high
uncertainty states, the discount rates should be higher than in low uncertainty state. In
the specification of stochastic discount factor, it is equivalent to say that the risk price of
switching from low to high uncertainty state is negative. In terms of risk-adjusted proba-
bilities of switching, it says that the risk-adjusted probabilities switching from low to high
uncertainty states is higher than the true probabilities.10
This figure plots the forecasted variance (blue area) and variance premium (red area) for S&P 500 from 1994
January through 2010 August. The sum of the two terms are the square of VIX index. Data are provided
by Bekaert and Hoerova (2014). Shaded areas are the NBER recession periods.
Figure 10: Forecasted Variance and Variance Premium
A.5 External Financing Costs
This subsection quantifies the external financing costs. Here I define the key measures of
financing costs, present the empirical evidences, and provide interpretation of those results.
10See Appendix A.6 for more details about risk-adjusted probabilities.
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My empirical definition of financing costs differ from the previous literature. The costs
of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) are typically divided into two categories, direct and
indirect costs. As in Gao and Ritter (2010), the direct costs usually refer to gross spread,
which is the total fees the issuer paid to the underwriters, and the indirect costs are the
underpricing or discount of new issues. However, these costs do not capture the underpricing
suffered by the existing shareholders. For this reason, I define my measure of financing costs,
from the existing shareholders standpoint, as
Total costs ≡ gross spread−annoucement return× total equity value before issuance .
To empirical implement this measure of total costs, I obtain its component from different
sources. Gross spread and the issuance principal are from Securities Data Company (SDC)
Platinum database. I use the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from 3 days before
through 1 day after announcement as the benchmark announcement return. Using other
CARs from alternative event window may change the magnitudes of the results but will not
change the statistical significance and the qualitative results. Corresponding, I use the total
equity values 3 days before announcement as the equity value before issuance. All measures
are denominated by last quarter end total assets, both to remove the size effects and to be
consistent with the theoretical model.
Also, for each type of costs, I separate issuing firms into two size groups. Altinkilic and
Hansen (2000) find that gross spread behaviors differ in issuing firm qualities, especially
firm size. 11 Using the median firm total assets for the full sample (including non-issuing
firms) in the last quarter as a cutoff, I define a firm to be large if its last quarter size is
above the median size and small otherwise. Although the median firm size is defined based
on both issuing and non-issuing firms, the issuance sample is divided relatively even. Using
the median firm size for only issuance firms as a cutoff will not alter the results much.
11Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) also find that idiosyncratic volatilities of stock returns are another impor-
tant determinant of issuance costs. While this paper does not address the idiosyncratic volatility effects, their
findings indirectly corroborate the effects of aggregate uncertainty, which has been shown to be positively
correlated with idiosyncratic volatilities in Bloom (2009).
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Table 7: The Costs of Seasoned Equity Offerings
Principal, total costs, and gross spread, are denominated by last quarter end total assets. Principal and
gross spread is from SDC Platinum database. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) compute the abnormal
returns (excluding dividends) on issuance date from CAPM model, which uses value-weighted market return
as a single factor. The estimation period spans from 246 days to 46 days before the issuance date. Both
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 in Panel B. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10%
statistical significance, respectively.
(a) Summary Statistics for Issuance Sample
N mean std.dev median mean-Large mean-Small
Principal 5,469 0.5669 1.0427 0.2752 0.2640 0.9120
Total costs 4,829 0.1644 0.6184 0.0463 0.0642 0.2910
Gross spread 4,954 0.0306 0.0551 0.0150 0.0120 0.0519
CAR(-3,+1) 5,330 -0.0387 0.1187 -0.0328 -0.0309 -0.0471
CAR(-1,+1) 5,330 -0.0291 0.1010 -0.0268 -0.0242 -0.0343
CAR(-5,+5) 5,330 -0.0418 0.1566 -0.0370 -0.0326 -0.0519
CAR(-10,+10) 5,330 -0.0462 0.2075 -0.0400 -0.0341 -0.0593
Table 7 describes how aggregate uncertainties affect the financing costs of SEO. It sum-
marizes the key variables. Several important points can be inferred from the table. (1)
Conditional from issuance, the average issuance amount is more than a half of the book
assets. (2) Total costs of SEO is substantial, which is about 16% of the book assets.12 (3)
Gross spread is about 3% of the book assets and announcement returns are ranging from
3-5%. (4) Gross spread is dwarfed by the indirect costs from existing shareholder perspec-
tive. This can be inferred from comparing gross spread (3%) to the total costs (16%). (5)
Small firms have much larger financing costs than large firms, consistent with Altinkilic and
Hansen (2000).
12Firms in my sample have average Tobin’s Q of 1.8. This gives the total financing costs relative to market
value of firms are about 8.89%.
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A.6 Simplification of the Problem in Risk-Neutral Measure
The model is can be further simplified under risk-neutral measure, as in most corporate
finance models. The dynamic of Z under risk-neutral measure is





In this equation, the productivity growth is discounted by a risk-adjustment term βsησa,s.
Here β is the response of firm productivity to aggregate productivity. Assuming that shocks











Here ε̂′a is the normal random shock to aggregate productivity. ρs is the correlation between
firm and aggregate productivities. This formula is the same as that in Bolton et al. (2011).
For simplicity, I assume that ρs and σsσa,s are constant. So βsησa,s can be simplifies to ρησs.















If the regime shift is priced, then qL and qH can be different from pL and pH . In particular,
if agents are risk-averse to the high uncertainty state H, one would expect agents perceive
the state H has higher probability to happen in the risk-neutral measure, i.e., qL < pL and
qH > pH . These transition probabilities are therefore also called risk-adjusted probabilities.




, reflect the prices of risk on the regime
shift.
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Under risk-neutral measure, the firm’s recursive problem is
V (K,W,Z, s) = max
{I,F,D}
{









Since r > 0, by Contraction Mapping Theory, this problem has a unique solution.
Finally, consider the problem after denominating K. The dynamics of normalized rev-
enue z ≡ Π/K is
log z′ = log z − (1− α) log (1− δ + i) +
(







As a result, under risk-neutral measure, the firm’s problem can be simplified to
v (w, z, s) = max
{i,d,f}
{
d− f − 1{f>0} (λ0s + λ1sf) (18)
+







log z′ = log z − (1− α) log (1− δ + i) +
(







(1− δ + i)w′ = (1 + rW )w + z −
(











w ≥ 0 .
I then solve and estimate this simplified problem. After solving this problem, I convert the
probabilities from risk-neutral measure to physical measure using Equation 16.
A.7 Solution and Structural Estimation Procedure
The model is solved and structurally estimated using a version of SMM, called Numerical
Generalized Method of Moments (NGMM). Here I describe the procedure of the solution
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and estimation.13
I first approximate the continuous state variables by discrete values. The value of log-
arithm of z, productivity-to-capital ratio, is discretized into 81 grids around -2, the mode
of the stationary distribution. It is made sure to include the whole capital inaction region,
as suggested by Bloom (2009). The value of w, cash-to-capital ratio, is discretized into 21
states, from 0 to 5. I assign equal and finer grids from 0 to 0.8, and looser grids from 1 to
5. Because there are more density and sensitivity in low cash states than in the high cash
states.
Then I guess a set of parameters, denoted by θ and solve the model. The model is solved
using Policy Function Iteration, which is an improved version of Value Function Iteration,
as in Judd (1998). This solution gives the optimal policy functions, value functions, and
transition probabilities of state variables.
Using the policy functions and the transition probabilities of state variables from the so-
lution, I numerically compute the stationary distribution of state variables and the moments.
This is done by noticing that a policy mapping matrix, a matrix mapping current states to
next period states, has non-negative values in all its elements and a sum of 1 in each row.14
In this case, the policy mapping matrix can be interpreted as a Markovian transition matrix
of the state variables. The composite Markovian transition matrix of the policy mapping
matrix and random state transition matrix exists. Then the stationary distribution of state
variables can be computed as the steady-state probabilities of the composite Markovian
transition matrix. Further more, with this stationary distribution of state variables π(w,z,s),
moments as functions of the state variables and their distribution can be numerically com-
puted. For example, if one wants to compute the expected value of a function on the state
13For more details of this method and the general framework, please refer to ?.
14Here is a concrete example, if a policy function maps the ith element of capital K to the jth element
of K′, then the policy mapping matrix has its elements on the ith row being all zero except the ith-row-jth
column element being 1. If a policy function maps the ith element of capital K to a value of K′ in between
the jth and (j + 1)th elements, i.e., βK′j +(1− β)K′j+1, then the policy mapping matrix has its elements on
the ith row being all zero, except the ith-row-jth column element being β and the ith-row-(j + 1)th column
element being 1 − β. As long as the discretized state space includes all inaction region in the model, all
elements in the policy mapping matrix should be non-negative and no greater than 1.
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variable space x (w, z, s), it can be simply computed as
EGMM [x (w, z, s)] =
∑
(w,z,s)
π(w,z,s)x (w, z, s) . (19)
This is the key difference that my NGMM approach differs from SMM, it avoids simulating
artificial data and thus the random errors from the simulated data.
The model moments are denoted by m (θ), computed using the approach as in Equation
19. Suppose the data moments are M̂ and their variance-covariance matrix is Ŝ. Ŝ is
estimated using the influence function approach as in Erickson and Whited (2002) and
Warusawitharana and Whited (2014). The distance between the model and data moments
is then g (θ) ≡ m (θ) − M̂ . The estimator of θ̂ solves the following GMM problem with a
weighting matrix Ŵ ,
θ̂ = arg min
θ
g (θ)> Ŵg (θ) .
The weighting matrix Ŵ is required to be positive definite and converge to a deterministic
positive definite matrix W . In this paper, I choose W to be a diagonal matrix with its
elements being the square of unconditional mean of the corresponding moments. This choice
of weighting matrix has an economic meaning that the corresponding objective function is
minimizing the percentage deviation of the model moment from the data moments.15
Inference of the estimation is the same as the usual GMM. By Central Limit Theorem,

















where G is the derivative of the moment condition with respect to θ evaluating at θ0, i.e.,
15Three popular choices of weighting matrix are used in the literature, identity, optimal, and information
function approach one as in Warusawitharana and Whited (2014). The first one is inappropriate here because
it will estimate the moments with small values with large variance relative to the moment magnitudes. In
my case with two regimes with asymmetric numbers of observations, optimal weighting matrix and the
information function approach one will estimate the conditional moments in the low uncertainty states
much more accurate than those in high uncertainty states, as the latter has relatively less observations and
higher variance.
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G ≡ ∂g(θ)∂θ |θ=θ0 . S is the probability limit of Ŝ. As both θ0 and S are not observable, the
















An important issue of the structural estimation is that, it estimates the parameters of an
average firm, not the average of the parameters across firms. The structural estimation can
only account for the heterogeneity stems from the prescribe state variables, productivity-
to-capital ratio, cash-to-capital ratio, and uncertainty states. It is not able to account for
other firm heterogeneity. For this reason, I adopt the approach in Warusawitharana and
Whited (2014) by removing the firm fixed effects to compute the variance-covariance matrix
of sample moments Ŝ. In order to accommodate other dimension of heterogeneity like size,
I divide the sample into small and large firms and compare their results to my benchmark
results. They are very similar.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
We proceed the model solution as forward. We first characterize the marginal value of cash
in the future, in particular, how it depends on p and λ. Then we solve the date-0 problem
by discussing them in different cash regions.
B.1 Marginal value of cash at date-1




1 if w1 ≥ w1D
pv′1D (w1) + (1− p) if w1D ≤ w1 < w1D
p (1 + λ) + (1− p) if w1P ≤ w1 < w1D
p (1 + λ) + (1− p) v′1P (w1) if w1P ≤ w1 ≤ w1P
1 + λ if w1 < w1P
which is a continuous function weakly decreasing with w1. It is strictly decreasing when
w1 ∈ (w1P , w1D) or Ev′1 (w1) ∈ (1, 1 + λ)
Note that this marginal value of cash is a weakly increasing function of devaluation
probability p. This can be proved immediately by using the property of v′1s (w1) ∈ [1, 1 + λ].
However, this marginal value of cash is also increasing with λ. A higher λ increases the values
of λ explicitly entering in the function. But it also reduces the thresholds of financing, here
w1D and w1P , these tend to decrease the function value. Therefore, the effect of λ on the
marginal value of cash is ambiguous.
We denote the discounted marginal value of cash to be




Suppose that given (p, λ), w∗1 (p, λ) is the one that satisfies mc1 (w∗1 (p, λ) ; p, λ) = 1.







, and λ > r, such w∗1
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exists and is unique. Moreover, because mc1 is increasing with p, w∗1 is decreasing with p.
For reasons similar to the marginal value of cash, financing costs λ have ambiguous effects
on w∗1.
B.2 Date-0 problem
For the date-0 problem. Then we have the following results:
Case 1 (Payout region) If w0 ≥ w0 (p, λ), then a firm pays out at date 0 and the optimal










Ev1 (w∗1 (p, λ))− 1− w∗1 (p, λ)
)
w0 (p, λ) ≡ i∗0 +
θ
2





Their properties are as follows. (1) Investment i∗0 is flat in p, because the right hand side
has derivative with respect to w1 being zero:
d
dp

















(2) w0 (p, λ) is decreasing with p as it is increasing with w∗1.
Case 2 (Financing region) Notice that mc1 ≤ 1+λ1+r , so as long as w1 ≥ 0, the firm has
no incentive to finance at date 0. Consider now the case w1 is zero:


















use Equation 2.4, the first order condition for investment, we have
i0 ≡
1





And a tradable firm resorts to external financing if and only if w0 < w0 ≡ i0 + θ2 i
2
0 − πP . In
this case, p has no effect on the optimal investment and the financing boundary. λ again has
ambiguous effects on investment because higher λ increases Ev1 (0) but at the same time
decreases the multiplier attached to Ev1 (0).
Case 3 (Cash inaction region) When w0 ∈ (w0, w0), a firm does not pay out or finance,
w1 is whatever left from w0 after operating and investment cash flows:




At the same time, we have the optimal investment:
i0 =
1












(1 + w1) (22)
Theses two equations putting together solves w1 and i0.
Instead of solving them explicitly, we can investigate their properties, we can implicitly
study their properties, especially their comparative statics to key parameters like w0, p, and








where Ev′′1 (w1) < 0 because v1s are concave. So the solution of w1 and i0 depends on a down-
ward slopping relationship defined by Equation (20) and an upward slopping relationship
defined by Equation (22).
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(1) Effects of w0. A higher w0 shifts the budget constraint, Equation (20) upward. At
the same time, if we use the FOC condition Equation (21) this is not directly affected by
w0, so So a higher w0 increases both the investment and future cash balance.
(2) Effects of p. Devaluation probability p does not directly affect Equation (20). A
higher p tends to increase both Ev1 (w1) and Ev′1 (w1) simultaneously,
dEv1 (w1)
dp
= v1 (w1D)− v1 (w1P ) > 0 ,
dEv′1 (w1)
dp
= v′1 (w1D)− v′1 (w1P ) > 0 .
But notice that v′1 (w1D)−v′1 (w1P ) is capped by λ, as the marginal value of cash is between
1 and 1 + λ in our model. But v1 (w1D) − v1 (w1P ) can be really large if the devaluation
increases the exporting firm revenues a lot. So generally, p increases Ev1 (w1) more than
Ev′1 (w1). As a result, a higher p increases the right-hand side of Equation (20). From Figure
(2.3) Panel (b), we know that p increases investment but decreases w1.
(3) Effects of λ are again ambiguous.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof. (Lemma 1) The first-order conditions for the producer’s value maximization are
















































Substitute this into the intermediary goods producer j’s monopoly pricing problem Equa-
tion (3.4), we have
Pjt = Pt = v, ∀j .
And then plug this into Equation (23), we have the optimal condition for Xjt as in Equation
(3.7).

















Substitute this back into first order conditions (23) and (24), we derive the results of
constant share of output for intermediate goods and labor. And then by the final goods




Kt + WtLt +
´ Nt
0 PjtXjtdj, we derive the share
of output for capital.
Proof. (Theorem 1) Given the guess in Equation (3.11), the semi-central planner’s problem
is equivalent to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB, hereafter. Time-
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have the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB, hereafter. Time-subscripts are


















































































To derive the boundary conditions, first notice that when N = 0 but K > 0, the
production of output is zero but the consumption is not zero since the semi-central planner
can still disinvest or short the capital and convert it back to consumption. As a result, the
semi-central planner is solving the following problem:








s.t. 0 = c+ i
dK
K




Guess z (n = 0) = z0, so JU (K, 0) =
(z0K)
1−γ















































K . One boundary condition is therefore z (0) = z0.






















N . So the other boundary condition is z (1) = z1.
Proof. (Asset Returns) Final goods producer l maximizes its firm value:
MtV
F (Klt;Kt, Nt) = max



































+ FKKlt (Λ (ilt)− δ) + FNNt (Θ (st)− φ)
Noticing that d̄lt = α (1− ξ) YltKlt − ilt, we take derivative with respect to ilt and have its
marginal q




Similar analysis in intermediate goods sector yields qN = 1Θ′(s) .
Claim 1. For an individual firm with (Klt, Nlt) which is a very small proportion of (Kt, Nt),
results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 still apply and so are other results.



































equation (3.2) and (3.3) .
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(PjltXjlt −Xjlt) djl −Nltslt
)
dτ
s.t. equation (3.3) .
Intuitively, things can be different if the firm itself requires a large proportion of Xjlt
compared to other firms. Only in this case the firm internalizes the monopolistic pricing on
its own technology. But we assume an individual accounts for only a very small proportion
of the economy, so the firm’s technology inputs are only a negligible share of all the demand
on its own technology. As a result, the monopolistic pricing rule (Pjlt, Xjlt) is the same as
in Lemma 1. Given this, the firm takes the prices of technology of itself and all others to
maximize its own value, so Lemma 2 also applies.
However, this cross section distribution is not a long run stationary distribution of indi-
vidual firms. Individual firm capital and technology grow at the same rate as the aggregate
capital and technology. Therefore, in the long run, all individuals firms must have the same
technology-capital ratio n as the aggregate economy. We offer on interpretation of our as-
sumption to ease this concern. We can assume that a continuous random reshuffle happens
in this economy. This changes the individual firm level technology-capital ratio but not the
aggregate one.
The individual firm objective function has homogeneous of degree 1, so its hybrid Tobin’s
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q is
ql (nl, n) ≡
Vl (Klt, Nlt;Kt, Nt)
Klt +Nlt
= (1− nl) qK (n) + nlqN (n)
and therefore the book-to-market ratio is
Klt
Vl (Klt, Nlt;Kt, Nt)
=
1− nl







The risk premium is
µl (nl, n) =
(1− nl) qK (n)σKSRK (n) + nlqN (n)σNSRN (n)
ql (nl, n)
.
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